History Of Operations Research In The United States Army V 3 1973 1995

This second of three volumes on the history of operations research identifies, describes, and evaluates the ideas, people, organizations, and events that influenced the development of ORSA in the Army from the inauguration of President Kennedy in 1961 to the withdrawal of U.S.T The last official campaign of the United States Army in Vietnam ended on 28 January 1973. By that date most Army combat units and advisers had been withdrawn from South Vietnam, leaving only a small contingent of combat support and combat service support troops who were soon redeployed to the United States. Thus ended one of the most eventful eras in U.S. military history. Indeed, the period from 1961 to 1973 was a tumultuous era in world history, an era marked by worldwide political upheaval, growing distrust of government, and alienation of the young from the hitherto accepted standards and values of political, economic, social, and cultural behavior. The 1960s and early 1970s were also a time of great growth and change in the Army analytical community, a time in which Army operations research and systems analysis (ORSA) managers and analysts faced a number of difficult challenges. The McNamara revolution in defense management emphasized quantitative methods and systematic analysis, and the evergrowing complexities of structuring military forces for the future as well as the problems of fighting a long war in Southeast Asia summoned a maximum effort from Army analysts. The use of ORSA techniques expanded into new areas, such as management and force planning. The reliance on one or two primary Army ORSA contractors was abandoned in favor of a wider range of private contractors and greater reliance on in-house Army ORSA organizations that grew substantially. The increased demand for trained ORSA managers and analysts prompted a number of studies that focused on the Army's need for systematic analysis and ORSA personnel. As a result, a professional program for the selection, training, and utilization of Army officer ORSA specialists was introduced, and measures were taken to improve the preparation and utilization of the Army's civilian analysts as well. The use of ORSA methods became a generally accepted part of the research and development and combat development processes, and Army ORSA analysts participated in the major studies of the day, particularly those dealing with the two most prominent military issues of the 1960s, counterinsurgency and airmobility, and applied their skills to solve the practical problems encountered in the war against the Communists in Southeast Asia.forces from Vietnam in 1973.

This second of three volumes on the history of operations research identifies, describes, and evaluates the ideas, people, organizations, and events that influenced the development of ORSA in the Army from the inauguration of President Kennedy in 1961 to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam in 1973.

Operations research (OR) emerged during World War II as an important means of assisting civilian and military leaders in making scienti?cally sound improvements in the design and performance of weapons and equipment. OR techniques were soon extended to address questions of tactics and strategy during the war and, after the war, to matters of high-level political and economic policy. Until now, the story of why and how the U.S. Army used OR has remained relatively obscure, surviving only in a few scattered o?cial documents, in the memories of those who participated, and in a number of notes and articles that have been published about selected topics on military operations research. However, none of those materials amounts to a comprehensive, coherent history. In this, the ? rst of three planned volumes, Dr. Charles R. Shrader has for the ?rst time drawn together the scattered threads and woven them into a well-focused historical narrative that describes the evolution of OR in the U.S. Army, from its origins in World War II to the early 1960s. He has done an admirable job of ferreting out the surviving evidence, shaping it into an understandable narrative, and placing it within the context of the overall development of American military institutions. Often working with only sparse and incomplete materials, he has managed to provide a comprehensive history of OR in the U.S. Army that o?ers important insights into the natural tension between military leaders and civilian scientists, the establishment and growth of Army OR organizations, the use (and abuse) of OR techniques, and, of course, the many important contributions that OR managers and analysts have made to the growth and improvement of the Army since 1942. In this volume, Dr. Shrader carries the story up to 1962, the beginning of the McNamara era and of America’s long involvement in Vietnam. The subsequent volumes will cover Army OR during the McNamara era; its application in support of military operations in Vietnam; and its significant contributions to the Army’s post–Vietnam recovery and reorganization, ultimately leading to a victory (after only 100 hours of combat) in the first Gulf War in 1991 and the emergence of the U.S. Army as second to none in modern weaponry, tactical prowess, and strategic vision.

NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price This second of three volumes on the history of operations research identifies, describes, and evaluates the ideas, people, organizations, and events that influenced the development of ORSA in the Army from the inauguration of President Kennedy in 1961 to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam in 1973. Related products: History of Operations Research in the United States Army, V. I: 1942-62 -- Print Paperback format --can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00433-0 History of Operations Research in the United States Army, V. 3, 1973-1995 --Print Paperback format -- can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00473-9"

Operations research (OR) emerged during World War II as an important means of assisting civilian and military leaders in making scienti?cally sound improvements in the design and performance of weapons and equipment. OR techniques were soon extended to address questions of tactics and strategy during the war and, after the war, to matters of high-level political and economic policy. Until now, the story of why and how the U.S. Army used OR has remained relatively obscure, surviving only in a few scattered o?cial documents, in the memories of those who participated, and in a number of notes and articles that have been published about selected topics on military operations research. However, none of those materials amounts to a comprehensive, coherent history. In this, the ? rst of three planned volumes, Dr. Charles R. Shrader has for the ?rst time drawn together the scattered threads and woven them into a well-focused historical narrative that describes the evolution of OR in the U.S. Army, from its origins in World War II to the early 1960s. He has done an admirable job of ferreting out the surviving evidence, shaping it into an understandable narrative, and placing it within the context of the overall development of American military institutions. Often working with only sparse and incomplete materials, he has managed to provide a comprehensive history of OR in the U.S. Army that o?ers important insights into the natural tension between military leaders and civilian scientists, the establishment and growth of Army OR organizations, the use (and abuse) of OR techniques, and, of course, the many important contributions that OR managers and analysts have made to the growth and improvement of the Army since 1942. In this volume, Dr. Shrader carries the story up to 1962, the beginning of the McNamara era and of America’s long involvement in Vietnam. The subsequent volumes will cover Army OR during the McNamara era; its application in support of military operations in Vietnam; and its significant contributions to the Army’s post–Vietnam recovery and reorganization, ultimately leading to a victory (after only 100 hours of combat) in the first Gulf War in 1991 and the emergence of the U.S. Army as second to none in modern weaponry, tactical prowess, and strategic vision.