Is The Wto Dispute Settlement Procedure Fair To Developing Countries

Since the inception of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, member countries have been heavily relying on the organization's dispute settlement procedure (DSP). Exploiting a new database on WTO litigations between 1995 and 2014, this paper describes disputes initiated over this period and identifies potential sources of bias concerning the participation of developing countries. The analysis builds on three different models to determine country i's probability of initiating a dispute against country j. Either it depends only on the two countries' structure of trade, that is the number of products exported by i to j (a situation we refer to as the rules-based model), or it is also affected by country i's or country j's specific characteristics (the unilateral power-based model), or it is also affected by bilateral economic and trade relations between countries i and j (the bilateral power-based model). We find that country i's structure of trade with j plays an important role in explaining the probability that i initiates a dispute against j under the DSP. Furthermore, country i's legal capacity and both countries' political regimes also affect this probability. However, we do not find that bilateral relationships between i and j, such as participants' capacity to retaliate against each others have an impact on dispute initiation.

The review of the dispute settlement system of the WTO was written into the results of the Uruguay Round establishing the organization. The planned review after four years failed to reach a conclusion and the review process was extended several times, to be finally taken up as a separate part of the Doha Round.

Essay from the year 2016 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Topic: Public International Law and Human Rights, grade: A, Macquarie University, course: Law, language: English, abstract: The Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP) embodied in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is a highly effective mechanism to ensure disputes are resolved in a reasonable period of time. However, it does not satisfactorily address the needs of developing countries to access the DSP. This could be reformed through financial and legal assistance for these countries. In addition, a more substantiated non-compliance clause could assist the timely resolution of disputes so as to not disrupt the free flow of international trade in goods and services, a key objective of the WTO system.

The World Trade Organization—backbone of today's international commercial relations—requires member countries to self-enforce exporters' access to foreign markets. Its dispute settlement system is the crown jewel of the international trading system, but its benefits still fall disproportionately to wealthy nations. Could the system be doing more on behalf of developing countries? In Self-Enforcing Trade, Chad P. Bown explains why the answer is an emphatic "yes." Bown argues that as poor countries look to the benefits promised by globalization as part of their overall development strategy, they increasingly require access to the WTO dispute settlement process to protect their trading interests. Unfortunately, the practical realities of WTO dispute settlement as it currently stands create a number of hurdles that prevent developing countries from enjoying the trading system's full benefits. This book confronts these challenges. Self-Enforcing Trade examines the WTO's "extended litigation process," highlighting the tangle of international economics, law, and politics that participants must master. He identifies the costs that prevent developing countries from disentangling the self-enforcement process and fully using the WTO system as part of their growth strategies. Bown assesses recent efforts to help developing countries overcome those costs, including the role of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law and development focused NGOs. Bown's proposed Institute for Assessing WTO Commitments tackles the largest remaining obstacle currently limiting developing country engagement in the WTO's selfenforcement process—a problematic lack of information, monitoring, and surveillance.

This book offers a multidisciplinary approach to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) by bringing together contributions from legal scholars and political scientists. Most of the authors belong to a tightly knit legal epistemic community, trained at the University of São Paulo and at the top-ranked research and policy centers on WTO law in Europe. Presenting a novel and unique perspective on the DSM, it provides an analysis of current themes at the heart of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism through the lenses of scholars with a “developing country” perspective. Focusing on assessment, substance, and process, it presents a three-fold approach to the analysis and offers a singular contribution to the scholarly literature on the WTO. The book discusses the topic from the viewpoint of individuals deeply involved in the scholarly production as well as the daily operation of the mechanism. The contributors include academics in the fields of international economic law and political science, diplomats, individuals engaged in legal private practice, and individuals affiliated with the WTO as well as WTO-related think tanks. The result is a balanced perspective on pressing issues that have arisen and that are likely to remain at the center of the scholarly and policy debate for years to come.

Abstract: Poor countries are rarely challenged in formal World Trade Organization trade disputes for failing to live up to commitments, reducing the benefits of their participation in international trade agreements. This paper examines the political-economic causes of the failure to challenge poor countries, and discusses the static and dynamic costs and externality implications of this failure. Given the weak incentives to enforce World Trade Organization rules and disciplines against small and poor members, bolstering the transparency function of the World Trade Organization is important for making trade agreements more relevant to trade constituencies in developing countries. Although the paper focuses on the World Trade Organization system, the arguments also apply to reciprocal North-South trade agreements.

International economic law has been evolving toward an unprecedented degree of institutionalism and supranational legal authority, expressed through the availability of legalistic and more coercive mechanisms to develop international legal obligations enforceable upon states. This book will explore the transparency of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) within the World Trade Organization (WTO), the level of participation of the WTO members, especially those of the developing and the least-developed countries, and the attitude of the DSM in relation to the issue of development.

Addresses the process of dispute resolution and appeal under the DSU of the WTO. This book covers politics and disputes between sovereign nations; power inequities in access to the DSU; specific categories of disputes, such as in agriculture and in intellectual property; and issues pertaining to compliance, enforcement and remedies.