Functional Models Of Cognition

Our ontology as well as our grammar are, as Quine affirms, ineliminable parts of our conceptual contribution to our theory of the world. It seems impossible to think of enti ties, individuals and events without specifying and constructing, in advance, a specific language that must be used in order to speak about these same entities. We really know only insofar as we regiment our system of the world in a consistent and adequate way. At the level of proper nouns and existence functions we have, for instance, a standard form of a regimented language whose complementary apparatus consists of predicates, variables, quantifiers and truth functions. If, for instance, the discoveries in the field of Quantum Mechanics should oblige us, in the future, to abandon the traditional logic of truth functions, the very notion of existence, as established until now, will be chal lenged. These considerations, as developed by Quine, introduce us to a conceptual perspective like the "internal realist" perspective advocated by Putnam whose principal aim is, for cer tain aspects, to link the philosophical approaches developed respectively by Quine and Wittgenstein. Actually, Putnam conservatively extends the approach to the problem of ref erence outlined by Quine: in his opinion, to talk of "facts" without specifying the language to be used is to talk of nothing.

A unified, general theory of functional cognition is presented in this book. Its generality appears in the titles of the 13 chapters listed below. Its unity appears in the effectiveness of the same methods and concepts across all of these areas. Generality and unity both stem from the foundation axiom of purposiveness. The axiom of purposiveness has been made effective through capability for functional measurement of values, which embody the goal-directed character of purposiveness. This measurement capability is based on the general cognitive algebra established in information integration theory. Functional theory can thus be made precise and effective near the level of everyday phenomenology. The book is written at a relatively simple level, directed at readers in every field of psychology. Among its characteristics are: * self-sufficient theory near the level of everyday phenomenology; * foundation on structure of the internal world; and * solid grounding in experimental analysis.

An introduction to computational modeling for cognitive neuroscientists, covering both foundational work and recent developments. Cognitive neuroscientists need sophisticated conceptual tools to make sense of their field’s proliferation of novel theories, methods, and data. Computational modeling is such a tool, enabling researchers to turn theories into precise formulations. This book offers a mathematically gentle and theoretically unified introduction to modeling cognitive processes. Theoretical exercises of varying degrees of difficulty throughout help readers develop their modeling skills. After a general introduction to cognitive modeling and optimization, the book covers models of decision making; supervised learning algorithms, including Hebbian learning, delta rule, and backpropagation; the statistical model analysis methods of model parameter estimation and model evaluation; the three recent cognitive modeling approaches of reinforcement learning, unsupervised learning, and Bayesian models; and models of social interaction. All mathematical concepts are introduced gradually, with no background in advanced topics required. Hints and solutions for exercises and a glossary follow the main text. All code in the book is Python, with the Spyder editor in the Anaconda environment. A GitHub repository with Python files enables readers to access the computer code used and start programming themselves. The book is suitable as an introduction to modeling cognitive processes for students across a range of disciplines and as a reference for researchers interested in a broad overview.

The field of cognitive modeling has progressed beyond modeling cognition in the context of simple laboratory tasks and begun to attack the problem of modeling it in more complex, realistic environments, such as those studied by researchers in the field of human factors. The problems that the cognitive modeling community is tackling focus on modeling certain problems of communication and control that arise when integrating with the external environment factors such as implicit and explicit knowledge, emotion, cognition, and the cognitive system. These problems must be solved in order to produce integrated cognitive models of moderately complex tasks. Architectures of cognition in these tasks focus on the control of a central system, which includes control of the central processor itself, initiation of functional processes, such as visual search and memory retrieval, and harvesting the results of these functional processes. Because the control of the central system is conceptually different from the internal control required by individual functional processes, a complete architecture of cognition must incorporate two types of theories of control: Type 1 theories of the structure, functionality, and operation of the controller, and type 2 theories of the internal control of functional processes, including how and what they communicate to the controller. This book presents the current state of the art for both types of theories, as well as contrasts among current approaches to human-performance models. It will be an important resource for professional and student researchers in cognitive science, cognitive-engineering, and human-factors. Contributors: Kevin A. Gluck, Jerry T. Ball, Michael A. Krusmark, Richard W. Pew, Chris R. Sims, Vladislav D. Veksler, John R. Anderson, Ron Sun, Nicholas L. Cassimatis, Randy J. Brou, Andrew D. Egerton, Stephanie M. Doane, Christopher W. Myers, Hansjörg Neth, Jeremy M Wolfe, Marc Pomplun, Ronald A. Rensink, Hansjörg Neth, Chris R. Sims, Peter M. Todd, Lael J. Schooler, Wai-Tat Fu, Michael C. Mozer, Sachiko Kinoshita, Michael Shettel, Alex Kirlik, Vladislav D. Veksler, Michael J. Schoelles, Jerome R. Busemeyer, Eric Dimperio, Ryan K. Jessup, Jonathan Gratch, Stacy Marsella, Glenn Gunzelmann, Kevin A. Gluck, Scott Price, Hans P. A. Van Dongen, David F. Dinges, Frank E. Ritter, Andrew L. Reifers, Laura Cousino Klein, Michael J. Schoelles, Eva Hudlicka, Hansjörg Neth, Christopher W. Myers, Dana Ballard, Nathan Sprague, Laurence T. Maloney, Julia Trommershäuser, Michael S. Landy, A. Hornof, Michael J. Schoelles, David Kieras, Dario D. Salvucci, Niels Taatgen, Erik M. Altmann, Richard A. Carlson, Andrew Howes, Richard L. Lewis, Alonso Vera, Richard P. Cooper, and Michael D. Byrne

Connectionist Models of Cognition and Perception collects together refereed versions of twenty-three papers presented at the Seventh Neural Computation and Psychology Workshop (NCPW7). This workshop series is a well-established and unique forum that brings together researchers from such diverse disciplines as artificial intelligence, cognitive science, computer science, neurobiology, philosophy and psychology to discuss their latest work on connectionist modelling in psychology.The articles have the main theme of connectionist modelling of cognition and perception, and are organised into six sections, on: cell assemblies, representation, memory, perception, vision and language. This book is an invaluable resource for researchers interested in neural models of psychological phenomena.

A comprehensive introduction to the computational modeling of human cognition.

An accessible introduction to the principles of computational and mathematical modeling in psychology and cognitive science This practical and readable work provides students and researchers, who are new to cognitive modeling, with the background and core knowledge they need to interpret published reports, and develop and apply models of their own. The book is structured to help readers understand the logic of individual component techniques and their relationships to each other.