Gradual Failure The Air War Over North Vietnam 1965 1966

Of the many facets of the American war in Southeast Asia debated by U.S. authorities in Washington, by the military services and the public, none has proved more controversial than the air war against North Vietnam. The air war s inauguration with the nickname Rolling Thunder followed an eleven-year American effort to induce communist North Vietnam to sign a peace treaty without openly attacking its territory. Thus, Rolling Thunder was a new military program in what had been a relatively low-key attempt by the United States to win the war within South Vietnam against insurgent communist Viet Cong forces, aided and abetted by the north. The present volume covers the first phase of the Rolling Thunder campaign from March 1965 to late 1966. It begins with a description of the planning and execution of two initial limited air strikes, nicknamed Flaming Dart I and II. The Flaming Dart strikes were carried out against North Vietnam in February 1965 as the precursors to a regular, albeit limited, Rolling Thunder air program launched the following month. Before proceeding with an account of Rolling Thunder, its roots are traced in the events that compelled the United States to adopt an anti-communist containment policy in Southeast Asia after the defeat of French forces by the communist Vietnamese in May 1954.

The United States Air Force reached its nadir during the opening two years of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in North Vietnam. Never had the Air Force operated with so many restraints and to so little effect. These pages are painful but necessary reading for all who care about the nation's military power. Jacob Van Staaveren wrote this book in the 1970s near the end of his distinguished government service, which began during the occupation of Japan; the University of Washington Press published his book on that experience in 1995. He was an Air Force historian in Korea during the Korean War, and he began to write about the Vietnam War while it was still being fought. His volume on the air war in Laos was declassified and published in 1993. Now this volume on the air war in North Vietnam has also been declassified and is being published for the first time. Although he retired to McMinnville, Oregon, a number of years ago, we asked him to review the manuscript and make any changes that seemed warranted. For the most part, this is the book he wrote soon after the war.

The air war against North Vietnam was launched with the nickname Rolling Thunder. This book covers the first phase from March 1965 to late 1966. It begins with the planning and execution of two initial limited air strikes, nicknamed Flaming Dart I and II. As the air campaign gradually expanded and the permissible targeting area moved northward, many in Washington believed "air power" could never win the war in the north. The United States Air Force reached its nadir during the opening two years of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in North Vietnam. Never had the Air Force operated with so many restraints and to so little effect. These pages are painful but necessary reading for all who care about the nation's military power. The author served as a historian for over twenty years with the Air Force history program. (Originally published by the Air Force History and Museums Program)

This U.S. Air Force (USAF) publication, previously classified, tells the story of the opening two years of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in North Vietnam. The United States Air Force reached its nadir during this time. Never had the Air Force operated with so many restraints and to so little effect. These pages are painful but necessary reading for all who care about the nation's military power. Jacob Van Staaveren wrote this book in the 1970s near the end of his distinguished government service, which began during the occupation of Japan; the University of Washington Press published his book on that experience in 1995. He was an Air Force historian in Korea during the Korean War, and he began to write about the Vietnam War while it was still being fought. His volume on the air war in Laos was declassified and published in 1993. Now this volume on the air war in North Vietnam has also been declassified and is being published for the first time. Although he retired to McMinnville, Oregon, a number of years ago, we asked him to review the manuscript and make any changes that seemed warranted. For the most part, this is the book he wrote soon after the war. Chapter 1 - Flaming Dart * The United States Considers a Reprisal Attack * Flaming Dart I * Flaming Dart II * Chapter 2 - Planning * Paramilitary Activities and Bombing Plans * Rising Pressure from the Services to Bomb the North * Selecting Major North Vietnamese Targets * The Gulf of Tonkin Incident * Washington Forbids Follow-on Strikes * The Bien Hoa Incident * Beginning of a Limited, Two-Phase Program * Washington's Resistance to a Bombing Program Ends * Chapter 3 - Rolling Thunder Begins * The Air Challenge in North Vietnam * Command and Control of Air Resources * Preparations for a Rolling Thunder Program * The First Two Rolling Thunder Strikes * Initial Analysis of Aircraft Losses * An Air Strategy Emerges * Beginning of Weekly Rolling Thunder Strikes * Supporting Operations for Rolling Thunder * Contingency Planning for a Larger Conflict * Chapter 4 - Gradual Expansion * Further Decisions on Prosecuting the War * Initial Bridge-Busting Attacks * Countering the North's Air Defenses * The Honolulu Conference of April 1965 * Rolling Thunder's Moderate Pace Continues * Expansion of the Leaflet Program * Cautious Optimism on Bombing Results * Chapter 5 - Pause and Escalation * The First Bombing Halt * Rolling Thunder Resumes * Hanoi Expands its Air and Ground Defenses * The Air Force Organizes for Extended Combat * Washington Rejects a More Air-Oriented Strategy * Beginning of Two-Week Bombing Cycles * Chapter 6 - The SAM Threat * Initial anti-SAM Operations * The First Iron Hand Missions * Improving Detection of SAM Sites * Continued Air Strikes on non-SAM Targets * Establishment of a Target Intelligence Center * Deepening Service Concern about Strike Restrictions * The First SAM "Kill" and the anti-SAM Campaign in Late 1965 * The Air Force Increases its anti-SAM Capability * Chapter 7 - Toward the Thirty-seven Day Bombing Halt * Additional Interdiction Changes and Planning for Negotiation * Continuation of the Leaflet Program * Beginning of a Thirty-seven Day Bombing Halt * Chapter 8 - Diplomacy Fails * Hanoi Rejects American Peace Overtures * Debate on Resuming the Bombing * Rolling Thunder 48 * More Deployment Planning * Rolling Thunder 49 * Chapter 9 - Rolling Thunder 50 * Westmoreland's "Extended Battlefield" Area * Selecting Rolling Thunder 50 Targets * Rolling Thunder 50 Begins * The Air Munitions Shortage * Circumventing Bad Weather With MSQ-77 Radar * Countering the North's Air Defense System * Improving MiG Watch and Border Patrol * Chapter 10 - The Strikes * The POL Debate * Approval of a Few POL Strikes * Gradual Expansion of POL Strikes * Strikes on Major POL Sites Begin * The Honolulu Conference, July 1966 * The POL Strangulation Campaign * Chapter 11 - Summary and Reappraisa

Includes 3 maps and 40 photographs No experience etched itself more deeply into Air Force thinking than the air campaigns over North Vietnam. Two decades later in the deserts of Southwest Asia, American airmen were able to avoid the gradualism that cost so many lives and planes in the jungles of Southeast Asia. Readers should come away from this book with a sympathetic understanding of the men who bombed North Vietnam. Those airmen handled tough problems in ways that ultimately reshaped the Air Force into the effective instrument on display in the Gulf War. This book is a sequel to Jacob Van Staaveren’s Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam, 1965-1966, which we have also declassified and are publishing. Wayne Thompson tells how the Air Force used that failure to build a more capable service-a service which got a better opportunity to demonstrate the potential of air power in 1972. Dr. Thompson began to learn about his subject when he was an Army draftee assigned to an Air Force intelligence station in Taiwan during the Vietnam War. He took time out from writing To Hanoi and Back to serve in the Checkmate group that helped plan the Operation Desert Storm air campaign against Iraq. Later he visited Air Force pilots and commanders in Italy immediately after the Operation Deliberate Force air strikes in Bosnia. During Operation Allied Force over Serbia and its Kosovo province, he returned to Checkmate. Consequently, he is keenly aware of how much the Air Force has changed in some respects-how little in others. Although he pays ample attention to context, his book is about the Air Force. He has written a well-informed account that is both lively and thoughtful.

No experience etched itself more deeply into Air Force thinking than the air campaigns over North Vietnam. Two decades later in the deserts of Southwest Asia, American airmen were able to avoid the gradualism that cost so many lives and planes in the jungles of Southeast Asia. Readers should come away from this book with a sympathetic understanding of the men who bombed North Vietnam. Those airmen handled tough problems in ways that ultimately reshaped the Air Force into the effective instrument on display in the Gulf War. This book is a sequel to Jacob Van Staaveren's Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam, 1965-1966, which we have also declassified and are publishing. Wayne Thompson tells how the Air Force used that failure to build a more capable service-a service which got a better opportunity to demonstrate the potential of air power in 1972. Dr. Thompson began to learn about his subject when he was an Army draftee assigned to an Air Force intelligence station in Taiwan during the Vietnam War. He took time out from writing To Hanoi and Back to serve in the Checkmate group that helped plan the Operation Desert Storm air campaign against Iraq. Later he visited Air Force pilots and commanders in Italy immediately after the Operation Deliberate Force air strikes in Bosnia. During Operation Allied Force over Serbia and its Kosovo province, he returned to Checkmate. Consequently, he is keenly aware of how much the Air Force has changed in some respects-how little in others. Although he pays ample attention to context, his book is about the Air Force. He has written a well-informed account that is both lively and thoughtful.

No experience etched itself more deeply into Air Force thinking than the air campaigns over North Vietnam. Two decades later in the deserts of Southwest Asia, American airmen were able to avoid the gradualism that cost so many lives and planes in the jungles of Southeast Asia. Readers should come away from this book with a sympathetic understanding of the men who bombed North Vietnam. Those airmen handled tough problems in ways that ultimately reshaped the Air Force into the effective instrument on display in the Gulf War. This book is a sequel to Jacob Van Staaveren's Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam, 1965-1966, which we have also declassified and are publishing. Wayne Thompson tells how the Air Force used that failure to build a more capable service-a service which got a better opportunity to demonstrate the potential of air power in 1972. Dr. Thompson began to learn about his subject when he was an Army draftee assigned to an Air Force intelligence station in Taiwan during the Vietnam War. He took time out from writing To Hanoi and Back to serve in the Checkmate group that helped plan the Operation Desert Storm air campaign against Iraq. Later he visited Air Force pilots and commanders in Italy immediately after the Operation Deliberate Force air strikes in Bosnia. During Operation Allied Force over Serbia and its Kosovo province, he returned to Checkmate. Consequently, he is keenly aware of how much the Air Force has changed in some respects-how little in others. Although he pays ample attention to context, his book is about the Air Force. He has written a well-informed account that is both lively and thoughtful.

No experience etched itself more deeply into Air Force thinking than the air campaigns over North Vietnam. Two decades later in the deserts of Southwest Asia, American airmen were able to avoid the gradualism that cost so many lives and planes in the jungles of Southeast Asia. Readers should come away from this book with a sympathetic understanding of the men who bombed North Vietnam.Those airmen handled tough problems in ways that ultimately reshaped the Air Force into the effective instrument on display in the Gulf War.This book is a sequel to Jacob Van Staaveren's Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam, 1965–1966, which we have also declassified and are publishing. Wayne Thompson tells how the Air Force used that failure to build a more capable service—a service which got a better opportunity to demonstrate the potential of air power in 1972.Dr. Thompson began to learn about his subject when he was an Army draftee assigned to an Air Force intelligence station in Taiwan during theVietnam War. He took time out from writing To Hanoi and Back to serve in the Checkmate group that helped plan the Operation Desert Storm air campaign against Iraq. Later he visited Air Force pilots and commanders in Italy immediately after the Operation Deliberate Force air strikes in Bosnia. During Operation Allied Force over Serbia and its Kosovo province, he returned toCheckmate. Consequently, he is keenly aware of how much the Air Force has changed in some respects—how little in others. Although he pays ample attention to context, his book is about the Air Force. He has written a well-informed account that is both lively and thoughtful.