Personal Identity As A Principle Of Biomedical Ethics

This book brings together the debate concerning personal identity (in metaphysics) and central topics in biomedical ethics (conception of birth and death; autonomy, living wills and paternalism). Based on a metaphysical account of personal identity in the sense of persistence and conditions for human beings, conceptions for beginning of life, and death are developed. Based on a biographical account of personality, normative questions concerning autonomy, euthanasia, living wills and medical paternalism are dealt with. By these means the book shows that “personal identity” has different meanings which have to be distinguished so that human persistence and personality can be used to deal with central questions in biomedical ethics.

When philosophers address personal identity, they usually explore numerical identity: what are the criteria for a person's continuing existence? When non-philosophers address personal identity, they often have in mind narrative identity: Which characteristics of a particular person are salient to her self-conception? This book develops accounts of both senses of identity, arguing that both are normatively important, and is unique in its exploration of a range of issues in bioethics through the lens of identity. Defending a biological view of our numerical identity and a framework for understanding narrative identity, DeGrazia investigates various issues for which considerations of identity prove critical: the definition of death; the authority of advance directives in cases of severe dementia; the use of enhancement technologies; prenatal genetic interventions; and certain types of reproductive choices. He demonstrates the power of personal identity theory to illuminate issues in bioethics as they bring philosophical theory to life.

This collection of essays examines alternative theories about persons and personal identity at the beginning and end of life. The contributions seek to answer the important question, When does a person begin and cease to exist? While the concept of personhood has figured prominently in contemporary debates over abortion and stem cell research, this is the first anthology to combine in a single volume both various theoretical perspectives and consideration of the more practical, bioethical issues. These essays are gathered from a rich tradition of philosophical and religious readings on the subject, from René Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy and John Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding to more modern discussions on persons living with dementia and on the definition of death. Organized chronologically, these works address three broad topics: theories of persons, persons at the beginning of life, and persons at the end of life. The first section offers differing views on the nature of persons that have influenced ontological and bioethical discussions of the subject. Essays in the next section track the debate over abortion and the moral status of embryos. The last section explores alternative definitions and determinations of death. Defining the Beginning and End of Life is a useful resource for examining the connection between theoretical and bioethical considerations about persons. It will engage bioethicists and philosophers as well as inform policy and law regarding issues at the beginning and end of life.

This collection of original essays explores the social and relational dimensions of individual autonomy. Rejecting the feminist charge that autonomy is inherently masculinist, the contributors draw on feminist critiques of autonomy to challenge and enrich contemporary philosophical debates about agency, identity, and moral responsibility. The essays analyze the complex ways in which oppression can impair an agent's capacity for autonomy, and investigate connections, neglected by standard accounts, between autonomy and other aspects of the agent, including self-conception, self-worth, memory, and the imagination.

D., Colgate University--John C. Racy "Journal of Clinical Psychiatry"

This book engages in a critical discussion on how to respect and promote patients’ autonomy in difficult cases such as palliative care and end-of-life decisions. These cases pose specific epistemic, normative, and practical problems, and the book elucidates the connection between the practical implications of the theoretical debate on respecting autonomy, on the one hand, and specific questions and challenges that arise in medical practice, on the other hand. Given that the idea of personal autonomy includes the notion of authenticity as one of its core components, the book explicitly includes discussions on underlying theories of the self. In doing so, it brings together original contributions and novel insights for “applied” scenarios based on interdisciplinary collaboration between German and Serbian scholars from philosophy, sociology, and law. It is of benefit to anyone cherishing autonomy in medical ethics and medical practice.

This book offers a systematic analysis of the moral principles that should apply to biomedicine. We understand "biomedical ethics" as one type of applied ethics. In our discussions of ethical theory per se, we offer anaylses of levels of moral deliberation and justification and of the ways two major approaches interpret principles, rules, and judgments. The systematic core of the book presents four fundamental moral principles--autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice.

The relationship between personal identity and ethics remains on of the most intriguing yet vexing issues in philosophy. It is commonplace to hold that moral responsibility for past actions requires that the responsible agent is in some respect identical to the agent who performed the action. Is this true? On the other hand, can ethics constrain our account of personal identity? Do the practical requirements of moral theory commit us to the view that persons do remain identical over time? For example, does the moral status of abortion or stem cell research depend on whether personal identity is based on psychological or biological properties? Or is it the case that personal identity is not, in fact, relevant to ethics? Personal Identity and Ethics provides the first comprehensive examination of these issues. Topics include personal identity and prudential rationality; personal identity’s significance for moral responsibility and ethical theory; and the practical consequences of accounts of personal identity for issues such as abortion, stem cell research, cloning, advance directives, population ethics, multiple personality disorder, and the definition of death.