Every Man A Tiger Revised

General Chuck Horner commanded the U.S. and allied air assets—the forces of a dozen nations—during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and was responsible for the design and execution of one of the most devastating air campaigns in history. Never before has the Gulf air war planning, a process filled with controversy and stormy personalities, been revealed in such rich, provocative detail. And in this revised edition, General Horner looks at the current Gulf conflict—and comments on the use of air power in Iraq today.

General Chuck Horner commanded the U.S. and allied air assets—the forces of a dozen nations—during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and was responsible for the design and execution of one of the most devastating air campaigns in history. Never before has the Gulf air war planning, a process filled with controversy and stormy personalities, been revealed in such rich, provocative detail. And in this revised edition, General Horner looks at the current Gulf conflict—and comments on the use of air power in Iraq today.

Covers contemporary authors and works that have enjoyed commercial success in the United States but are typically neglected by more "literary" guides. Provides high school and college students with everything they need to know to understand the authors and works of American popular fiction.

In the early hours of August 2, 1990, one hundred thousand mechanized troops of Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi army roared and rumbled across the border into Kuwait. By noon of August 4, the tiny, oil-rich nation belonged to the Iraqi invaders. When informed of Iraq’s unprovoked aggression, U.S. President George H. W. Bush said, “This will not stand.” In defense of Saudi Arabia and stability in the Middle East, he drew a line in the sand. Operating under the umbrella of the United Nations, President Bush assembled a multinational coalition and prepared for war. Over the next five months, Saddam refused to accept UN diplomatic efforts for Iraq’s complete withdrawal from Kuwait. He ignored a UN ultimatum to withdraw by January 15, 1991. On January 17, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Iraqis reaped the lethal consequences of their leader’s aggression and defiance. A huge coalition air armada struck Baghdad and ushered in a new era of high-tech warfare.

Notwithstanding the long shadows cast by Abu Ghraib and Guantnamo, the United States has been generally humane in the treatment of prisoners of war, reflecting a desire to both respect international law and provide the kind of treatment we would want for our own troops if captured. In this first comprehensive study of the subject in more than half a century, Paul Springer presents an in-depth look at American POW policy and practice from the Revolutionary War to the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Springer contends that our nation's creation and application of POW policy has been repeatedly improvised and haphazard, due in part to our military's understandable focus on defeating its enemies on the field of battle, rather than on making arrangements for their detention. That focus, however, has set the conditions for the military's chronic failure to record and learn from both successful and unsuccessful POW practices in previous wars. He also observes that American POW policy since World War II has largely sought to outsource POW operations to allied forces in order to retain American personnel for frontline service-outsourcing that has led to recent scandals. Focusing on each major war in turn, Springer examines the lessons learned and forgotten by American military and political leaders regarding our nation's experience in dealing with foreign POWs. He highlights the indignities of the Civil War, the efforts of the United States and its World War I allies to devise an effective POW policy, the unequal treatment of Japanese prisoners compared with that of German and Italian prisoners during World War II, and the impact of the Geneva Convention on the handling of Korean and Vietnamese captives. In bringing his coverage up to the so-called War on Terror, he also marks the nation's clear departure from previous practice-American treatment of POWs, once deemed exemplary by the Red Cross after Operation Desert Storm, has become controversial throughout the world. America's Captives provides a long-needed overarching framework for this important subject and makes a strong case that we should stop ignoring the lessons of the past and make the disposition of prisoners one of the standard components of our military education and training.

This book is a study of UW men's basketball fans during the 2001-2002 season and explores their proclivity to 'cheering for self' during basketball events. The term 'basketball event' is used rather than 'basketball game' to make clear that everything connected to and seen, heard, or experienced before, during and after a basketball game is included. The actual game itself is only part of the 'basketball event. An undercurrent runs throughout this participant observation mini-ethnography dealing with access, and the relative quality of that access, to basketball events being affected by ones age, class, race, and gender. The prominent role of advertising in shaping basketball events and helping to construct fans as consumers of products (both commercial and institutional) during the process of cheering for self is central to this idea. Cheering for self is the activity engaged in by individual fans after they find things to identify or connect with through personal investment. Fans cheer for self indirectly. Fans cheer for the team that they identify with. Through the process of cheering for self while attending the basketball event people are taught how to become fans, to consume a UW product--the basketball event and to consume advertisers' products. People have a tendency to spend their entire life trying to impress others.