Incentives For Research Development And Innovation In Pharmaceuticals

Incentives for innovation are particularly relevant in the pharmaceutical industry where not all social needs provide equally profitable opportunities and where most OECD countries try to implement different measures that promote research in these less profitable areas. This book describes how incentives can be provided to deal with less profitable activities when no clear markets exist for the innovations. The book discusses alternative mechanisms to substitute for inexistent markets, situations where traditional instruments have proven totally insufficient, and the clear mismatch between the size of the markets being targeted and the incentives being provided. Patents become an ineffective way to incentivise R&D when the appropriability is low; this book provides alternative ideas such as allowing for a period of data exclusivity to firms that develop new drugs.

From Nobel Prize–winning economist Michael Kremer and fellow leading development economist Rachel Glennerster, an innovative solution for providing vaccines in poor countries Millions of people in the third world die from diseases that are rare in the first world—diseases like malaria, tuberculosis, and schistosomiasis. AIDS, which is now usually treated in rich countries, still ravages the world's poor. Vaccines offer the best hope for controlling these diseases and could dramatically improve health in poor countries. But developers have little incentive to undertake the costly and risky research needed to develop vaccines. This is partly because the potential consumers are poor, but also because governments drive down prices. In Strong Medicine, Michael Kremer and Rachel Glennerster offer an innovative yet simple solution to this worldwide problem: "Pull" programs to stimulate research. Here's how such programs would work. Funding agencies would commit to purchase viable vaccines if and when they were developed. This would create the incentives for vaccine developers to produce usable products for these neglected diseases. Private firms, rather than funding agencies, would pick which research strategies to pursue. After purchasing the vaccine, funders could distribute it at little or no cost to the afflicted countries. Strong Medicine details just how these legally binding commitments would work. Ultimately, if no vaccines were developed, such a commitment would cost nothing. But if vaccines were developed, the program would save millions of lives and would be among the world's most cost-effective health interventions.

The pharmaceutical industry worldwide is a rapidly burgeoning industry contributing to growth of gross domestic product and employment. Technological change in this field has been very rapid, with many new products being introduced. For this reason in part, health care budgets throughout the world have increased dramatically, eliciting growing pressures for cost containment. This book explores four important issues in pharmaceutical innovations: (1) the industry structure of pharmaceutical innovation; (2) incentives for correcting market failures in allocating resources for research and development; (3) competition and marketing; and (4) public evaluation of the benefits and costs of innovation. The lessons are applicable to countries all over the world, at all levels of economic development. By discussing existing evidence this book proposes incentive arrangements to accomplish social objectives.

Virtually no research is targeted at developing medicines for tropical diseases as the expected market returns from R&D into these diseases in the private pharmaceuticals sector are too low. Frank Müller-Langer addresses the market failure with respect to R&D for medicines for tropical diseases and the lack of short-term access to affordable medicines in poor countries. The author analyzes additional push and pull mechanisms to stimulate R&D for pharmaceutical products alongside patent protection which may help mitigate the problem of those consumers in poor countries who lack access to affordable medicines. Furthermore, he reasons that a global regime of banning parallel trade from low-income countries to high-income countries is desirable from a developing country’s perspective.

Incentives for innovation are particularly relevant in the pharmaceutical industry where not all social needs provide equally profitable opportunities and where most OECD countries try to implement different measures that promote research in these less profitable areas. This book describes how incentives can be provided to deal with less profitable activities when no clear markets exist for the innovations. The book discusses alternative mechanisms to substitute for inexistent markets, situations where traditional instruments have proven totally insufficient, and the clear mismatch between the size of the markets being targeted and the incentives being provided. Patents become an ineffective way to incentivise R&D when the appropriability is low; this book provides alternative ideas such as allowing for a period of data exclusivity to firms that develop new drugs.

Investment and innovation in drug research and development (R&D) for highly prevalent chronic diseases has stalled in recent decades, despite half of all Americans living with at least one chronic disease. As a result, prevalent chronic diseases are producing immense health care costs as well as preventable suffering and death. On February 22, March 2, and March 8, 2021, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, convened a workshop to discuss barriers to innovation in this space and examine strategies and incentives to support equitable, person-centered drug R&D for prevalent chronic diseases.

Perceptions that the pace of new-drug development has slowed and that the pharmaceutical industry is highly profitable have sparked concerns that significant problems loom for future drug development. This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study-prepared at the request of the Senate Majority Leader-reviews basic facts about the drug industry's recent spending on research and development (R&D) and its output of new drugs. The study also examines issues relating to the costs of R&D, the federal government's role in pharmaceutical research, the performance of the pharmaceutical industry in developing innovative drugs, and the role of expected profits in private firms' decisions about investing in drug R&D. In keeping with CBO's mandate to provide objective, impartial analysis, the study makes no recommendations. David H. Austin prepared this report under the supervision of Joseph Kile and David Moore. Colin Baker provided valuable consultation...