Governing With Judges

This text elaborates a theory of constitutional politics. It examines the pan-European movement to confer constitutional review authority on a new governmental institution. Cases show how and to what extent legislative processes have been under the influence of consititutional judges.

Governing with Judges elaborates a theory of constitutional politics, the process through which the discursive practices and techniques of constitutional adjudication come to structure the work of governments, parliaments, judges, and administrators. Focusing on the cases of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the European Union, the book examines the sources and consequences of the pan-European movement to confer constitutional review authority on a new governmental institution, the constitutional court. Detailed case studies illustrate how and to what extent legislative processes have been placed under the influence of constitutional judges. In a growing number of policy domains, these judges function as powerful, adjunct legislators. As constitutional courts have consolidated their position as authoritative interpreters of the constitutional law, and especially of human rights provisions, the work of the judiciary, too, has gradually been constitutionalised. Today, ordinary judges seek to detect violations of the constitution in their application of the various codes, and to rewrite statutes that they deem unconstitutional. Constitutional politics have not only provoked the demise of traditional notions of parliamentary sovereignty, they have organized profound transformations in the very nature of European governance. Stone Sweet argues that constitutional adjudication constructs complex causal linkages between rule systems and normativity, on the onehand, and the strategic behaviour of individuals, on the other. The theory constitutes a novel synthesis of normative and rational approaches to politics. The book also addresses central questions raised by a wide range of ongoing theory projects, including the 'new institutionalism,'rational choice, principal-agent theories of delegation, and the new constitutionalism in Continental legal theory.

Regulating Judges presents a novel approach to judicial studies. It goes beyond the traditional clash of judicial independence versus judicial accountability. Drawing on regulatory theory, Richard Devlin and Adam Dodek argue that judicial regulation is multi-faceted and requires us to consider the complex interplay of values, institutional norms, procedures, resources and outcomes. Inspired by this conceptual framework, the book invites scholars from 19 jurisdictions to describe and critique the regulatory regimes for a variety of countries from around the world.

In Governing from the Bench, Emmett Macfarlane draws on interviews with current and former justices, law clerks, and other staff members of the court to shed light on the institution’s internal environment and decision-making processes. He explores the complex role of the Supreme Court as an institution; exposes the rules, conventions, and norms that shape and constrain its justices’ behavior; and situates the court in its broader governmental and societal context, as it relates to the elected branches of government, the media, and the public.

This publication is the latest in a series of steps to assist judges in carrying out their onerous responsibilities, and represents a concise yet comprehensive set of principles addressing the many difficult ethical issues that confront judges as they work and live in their communities. It also provides a sound basis to promote a more complete understanding of the role of the judge in society and of the ethical dilemmas they so often encounter. Sections of the publication cover the following: the purpose of the publication; judicial independence; integrity; diligence; equality; and impartiality, including judicial demeanour, civic and charitable activity, political activity, and conflicts of interest.