Failed Intervention

Providing an overview of researchers' and practitioners’ “confessions” on the fascinating phenomenon of failed or derailed organizational health and well-being interventions and contextualizing these confessions is the aim of this innovative volume. Organizational intervention failures, paradoxes and unexpected consequences can offer a lot of rich and extremely useful practical lessons on intervention design and implementation and possibly on the design of future research on organizational interventions. This volume presents lessons learned from derailed interventions and provides possible solutions to those tasked with implementing interventions. It provides an open, practical and solutions-focused account of researchers' and practitioners' experiences in implementing organizational interventions for health and well-being.

Contests to reorganize the international system after the Cold War agree on the security threat of failed states: this book asks why.

War, as Clausewitz reminds, is the most uncertain of human political and social activities. It also imposes burdens. In an alliance among states for the promotion of collective defense or security, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), burdens have to be shared. This study looks at the experience of the United States and other member states of NATO in four situations of multinational military intervention - Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, and South Asia - and considers the implications of nuclear arms reductions and nonproliferation for the US and NATO. Each case study represents an important period in the distribution of power, interest, and values, amounting to more than a sequential consideration of incidents of military intervention and/or conflict prevention. These politico-military challenges include a major coalition war, a traditional peacekeeping operation, an exercise in peace enforcement, and a conflict that combines counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism with stability and security operations.

Failed states are a huge problem in international relations, threatening world order in a number of ways. Conflicts in failed states often spill unto neighbouring states, failed states make for unreliable partners in the resolution of global social problems such as poverty and AIDS, and failed states magnify the effects of natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes. In response to the multiple threats posed by failed states, working states, sometimes acting alone sometimes in concert with others, have undertaken military operations, often under the rubric of humanitarian intervention. This book is a historical study of state failure, underdevelopment and foreign intervention in light of the Haitian experience with all three. Its main thesis is that state failure has been a recurring feature of Haitian political life for much of the country’s history, and this inability of the Haitians to craft a viable political order is at the heart of Haitian poverty and underdevelopment. Haitian state-making failure is underwritten by a complex array of deleterious local and external institutions, as well as natural constraints, including class, lack of elite cohesion, geography, population growth, the social origins of the Haitian polity, imperialism, and technology.

This Council Policy Initiative frames the issues raised by the "ClintonDoctrine", which advocates U.S. military intervention against large-scale humanitarian abuses. The introduction offers a hypothetical memorandum prepared by a national security adviser to the president, setting forth relevant precedents and context. Three perspectives on U.S. policy options follow, written as speeches theU.S. president might make to the American people: one, humanitarian intervention can serve national interests; two, humanitarian interests alone do not justify military intervention; and three, strategic interest and moral imperative must be balanced.

Military intervention in a conflict without a reasonable prospect of success is unjustifiable, especially when it is done in the name of humanity. Couched in the debate on the responsibility to protect civilians from violence and drawing on traditional 'just war' principles, the centralpremise of this book is that humanitarian military intervention can be justified as a policy option only if decision makers can be reasonably sure that intervention will do more good than harm. This book asks, 'Have past humanitarian military interventions been successful?' It defines success as saving lives and sets out a methodology for estimating the number of lives saved by a particular military intervention. Analysis of 17 military operations in six conflict areas that were thedefining cases of the 1990s-northern Iraq after the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor-shows that the majority were successful by this measure. In every conflict studied, however, some military interventions succeeded while others failed, raising the question, 'Why have some past interventions been more successful than others?' This book argues that the central factors determining whether a humanitarian intervention succeeds are theobjectives of the intervention and the military strategy employed by the intervening states. Four types of humanitarian military intervention are offered: helping to deliver emergency aid, protecting aid operations, saving the victims of violence and defeating the perpetrators of violence. Thefocus on strategy within these four types allows an exploration of the political and military dimensions of humanitarian intervention and highlights the advantages and disadvantages of each of the four types.Humanitarian military intervention is controversial. Scepticism is always in order about the need to use military force because the consequences can be so dire. Yet it has become equally controversial not to intervene when a government subjects its citizens to massive violation of their basic humanrights. This book recognizes the limits of humanitarian intervention but does not shy away from suggesting how military force can save lives in extreme circumstances.

Interventions in other states on behalf of their subject populations is often portrayed as a novel phenomenon in state practice, one which breaches the old principle of sovereignty. But is this practice really so new? Patrick Milton argues that such interventions for the protection of other rulers' subjects occurred frequently as far back as the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. It is the first detailed study of interventions in the early modern period and focusses on central Europe, in particular the Holy Roman Empire. It therefore challenges the common view that in the period after the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the legal scope for, and occurrence of, intervention, were reduced. The book sheds new light on the geopolitical and legal interconnections between the old German Reich and Europe, while also providing comparative insights. It investigates the norms inherent in central European interventions and thereby contributes to a better understanding of the political and legal culture of the Empire, while also assessing the relative importance of geopolitical considerations in such undertakings.

Includes chapters on curriculum based measurement and response to intervention, dynamic assessment and working memory, diagnostic accuracy and functional diagnosis, assessment of social behavior, assessment and intervention in reading and writing, and assessment and intervention in social and emotional competence and self-determination.