Human Identity And Bioethics

When philosophers address personal identity, they usually explore numerical identity. When non-philosophers address personal identity, they often have in mind narrative identity. This book develops accounts of both senses of identity, arguing that both are normatively important, and is unique in its exploration of a wide range of issues in bioethics through the lens of identity. Defending a biological view of our numerical identity and a framework for understanding narrative identity, David DeGrazia investigates various issues for which considerations of identity prove critical.

This collection of essays examines alternative theories about persons and personal identity at the beginning and end of life. The contributions seek to answer the important question, When does a person begin and cease to exist? While the concept of personhood has figured prominently in contemporary debates over abortion and stem cell research, this is the first anthology to combine in a single volume both various theoretical perspectives and consideration of the more practical, bioethical issues. These essays are gathered from a rich tradition of philosophical and religious readings on the subject, from René Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy and John Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding to more modern discussions on persons living with dementia and on the definition of death. Organized chronologically, these works address three broad topics: theories of persons, persons at the beginning of life, and persons at the end of life. The first section offers differing views on the nature of persons that have influenced ontological and bioethical discussions of the subject. Essays in the next section track the debate over abortion and the moral status of embryos. The last section explores alternative definitions and determinations of death. Defining the Beginning and End of Life is a useful resource for examining the connection between theoretical and bioethical considerations about persons. It will engage bioethicists and philosophers as well as inform policy and law regarding issues at the beginning and end of life.

American law assumes that individuals are autonomous, defined by their capacity to choose, and not obligated to each other. But our bodies make us vulnerable and dependent, and the law leaves the weakest on their own. O. Carter Snead argues for a paradigm that recognizes embodiment, enabling law and policy to provide for the care that people need.

Just what is a human being? Who counts? The answers to these questions are crucial when one is faced with the ethical issue of taking human life. In this affirmation of the intrinsic personal dignity and inviolability of every human individual, John Kavanaugh, S. J., denies that it can ever be moral to intentionally kill another. Today in every corner of the world men and women are willing to kill others in the name of "realism" and under the guise of race, class, quality of life, sex, property, nationalism, security, or religion. We justify these killings by either excluding certain humans from our definition of personhood or by invoking a greater good or more pressing value. Kavanaugh contends that neither alternative is acceptable. He formulates an ethics that opposes the intentional killing not only of medically "marginal" humans but also of depersonalized or criminalized enemies. Offering a philosophy of the person that embraces the undeveloped, the wounded, and the dying, he proposes ways to recover a personal ethical stance in a global society that increasingly devalues the individual. Kavanaugh discusses the work of a range of philosophers, artists, and activists from Richard Rorty and Søren Kierkegaard to Albert Camus and Woody Allen, from Mother Teresa to Jack Kevorkian. His approach is in stark contrast to that of writer Peter Singer and others who believe that not all human life has intrinsic moral worth. It will challenge philosophers, students of ethics, and anyone concerned about the depersonalization of contemporary life.

Offers a compelling theory of bioethics, covering medical assistance-in-dying, the right to health care, abortion, animal research, and the definition of death.

This book brings together the debate concerning personal identity (in metaphysics) and central topics in biomedical ethics (conception of birth and death; autonomy, living wills and paternalism). Based on a metaphysical account of personal identity in the sense of persistence and conditions for human beings, conceptions for beginning of life, and death are developed. Based on a biographical account of personality, normative questions concerning autonomy, euthanasia, living wills and medical paternalism are dealt with. By these means the book shows that “personal identity” has different meanings which have to be distinguished so that human persistence and personality can be used to deal with central questions in biomedical ethics.

This collection of essays examines alternative theories about persons and personal identity at the beginning and end of life. The contributions seek to answer the important question, When does a person begin and cease to exist? While the concept of personhood has figured prominently in contemporary debates over abortion and stem cell research, this is the first anthology to combine in a single volume both various theoretical perspectives and consideration of the more practical, bioethical issues. These essays are gathered from a rich tradition of philosophical and religious readings on the subject, from René Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy and John Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding to more modern discussions on persons living with dementia and on the definition of death. Organized chronologically, these works address three broad topics: theories of persons, persons at the beginning of life, and persons at the end of life. The first section offers differing views on the nature of persons that have influenced ontological and bioethical discussions of the subject. Essays in the next section track the debate over abortion and the moral status of embryos. The last section explores alternative definitions and determinations of death. Defining the Beginning and End of Life is a useful resource for examining the connection between theoretical and bioethical considerations about persons. It will engage bioethicists and philosophers as well as inform policy and law regarding issues at the beginning and end of life.

The social practice of forming, shaping, expressing, contesting, and maintaining personal identities makes human interaction, and therefore society, possible. Our identities give us our sense of how we are supposed to act and how we may or must treat others, so how we hold each other in our identities is of crucial moral importance. To hold someone in her identity is to treat her according to the stories one uses to make sense of who she is. Done well, holding allows individuals to flourish personally and in their interactions with others; done poorly, it diminishes their self-respect and restricts their participation in social life. If the identity is to represent accurately the person who bears it, the tissue of stories that constitute it must continue to change as the person grows and changes. Here, good holding is a matter of retaining the stories that still depict the person but letting go of the ones that no longer do. The book begins with a puzzling instance of personhood, where the work of holding someone in her identity is tragically one-sided. It then traces this work of holding and letting go over the human life span, paying special attention to its implications for bioethics. A pregnant woman starts to call her fetus into personhood. Children develop their moral agency as they learn to hold themselves and others in their identities. Ordinary adults hold and let go, sometimes well and sometimes badly. People bearing damaged or liminal identities leave others uncertain how to hold and what to let go. Identities are called into question at the end of life, and persist after the person has died. In all, the book offers a glimpse into a fascinating moral terrain that is ripe for philosophical exploration.