Iran S Weapons Of Mass Destruction

This book provides an in-depth examination of the serious security implications that Iran's nuclear program has on a region that is already plagued by insecurity and conflict. Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race? is an expert insider's look at Iran's current and potential ability to wage both conventional and asymmetrical warfare, and the options available for dealing with a nuclear Iran. Are we on the brink of a regional nuclear arms race in the Middle East? In this urgent volume, Anthony Cordesman and Adam Seitz examine how Iran's nuclear ambitions have already altered security policy for the United States, Iran's neighbors, and the international community. Cordesman and Seitz address the full range of issues related to Iran's quest for nuclear weapons, including its emphasis on medium- and long-range missiles, the decline of Iran's conventional military capabilities, and continued Iranian efforts to undercut the spread of democracy in the region.

Iran today is still struggling with the legacy of its own Islamic revolution, and is deeply divided between the moderates who enjoy broad public support and the conservatives who control the levers of power. The mixed policies that result are reflected in Iran's ambivalent military posture. In recent years, Iran has only conducted a limited build-up of its armed forces and has cut defense spending and arms imports. On the other hand, Iran has developed a carefully focused program that threatens shipping in the lower Gulf and the world's oil exports. It has strengthened its capability for unconventional warfare and continues to be a significant proliferator, setting up indigenous military industries and developing a greater ability to import weapons. In this authoritative analysis of interest to Middle Eastern specialists and military affairs experts alike, Anthony Cordesman concludes that the continuation of Iran's current defensive security posture depends as much on these economic factors as on the outcomes of domestic political rivalries. Iran may eventually limit any military expansion to a necessary defensive strength and set strategic goals for itself that are compatible with the legitimate interests of other nations, or it may choose a more aggressive course. Regardless of the ultimate outcome, argues Cordesman, it does no good to either demonize or excuse Iranian policies. Instead, the United States and other nations with interests in the Middle East and Central Asia need to deal realistically with Iran as a reemerging regional power.

Considering the latest Iranian nuclear developments, one might question whether a study now on how best to restrain Tehran is simply one that's come too late. To be sure, estimates vary as to when Iran could build its first bomb. Some believe Tehran could do it before the end of 2005; others think Iran would only be able to do so by the end of the decade. In either case, though, the die seems cast: If Iran wants, it has all that it needs eventually to build a bomb on its own. Certainly, trying to deny Iran further nuclear technology in the hopes that this will prevent it from getting nuclear weapons is no longer a credible strategy. The questions this edited volume addresses are whether or not any strategy can prevent Iran from going nuclear, what the proper goals of such a strategy might be (deterring use, keeping Tehran from deploying weapons, getting it to dismantle its nuclear program, etc.), and what other nonproliferation goals ought to be attempted (including trying to dissuade other nations from following Iran's example). The answers this volume offers are: 1) in the long-run Iran will gain little from going nuclear, and 2) much can be gained by enforcing the nonproliferation rules Iran agreed to and spelling out the costs to Iran of its continuing acquisition of nuclear weapons- related capabilities.

The possibility that Iran will acquire a nuclear weapons capability poses a significant threat to the stability of the Middle East and a potential challenge to the long-term viability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Since 2003, diplomatic efforts by the EU-3 (United Kingdom, France and Germany) have succeeded in suspending the sensitive aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, but prospects for reaching a permanent agreement with the Iranian government are uncertain. If the EU-3 effort collapses, a number of policy options will be given more serious consideration, including sanctions, containment, regime change and military action. This IISS ‘Strategic Dossier’ on Iran’s strategic weapons programmes provides an objective technical assessment of Iran’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capabilities, as well as its ballistic missile programme. The dossier evaluates what is known and what is not known about these capabilities and projects potential future developments. In addition, the dossier provides a history of democratic efforts over the last three decades, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability and examines different options for current diplomatic efforts. Each chapter has been written and reviewed by recognised international experts in their respective fields. The IISS does not advocate any particular policy option for dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue. The objective of Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment is to assess, as accurately and dispassionately as possible, Iran’s capabilities and evaluate the pros and cons of different policy options in the order to foster a well-informed policy debate.