Evolution And Design Of Institutions

This book comprises nine papers approaching designed institutions and their interplay with spontaneous institutions from various angles. While the evolution of spontaneous institutions is quite well understood in economic thinking, the development of consciously designed institutions has been examined much less. In new institutional economics, public choice, and law and economics the interaction between changing preferences and spontaneously evolving institutions on the one hand and the evolution of designed institutions (as, e.g., legal systems) on the other hand has largely been ignored. A number of top class international contributors have been assembled to study this phenomenon including Viktor Vanberg, Bruno Frey, Elinor Ostrom and Francesco Parisi.

This book challenges the widespread assumption of the incompatibility of evolution and the biological design argument. Kojonen analyzes the traditional arguments for incompatibility, and argues for salvaging the idea of design in a way that is fully compatible with evolutionary biology. Relating current views to their intellectual history, Kojonen steers a course that avoids common pitfalls such as the problems of the God of the gaps, the problem of natural evil, and the traditional Humean and Darwinian critiques. The resulting deconstruction of the opposition between evolution and design has the potential to transform this important debate.

Evolution is Nature’s design process. The natural world is full of wonderful examples of its successes, from engineering design feats such as powered flight, to the design of complex optical systems such as the mammalian eye, to the merely stunningly beautiful designs of orchids or birds of paradise. With increasing computational power, we are now able to simulate this process with greater fidelity, combining complex simulations with high-performance evolutionary algorithms to tackle problems that used to be impractical. This book showcases the state of the art in evolutionary algorithms for design. The chapters are organized by experts in the following fields: evolutionary design and "intelligent design" in biology, art, computational embryogeny, and engineering. The book will be of interest to researchers, practitioners and graduate students in natural computing, engineering design, biology and the creative arts.

The question of how cooperation and social order can evolve from a Hobbesian state of nature of a “war of all against all” has always been at the core of social scientific inquiry. Social dilemmas are the main analytical paradigm used by social scientists to explain competition, cooperation, and conflict in human groups. The formal analysis of social dilemmas allows for identifying the conditions under which cooperation evolves or unravels. This knowledge informs the design of institutions that promote cooperative behavior. Yet to gain practical relevance in policymaking and institutional design, predictions derived from the analysis of social dilemmas must be put to an empirical test. The collection of articles in this book gives an overview of state-of-the-art research on social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation. It covers theoretical contributions and offers a broad range of examples on how theoretical insights can be empirically verified and applied to cooperation problems in everyday life. By bringing together a group of distinguished scholars, the book fills an important gap in sociological scholarship and addresses some of the most interesting questions of human sociality.

Tackles one of the most enduring and contentious issues of positive political economy: common pool resource management.

Tang provides a coherent and systematic exploration of social evolution as a phenomenon and as a paradigm. He critically builds on existing discussions on social evolution, while drawing from a wide range of disciplines, including archaeology, evolutionary anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, the philosophy of social sciences, and evolutionary biology. Clarifying the relationship between biological evolution and social evolution, Tang lays bare the ontological and epistemological principles of the social evolutionary paradigm. He also presents operational principles and tools for deploying this paradigm to understand empirical puzzles about human society. This is a vital resource for students, practitioners, and philosophers of all social sciences.

Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions.

Challenging the belief that national security agencies work well, this book asks what forces shaped the initial design of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council in ways that meant they were handicapped from birth.