International Cooperation And Reputation In An Empirical Two Bloc Model

Since the five largest industrial democracies concluded the Plaza Agreement in 1985, the theory and practice of international economic policy coordination has become the subject of spirited academic and public-policy debate. While some view policy coordination as crucial for the construction of an improved international monetary system, others fear that it risks delaying or weakening the implementation of macroeconomic and structural policies. In these papers and comments, prominent international economists consider past and present interpretations of the meaning of international policy coordination; conditions necessary for coordination to be beneficial both to the direct participants and the global economy; influential factors for the quantitative impact of coordination; obstacles to coordination; the most—and least—effective methods of coordination; and future directions of the coordination process, including processes associated with greater fixity of exchange rates. These studies will be readily accessible to policymakers, while offering sophisticated analyses to interested scholars of the global economy.

It has been argued that “buy-backs” and “debt-equity swaps” allow developing countries to benefit from market discounts on their external debt. It is argued here, however, that if such programs are expected to be successful in increasing the market value of remaining debt, they also lead to a roughly equivalent increase in prices at which a buy-back or debt-equity swap could be carried out.

In this book David Currie and Paul Levine address a broad range of issues concerning the design and conduct of macroeconomic policy in open economies. Adopting neo-Keynesian models for which monetary and fiscal policy have short-term real effects, they analyse active stabilisation policies in both a single- and multi-country context. Questions addressed include: the merits of simple policy rules, policy design in the face of uncertainty and international policy coordination. A central feature of the book is the treatment of credibility and the effect of a policy-maker's reputation for sticking to announced policies. These considerations are integrated with coordination issues to produce a unique synthesis. The volume develops optimal control methods and dynamic game theory to handle relationships between governments and a conscious rational private sector and produces a unified, coherent approach to the subject. This book will be of interest to students and teachers of open economy macroeconomics and to professional economists interested in using macroeconomic models to design policy.

This volume contains the proceedings of a September 1987 conference and focuses on the North-South macroeconomic interactions.

The book includes selected papers of Morris Goldstein on the following topics in international macroeconomics: international trade, currency regimes, exchange rate policy, international policy coordination, banking, financial crises, financial regulation, IMF policies, and China's exchange rate policy. Some of the papers are empirical in nature, while others address key policy issues in international macroeconomics. Many of the papers are co-authored with other well-known international economists, including Jacob Frenkel, Mohsin Khan, Nicholas Lardy, Peter Montiel, Michael Mussa, Carmen Reinhart, and Philip Turner, among others. Taken as a group, the papers should give the reader a good picture of many of the most important issues in international macroeconomics over the past 35 years.