Information Technology For Peace And Security

This book offers an introduction to Information Technology with regard to peace, conflict, and security research, a topic that it approaches from natural science, technical and computer science perspectives. Following an initial review of the fundamental roles of IT in connection with peace, conflict and security, the contributing authors address the rise of cyber conflicts via information warfare, cyber espionage, cyber defence and Darknets. The book subsequently explores recent examples of cyber warfare, including: • The Stuxnet attack on Iran’s uranium refining capability • The hacking of the German Federal Parliament’s internal communication system • The Wannacry malware campaign, which used software stolen from a US security agency to launch ransomware attacks worldwide The book then introduces readers to the concept of cyber peace, including a discussion of confidence and security-building measures. A section on Cyber Arms Control draws comparisons to global efforts to control chemical warfare, to reduce the risk of nuclear war, and to prevent the militarization of space. Additional topics include the security of critical information infrastructures, and cultural violence and peace in social media. The book concludes with an outlook on the future role of IT in peace and security. Information Technology for Peace and Security breaks new ground in a largely unexplored field of study, and offers a valuable asset for a broad readership including students, educators and working professionals in computer science, IT security, peace and conflict studies, and political science.

Looking at a variety of armament sectors, the book examines how Artificial Intelligence (AI) impacts the fields of armament and arms control, how existing arms control measures will be affected by AI, and what new approaches based on AI have been or are currently developed. The significant increase in computing power, the increasing reliance on software, and the advent of (narrow) AI and deep-learning algorithms all have the potential to lead to disruptive changes for military operations and warfare, rendering many classical arms control instruments less effective, or even useless. On the other hand, AI might lead to completely new arms control approaches, raising the effectiveness and reliability of new verification measures. To provide a common understanding, the book starts by presenting a general introduction to the state of the art in artificial intelligence and arms control, and how the two topics are interrelated. The second part of the book looks at examples from various fields of weapon technology, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD), conventional armament, and emerging technologies. The final section offers a cross-cutting perspective based on the examples presented in the second part. This volume will appeal to students and scholars of international relations, as well as policy-makers and practitioners interested in a better understanding of peace and security studies in general, and armament and arms control in particular with a strong focus on AI.

Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are important to human, national, and even international security. IT research, artifacts, and knowledge that can be applied in military and civilian contexts, used as part of weapon systems, or cause significant harm are referred to as dual-use. Advances in artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, cybersecurity, and open source intelligence (OSINT) raise questions about their dual-use risks. But how can dual-use of such disparate technologies be assessed? Case studies are still lacking on how to assess dual-use ICT and how to enable sensitive and responsible dual-use design. To address the research gap, this cumulative dissertation uses Technology Assessment (TA) as an epistemological framework to bring together approaches of Critical Security Studies (CSS) as well as Value Sensitive Design (VSD) from the field of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI). As a result, the dissertation systematizes the dual-use risks and scenarios of the selected ICTs and derives organizational and design implications.

Marc-André Kaufhold explores user expectations and design implications for the utilization of new media in crisis management and response. He develops a novel framework for information refinement, which integrates the event, organisational, societal, and technological perspectives of crises. Therefore, he reviews the state of the art on crisis informatics and empirically examines the use, potentials and barriers of both social media and mobile apps. Based on these insights, he designs and evaluates ICT concepts and artifacts with the aim to overcome the issues of information overload and quality in large-scale crises, concluding with practical and theoretical implications for technology adaptation and design.

After the attacks of 9/11 terrorism and other forms of transnational risks of violence dominated official security policy. Researchers at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg investigated the consequences of this change for security governance in a multi-annual research program. Case studies show that transnational security policies changed, but that national governments remained dominant. In other words, the transnationalisation of threat perceptions only led to a limited internationalisaton of security policies. The volume presents results of the research program. It combines conceptual work on security governance with empirical research, for instance on counterterrorism, changing perceptions of security in international organizations, such as the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

This book examines new and challenging political aspects of cyber security and presents it as an issue defined by socio-technological uncertainty and political fragmentation. Structured along two broad themes and providing empirical examples for how socio-technical changes and political responses interact, the first part of the book looks at the current use of cyber space in conflictual settings, while the second focuses on political responses by state and non-state actors in an environment defined by uncertainties. Within this, it highlights four key debates that encapsulate the complexities and paradoxes of cyber security politics from a Western perspective – how much political influence states can achieve via cyber operations and what context factors condition the (limited) strategic utility of such operations; the role of emerging digital technologies and how the dynamics of the tech innovation process reinforce the fragmentation of the governance space; how states attempt to uphold stability in cyberspace and, more generally, in their strategic relations; and how the shared responsibility of state, economy, and society for cyber security continues to be re-negotiated in an increasingly trans-sectoral and transnational governance space. This book will be of much interest to students of cyber security, global governance, technology studies, and international relations. The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.