Genomic Surveillance And Pandemic Preparedness

Genomic Surveillance and Pandemic Preparedness offers practical, in-depth instruction in where, how, and why genomic surveillance may be applied. Drawing heavily from the learnings during the COVID-19 pandemic, this book covers different aspects of microbes with a focus on viral genome sequencing and analysis, implementation and inference of genomic surveillance, and global data sharing best practices for future pandemic preparedness. Here, more than a dozen international authors consider host and pathogen genome interaction, population-level prevalence, individual disease susceptibility and gene protection, pathogen mutation evolutionary dynamics, RNA modulation of infection, pathogen diversity, and the role of coinfections and comorbidities in disease severity. A wide range of examples, from bacterial pathogens to fungal and viral infections, with an emphasis on recent COVID-19 analysis, are discussed. Finally, the authors provide step-by-step instruction in experimental and computational approaches for genomic surveillance, including nucleic acid isolation, sequencing library preparation, functional sequencing analysis, and bioinformatics pipelines. Throughout this book, importance is placed on inference—moving from genomic sequencing to meaningful genomic surveillance that bolsters pandemic preparedness. Highlights different aspects of genomic surveillance, from theory to implementation to inferences Covers a broad range of infectious diseases, with emphasis on recent COVID-19 studies Shares methods and approaches for sequencing-based pathogen detection, diagnostics, and surveillance Facilitates international collaboration in drug and vaccine development

Policy considerations to strengthen genomic surveillance for pathogens with pandemic and epidemic potential is a support tool that provides key consideration and a proposed stepwise approach for countries to develop a national genomic surveillance strategy or action plan for pathogens with pandemic and epidemic potential. This document is intended for use by all stakeholders at the national and subnational level relevant to the development and implementation of the strategy or action plan, including health authorities, One Health partners, donors, public health officers, academia, the private sector and laboratory specialists.

The Global Genomic Surveillance Strategy for Pathogens with Pandemic and Epidemic Potential 2022-2032 provides a high-level unifying framework to leverage existing capacities, address barriers and strengthen the use of genomic surveillance in the detection, monitoring and response to public health threats. Genomic surveillance is part of the broader surveillance and laboratory system, and its implementation should reinforce end-to-end capacities including sample collection, diagnostics, data sharing and analysis. The strategy aims to facilitate the connectivity between different disease control programs and surveillance networks. This interoperability will strengthen the cross-cutting essential public health laboratory functions underpinning genomics holistically. The strategy articulates the overarching goal, objectives and strategic actions needed. These are dependent on commitments from countries, partners and WHO for their implementation.

The Global Genomic Surveillance Strategy for Pathogens with Pandemic and Epidemic Potential 2022-2032 provides a high-level unifying framework to leverage existing capacities, address barriers and strengthen the use of genomic surveillance in the detection, monitoring and response to public health threats. Genomic surveillance is part of the broader surveillance and laboratory system, and its implementation should reinforce end-to-end capacities including sample collection, diagnostics, data sharing and analysis. The strategy aims to facilitate the connectivity between different disease control programs and surveillance networks. This interoperability will strengthen the cross-cutting essential public health laboratory functions underpinning genomics holistically. The strategy articulates the overarching goal, objectives and strategic actions needed. These are dependent on commitments from countries, partners and WHO for their implementation.

Surveillance is a pillar of the public health response to epidemics and pandemics. Yet, gaps in surveillance, from the local to the global, continue to leave the world vulnerable to infectious hazards. To address these vulnerabilities, the health emergency preparedness, response, and resilience (HEPR) architecture calls for a new approach to future surveillance - collaborative surveillance - that aligns traditional tactics with new initiatives to safeguard health for all. This report reflects the input and advice on future surveillance of leading experts with different skills, worldviews and experiences who share a commitment to better prepare for future infectious hazards. It charts a course towards future surveillance and collaborative action.

SHORTLISTED FOR THE ORWELL PRIZE FOR POLITICAL WRITING 2022 THE TIMES SCIENCE BOOK OF THE YEAR A GUARDIAN BEST POLITICS BOOK OF THE YEAR A TOP 5 SUNDAY TIMES BESTSELLER *Revised and updated edition with new chapter reflecting on the impact of Covid-19 two years on, and what come next* Did the UK government really 'follow the science' throughout the Covid-19 pandemic, as it claims? As head of the Wellcome Trust, Jeremy Farrar was one of the first people in the world to hear about a mysterious new disease in China - and to learn it could readily spread between people. A member of the SAGE emergency committee, Farrar was a key figure in both the UK and the World Health Organization at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic amid great uncertainty, fast-moving situations and missed opportunities. Spike is his widely acclaimed inside story. His account casts light on the UK government's claims to be 'following the science' and is informed not just by Farrar's views but by interviews with other top scientists and political figures.

Public health officials and organizations around the world remain on high alert because of increasing concerns about the prospect of an influenza pandemic, which many experts believe to be inevitable. Moreover, recent problems with the availability and strain-specificity of vaccine for annual flu epidemics in some countries and the rise of pandemic strains of avian flu in disparate geographic regions have alarmed experts about the world's ability to prevent or contain a human pandemic. The workshop summary, The Threat of Pandemic Influenza: Are We Ready? addresses these urgent concerns. The report describes what steps the United States and other countries have taken thus far to prepare for the next outbreak of "killer flu." It also looks at gaps in readiness, including hospitals' inability to absorb a surge of patients and many nations' incapacity to monitor and detect flu outbreaks. The report points to the need for international agreements to share flu vaccine and antiviral stockpiles to ensure that the 88 percent of nations that cannot manufacture or stockpile these products have access to them. It chronicles the toll of the H5N1 strain of avian flu currently circulating among poultry in many parts of Asia, which now accounts for the culling of millions of birds and the death of at least 50 persons. And it compares the costs of preparations with the costs of illness and death that could arise during an outbreak.