Foundations Of Modern Jurisprudence

A New Introduction to Jurisprudence takes one of the central problems of law and jurisprudence as its point of departure: what is the law? Adopting an intermediate position between legal positivism and natural law, this book reflects on the concept of ‘liberal democracy’ or ‘constitutional democracy’. In five chapters the book analyses: (i) the idea of higher law, (ii) liberal democracy as a legitimate model for the state, (iii) the separation of church and state or secularism as essential for the democratic state, (iv) the universality of higher law principles, (v) the history of modern political thought. This interdisciplinary approach to jurisprudence is relevant for legal scholars, philosophers, political theorists, public intellectuals, historians, and politicians.

The second edition of this book provides a concise and accessible guide to modern jurisprudence, offering an examination of the major theories as well as highlighting principal themes such as legality and justice. Together with new material, the second edition explores the historical developments and ideas that give modern thinking its distinctive shape. A key feature of the book is that readers are not simply presented with opposing theories, but are guided through the rival standpoints on the basis of a coherent line of reflection from which an overall sense of the subject can be gained. Chapters on Hart, Fuller, Rawls, Dworkin and Finnis take the reader systematically through the terrain of modern legal philosophy, tracing the issues back to fundamental questions of philosophy, and indicating lines of criticism that result in a fresh and original perspective on the subject.

This book differs from a standard jurisprudence text in that it examines law as a truth claim. Its major question is whether there are any eternal truths about the law, and, if so, whether they are knowable. Examples of questions discussed are: What is the correct foundation of law? Is it knowable? What is its source? What is the role of reason? Does reason exist apart from the "sources" of law, in the Cartesian tradition separating mind and body (res cogitans and res extensa)? What is the nature of the obligation to obey the law and how does it arise? What is the nature of the connection between law and morality? The first Western philosopher who explicitly asserted that law is a truth claim was Socrates. It is not surprising that other Western philosophers followed this path. This book traces the origins of this claim to some 500 years before Socrates walked the streets of Athens and then provides a compete historical profile over eight overlapping historical/philosophical periods: The pre-philosophical period, the presocratic period, the post-socratic period, the Roman period, the medieval/Christian period, the enlightenment period, the modern period and the postmodern period. These periods are intended to serve as analytical categories on which the organizational framework of the book rests. They also serve as evolutionary guideposts in an intellectual voyage, so that the reader gets an integrated picture of law not just as a social phenomenon but also as a truth claim, which, like all truth claims, can be critically evaluated. "This book is a brilliantly conceived and executed exploration of the extent to which law is rooted in "truth": rational truth, perceptive truth, and moral truth. This question is obviously foundational to law, whether law is viewed practically or theoretically. Through keen selection of materials and sharp commentary, Professor Dore presents - in one volume - the best current treatment of these issues from a broad historical perspective. It is an engaging and critical achievement, important reading for anyone interested in law as a human institution." -- Laura S. Underkuffler, J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School

This book provides a concise and accessible guide to modern jurisprudence, offering an examination of the major theories and systematic discussion of themes such as legality and justice. It gives readers a better understanding of the rival viewpoints by exploring the historical developments which give modern thinking its distinctive shape, and placing law in its political context. A key feature of the book is that readers are not simply presented with opposing theories, but are guided through the rival standpoints on the basis of a coherent line of reflection from which an overall sense of the subject can be gained. Chapters on Hart, Fuller, Rawls, Dworkin and Finnis take the reader systematically through the terrain of modern legal philosophy, tracing the issues back to fundamental questions of philosophy, and indicating lines of criticism that build to a fresh and original perspective on the subject.

Foundations of Jurisprudence is a dual-text critical edition, edited and translated by Sayyid Amjad H. Shah Naqavi, of Mabādiʾ al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm al-uṣūl, an introduction to Islamic legal principles (uṣūl al-fiqh) by the renowned Shīʿah jurist and theologian al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī.

Foundations of Public Law offers an account of the formation of the discipline of public law with a view to identifying its essential character, explaining its particular modes of operation, and specifying its unique task. Building on the framework first outlined in The Idea of Public Law (OUP, 2003), the book conceives public law broadly as a type of law that comes into existence as a consequence of the secularization, rationalization and positivization of the medieval idea of fundamental law. Formed as a result of the changes that give birth to the modern state, public law establishes the authority and legitimacy of modern governmental ordering. Public law today is a universal phenomenon, but its origins are European. Part I of the book examines the conditions of its formation, showing how much the concept borrowed from the refined debates of medieval jurists. Part II then examines the nature of public law. Drawing on a line of juristic inquiry that developed from the late sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries-extending from Bodin, Althusius, Lipsius, Grotius, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke and Pufendorf to the later works of Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, Smith and Hegel-it presents an account of public law as a special type of political reason. The remaining three Parts unpack the core elements of this concept: state, constitution, and government. By taking this broad approach to the subject, Professor Loughlin shows how, rather than being viewed as a limitation on power, law is better conceived as a means by which public power is generated. And by explaining the way that these core elements of state, constitution, and government were shaped respectively by the technological, bourgeois, and disciplinary revolutions of the sixteenth century through to the nineteenth century, he reveals a concept of public law of considerable ambiguity, complexity and resilience.