Iran Soviet Interests Us Concerns

Includes: historical perspective, Soviet military posture, Soviet strategic interests, implications (the Soviet threat, effect of recent developments, the road ahead), & toward a U.S. strategy. Covers: withdrawal from Afghanistan, Perestroika, Glasnost, & Soviet-Iranian rapprochement. Extensive bibliography. 4 maps.

The invasion began early one August morning. Invoking Article Six of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship, which states, "The Soviet Government shall have the right to send its army into Persia in order to take the necessary military steps in its own defense," the Soviets sent their forces marching toward Tehran. Although tensions in the region had been mounting steadily and strong Soviet diplomatic protests had reached Tehran earlier in the month, the Iranians were surprised by the attack. The invasion carefully followed the plan laid out several months earlier by the soviet General Staff. A two-pronged attack into the northwestern Azerbaijan Province quickly envelope Tabriz, Iran's second-largest city, before progressing onward toward Zanjan, Qazvin, and ultimately to the western approaches to Tehran. Another two-pronged attack was launched simultaneously against Khorasan Province in the northeast. Iran's third-largest city, Mashhad, quickly fell to the Soviets. A third Soviet force, along the eastern Caspian Sea coast, complemented this effort against Mashad and helped cut off Tehran from the east. All told, 40,000 Soviet troops participated in the initial attack, with the occupation force quickly swelling to nearly 100,000 combat troops. Soviet air forces supported the advancing ground armies and also conducted a highly effective, largely unchallenged air campaign of terror against virtually all major northern Iranian towns and cities, including Tehran itself. These indiscriminate air attacks added to the atmosphere of panic and intimidation. In the face of this swift and powerful ground and air onslaught, Iranian resistance caved in. Within a week, the major northern cities were under Soviet control. Within two weeks, Tehran was effectively cut off from both east and west and the Iranian Majlis (Parliament) was urging the central government to accept Soviet terms. Within three weeks, as Soviet troops reached the outskirts of Tehran, Iran's senior leadership prepared to flee the country and leave behind a new regime - one willing to accept Soviet domination over northern Iran.

The most significant challenge to the post-Cold War international order is the growing power of ambitious states opposed to the West. Iran, Russia and China each view the global structure through the prism of historical experience. Rejecting the universality of Western liberal values, these states and their governments each consider the relative decline of Western economic hegemony as an opportunity. Yet cooperation between them remains fragmentary. The end of Western sanctions and the Iranian nuclear deal; the Syrian conflict; new institutions in Central and East Asia: in all these areas and beyond, the potential for unity or divergence is striking. In this new and comprehensive study, Ariane Tabatabai and Dina Esfandiary address the substance of this `triple axis' in the realms of energy, trade, and military security. In particular they scrutinise Iran-Russia and the often overlooked field of Iran-China relations. Their argument - that interactions between the three will shape the world stage for decades to come - will be of interest to anyone looking to understand the contemporary international security puzzle.

Moscow's ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran underwent dramatic fluctuations following Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's triumphant return to Tehran in 1979. After a prolonged implosion, they fitfully expanded, shaped not only by the rush of current events but by centuries of ingrained practices and prejudices. By summer 2006, as Iran forged ahead with its nuclear program and Shia-based forces flexed their muscles across the Middle East, Russian-Iranian relations again appeared to be on the threshold of an entirely new dynamic. Drawing on firsthand interviews as well as primary and secondary sources, John Parker delineates Moscow's motives and approaches to dealing with the resurgent Tehran, weaving into the public record the recollections and analyses of Russian politicians, diplomats, and experts who dealt directly with Iran both under the Pahlavi monarchy and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Parker also emphasizes other touchstones of relations between the two countries, including their complex dealings in 1992 immediately after the Soviet Union's collapse and when they backed opposing sides in the civil war in Tajikistan yet nourished mutual interests on other issues. The depth of his analysis sheds light on the more recent repercussions of the September 11 terrorist attacks for Afghanistan and Iraq, for the Middle East as a whole, and for Iran's accelerating nuclear program.