Illuminating Tomorrow S War

Considers how the information revolution is creating a revolution in military affairs that will fundamentally change the way U.S. forces fight . . . supported by a system of systemsÓ that will give U.S. forces superior battlespace awareness. Chapters: precision-guided munitions; precision location; a world of sensors; the potential proliferation of the revolution in military affairs; standoff warfare; coalition structures; prospects for the grid; defining the grid; knowledge maintenance; access; security; difficulties of top-down integration; cutting to the core; planning, experimentation, & technology development; & opportunities for bottom-up integration.

In the weeks leading up to Desert Storm, anxious analysts tried to forecast the course of war by counting what the coalition and Iraq each brought to the battlefield: they have this many men, we have that many men; they have this much armor, we have that much armor; their air fleet is this big; ours is that big. Few doubted which side would prevail in battle, but many analysts were not so sure the war could be won swiftly and with acceptable casualties. Looking back, their worries seem baseless and their correlation of force calculations almost quaint. Indeed, the coalition may have carried the day almost as well with only half the forces. By the time the planes came back from Baghdad, Iraq was blind, but the coalition could see. That, plus precision weapons (and people trained to use them) determined the outcome. All else was detail.- The Gulf War suggested that the ability to see the battlespace is key to prevailing in conventional conflict when technology permits forces to hit and kill what they can see. This close relationship between seeing and striking may affect everything about conventional warfare: how it is fought, what forces and equipment it is fought with, and the role of the United States and others in fighting it.

“ In this book I have written about some aspects of the war which, I believe, the world must know and remember, not only as a memorial of men’s courage in tragic years, but as a warning of what will happen again—surely—if a heritage of evil and of folly is not cut out of the hearts of peoples. Here it is the reality of modern warfare not only as it appears to British soldiers, of whom I can tell, but to soldiers on all the fronts where conditions were the same. What I have written here does not cancel, nor alter, nor deny anything in my daily narratives of events on the western front as they are now- published in book form. They stand, I may claim sincerely and humbly, as a truthful, accurate, and tragic record of the battles in France and Belgium during the years of war, broadly pictured out as far as I could see and know. My duty, then, was that of a chronicler, not arguing why things should have happened so nor giving reasons why they should not happen so, but describing faithfully many of the things I saw, and narrating the facts as I found them, as far as the censorship would allow. After early, hostile days it allowed nearly all but criticism, protest, and of the figures of loss. The purpose of this book is to get deeper into the truth of this war and of all war—not by a more detailed narrative of events, but rather as the truth was revealed to the minds of men, in many aspects, out of their experience; and by a plain statement of realities, however painful, to add something to the world’s knowledge out of which men of good-will may try to shape some new system of relationship between one people and another, some new code of international morality, preventing or at least postponing another massacre of youth like that five years’ sacrifice of boys of which I was a witness.” (Sir Philip Gibbs – 1920)

There has been a great deal of speculation recently concerning the likely impact of the 'Information Age' on warfare. In this vein, much of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) literature subscribes to the idea that the Information Age will witness a transformation in the very nature of war. In this book, David Lonsdale puts that notion to the test. Using a range of contexts, the book sets out to look at whether the classical Clausewitzian theory of the nature of war will retain its validity in this new age. The analysis covers the character of the future battlespace, the function of command, and the much-hyped concept of Strategic Information Warfare. Finally, the book broadens its perspective to examine the nature of 'Information Power' and its implications for geopolitics. Through an assessment of both historical and contemporary case studies (including the events following September 11 and the recent war in Iraq), the author concludes that although the future will see many changes to the conduct of warfare, the nature of war, as given theoretical form by Clausewitz, will remain essentially unchanged.

A chilling look at the weapons that could be part of future wars.

As the War in Iraq continues to rage, many in the White House, State Department, Department of Defense, and outside government are left to wonder if it was possible to foresee the difficulty the United States is currently having with Sunni nationalists and Islamic extremists. Recent American military experience offers significant insight into this question. With the fog of the Cold War finally lifting and clarity returning to the nature of conflict, the dominance of asymmetry in the military experience of the United States is all too evident. Lebanon (1982-1984), Somalia (1992-1994), and Afghanistan (2001-2004) offer recent and relevant insight into successes and failures of American attempts to fight adversaries utilizing asymmetric conflict to combat the United States when it intervened in these three states. The results illustrate the difficulty of engaging adversaries unwilling to wage a conventional war and the need for improved strategic and tactical doctrine. It is easy, Lowther writes, for Americans to forget the lessons of past conflicts as the politics of the present dominate.... His purpose here is to highlight some of history's recent lessons so that we may move forward with an awareness of what experience offers.

This collection of essays examines the strategic dimensions of contemporary terrorist threats. It evaluates the changing nature of modern terrorism in the light of the events of September 11 2001. The collection argues that terrorism now promises to enter the terrain of global "grand strategy".

During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Iraq plunged into a complex insurgency, and defeating this insurgency required beating highly adaptive foes. A competition between the hierarchical and vertically integrated army and networked and horizontally integrated insurgents ensued. The latter could quickly adapt and conduct networked operations in a decentralized fashion; the former was predisposed to fighting via prescriptive plans under a centralized command and control. To achieve success, the US Army went through a monumental process of organizational adaptation—a process driven by soldiers and leaders that spread throughout the institution and led to revolutionary changes in how the army supported and conducted its operations in Iraq. How the army adapted and the implications of this adaptation are the subject of this indispensable study. Intended for policymakers, defense and military professionals, military historians, and academics, this book offers a solid critique of the army’s current capacity to adapt to likely future adversary strategies and provides policy recommendations for retaining lessons learned in Iraq.