How Russia Became A Market Economy

This book provides the most detailed and insightful assessment to date of the Russian transformation from a socialist economy to a market economy. As a longtime specialist on the Soviet economy and an economic adviser to the Russian government during most of this period, Aslund analyzes the original intentions of the government, what they were to accomplish, and why they fell short. According to Aslund, the Russian transformation has not been too quick, as many maintain, but rather too slow.

The breakup of the Soviet Union and the attempted transformation of Russia into a democracy and a market economy constitute one of the most significant events of our time. A transformation could hardly be greater, yet judgments vary from failure to substantial achievement. This book clarifies that Russia has actually become a market economy. Anders Aslund provides the most detailed and insightful assessment to date of the Russian transformation from a socialist economy to a market economy. His account covers the period from the formation of the Russian reform government in November 1991 through the autumn of 1994. He discusses the preconditions of economic reform, the formation of a reform program, relations with other former Soviet republics, liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, and privatization. The final chapter evaluates the transformation. As a longtime specialist on the Soviet economy and an economic adviser to the Russian government during most of this period, Aslund analyzes the original intentions of the government, what they were able to accomplish, and why they fell short. The book's general conclusion is that the greater the speed, consistency, and determination, the more impressive the results. The main threat to the reform process was the resistance from the state enterprise managers, who wanted to enrich themselves at the expense of the state. The reformers could only win if they acted swiftly and firmly. According to Aslund, the Russian transformation has not been too quick, as many maintain, but rather too slow.

Here, for the first time, two of Russia's leading economists provide an authoritative analysis of the transition to a democratic market economy that has taken place in Russia since 1990. Serguey Braguinsky, a Russian economist with extensive international experience, and Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the liberal "Yabloko" party and a major public figure in Russia, focus on the institutions that are critical to a successful transition and the economic incentives needed to make these institutions work. Finally, they discuss in detail the specific components of the economic processes that are necessary for economic transition in general and they draw lessons that can be applied to other nations dealing with similar transitions. In 1989, Grigory Yavlinsky became a member of the Commission for Economic Reform and wrote the groundbreaking "500 Day Plan," which outlined the first program of transition to a market economy. Two years later, he co-wrote the program of strategic cooperation between the Soviet government and the West (known as the "Grand Bargain"). Here he and Serguey Braguinsky examine what went wrong with the Russian plan--and what is needed to put the economy back on the road to becoming a fully functioning market economy. The first section of the book presents a new interpretation of the political economy of the socialist state and the incentives and institutions that underpin it, with an emphasis on the present Russian situation. The second part deals with the political economy of "spontaneous transition" and the inefficiencies inherent in economies that lack the organizations and institutions that inhere in established Western democratic economies. In the final section, the authors present a program of actions to put the economic transition in Russia back on track, based on their assessment of the actual current state of both the economy and the government. Their approach is unique in emphasizing organizational evolution at the microeconomic level instead of stressing macroeconomic issues such as money and inflation that are at the heart of most arguments. This is a thoughtful and thought-provoking book and one that will be widely discussed and debated.

�What was the revolution of the 1990s for Russia?� writes Yegor Gaidar. �Was it a hard but salutary road toward the creation of a workable democracy with workable markets, a way for Russia to develop and survive in the twenty-first century? Or was it the prologue to another closed, stultified regime marching to the music of old myths and anthems?� Few are as well-equipped to consider this matter as Gaidar, noted Russian economist and prime minister during Boris Yeltsin�s early years as post-Soviet Russia�s leader. He is also a student of the socioeconomic history of his country, which he traces in the book with skill and insight. Both Eastern and Western influences are examined in light of Russia�s particular challenges and choices over the years and the kinds of institutions it developed as a result. The author focuses on comparing attitudes toward private property and the persistence of Eastern forms of landownership. He sees Marx�s concept of the �Asiatic mode of production� as unfortunately still reflecting Russian realities. Gaidar�s interesting analysis of Western development offers a perspective on private ownership of property in relation to government ownership that explains a lot about the evolution of socioeconomic and political systems East and West. �If our country begins yet another cycle of privatization of authority and office,� concludes the author, �it will shut itself off from the First World. If we can open up this socioeconomic space, if we can let liberal democratic evolution take its course, then Russia will have every chance in the world to take its rightful place among twenty-first-century civilizations.� State and Evolution was published in Russia in 1994. The English edition includes a new preface discussing the significance of events since that time.

Russia's Market Economy is a seminal account of Russia's transition to the market, its tortuous development as a fledgling market economy through the 1990s, right through to its spectacular collapse in August 1998. Rather than beginning with the economic collapse, the book traces the historical mismanagement of Russian wealth through to the Soviet command economy, and on to Gorbachev. Stefan Hedlund finally discusses what lessons should be learned from the damage inflicted on the Russian economy, as well as its social, legal and political infrastructure, by the race of reform.

This book captures the essence of the period when Russians and Americans collaborated in creating new structures of government and new businesses in completely uncharted conditions. It presents the experiences of key American participants in late Soviet and post-Soviet Russia during a time when Americans thought anything was possible in Russia. Using an analytic framework of foreground ideas (Western, liberal, and neo-liberal) and background forces (Russian cultural influences, nationalism, and lingering Soviet ideology), it examines the ideas and intentions of the people involved. First-person interviews with consultants, businesspeople, and citizen diplomats help capture the essence of this turbulent reform period through the eyes of those who experienced it and present the importance of this experience as a piece of the puzzle in understanding contemporary Russia. It will be an invaluable resource for students of international relations, Russian Studies majors, researchers, and members of the general public who are trying to understand the evolution of the current antagonism between the United States and Russia.

A penetrating look into the extreme plutocracy Vladimir Putin has created and its implications for Russia’s future This insightful study explores how the economic system Vladimir Putin has developed in Russia works to consolidate control over the country. By appointing his close associates as heads of state enterprises and by giving control of the FSB and the judiciary to his friends from the KGB, he has enriched his business friends from Saint Petersburg with preferential government deals. Thus, Putin has created a super wealthy and loyal plutocracy that owes its existence to authoritarianism. Much of this wealth has been hidden in offshore havens in the United States and the United Kingdom, where companies with anonymous owners and black money transfers are allowed to thrive. Though beneficial to a select few, this system has left Russia’s economy in untenable stagnation, which Putin has tried to mask through military might.