Heterogeneity Of Bank Risk Weights In The Eu

Concerns about excessive variability in bank risk weights have prompted their review by regulators. This paper provides prima facie evidence on the extent of risk weight heterogeneity across broad asset classes and by country of counterparty for major banks in the European Union using internal models. It also finds that corporate risk weights are sensitive to the riskiness of an average representative firm, but not to a market indicator of a firm’s probablity of default. Under plausible yet severe hypothetical scenarios for harmonized risk weights, counterfactual capital ratios would decline significantly for some banks, but they would not experience a shortfall relative to Basel III’s minimum requirements. This, however, does not preclude falling short of meeting additional national supervisory capital requirements.

In this paper, we provide an overview of the concerns surrounding the variations in the calculation of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) across banks and jurisdictions and how this might undermine the Basel III capital adequacy framework. We discuss the key drivers behind the differences in these calculations, drawing upon a sample of systemically important banks from Europe, North America, and Asia Pacific. We then discuss a range of policy options that could be explored to fix the actual and perceived problems with RWAs, and improve the use of risk-sensitive capital ratios.

This paper evaluates the impact of the crisis on European banks’ capital under a range of macroeconomic scenarios, using granular data on the size and riskiness of sectoral exposures. The analysis incorporates the important role of pandemic-related policy support, including not only regulatory relief for banks, but also policies to support businesses and households, which act to shield the financial sector from the real economic shock.

Using data on commercial banks in the United States and Europe, this paper analyses the impact of the new Basel III capital and liquidity regulation on bank-lending following the 2008 financial crisis. We find that U.S. banks reinforce their risk absorption capacities when expanding their credit activities. Capital ratios have significant, negative impacts on bank-retail-and-other-lending-growth for large European banks in the context of deleveraging and the “credit crunch” in Europe over the post-2008 financial crisis period. Additionally, liquidity indicators have positive but perverse effects on bank-lending-growth, which supports the need to consider heterogeneous banks’ characteristics and behaviors when implementing new regulatory policies.

This paper presents a novel approach to investigate and model the network of euro area banks’ large exposures within the global banking system. Drawing on a unique dataset, the paper documents the degree of interconnectedness and systemic risk of the euro area banking system based on bilateral linkages. We develop a Contagion Mapping model fully calibrated with bank-level data to study the contagion potential of an exogenous shock via credit and funding risks. We find that tipping points shifting the euro area banking system from a less vulnerable state to a highly vulnerable state are a non-linear function of the combination of network structures and bank-specific characteristics.

We study how investors account for the riskiness of banks' risk-weighted assets (RWA) by examining the determinants of stock returns and market measures of risk. We find that banks with higher RWA had lower stock returns over the US and European crises. This relationship is weaker in Europe where banks can use Basel II internal risk models. For large banks, investors paid less attention to RWA and rewarded instead lower wholesale funding and better asset quality. RWA do not, in general, predict market measures of risk although there is evidence of a positive relationship before the US crisis which becomes negative afterwards.

This Technical Note reviews the stability of Luxembourg’s financial system. The financial soundness indicators for Luxembourg’s financial system, which plays a key role in the intermediation of financial capital, have remained relatively robust in recent years. Household stress test results suggest that households’ solvency would be significantly affected by a drop in income and housing prices and a rise in unemployment. Bank liquidity displays broad resilience, but would be weakened should wholesale funding dry up or funding stress emerge in foreign currencies. Banks were found to be less vulnerable to direct contagion risk through bilateral exposure; however, most banks have considerable cross-border exposure.