Israeli Politics And The Middle East Peace Process 1988 2002

The book is a fresh interpretation of Israeli foreign policy vis-à-vis the peace process, one that deems domestic political factors as the key to explain the shift within Israel from war to peace. The main assumption is that peacemaking that entails territorial compromise is an issue that can only be completely comprehended by understanding the interaction of domestic factors such as inter-party politics, ideology, personality and the politics of coalition. Although the bulk of the book focuses on how internal inputs informed the peace process, the book takes into account the external factors and how they impacted on the internal constellation of political forces in Israel.

This book argues that domestic Israeli politics have been a key factor in determining Israeli-Palestinian peacmaking in the period from 1988 to the present.

There has been a serious deterioration of the peace process since 1996, particularly regarding the Palestinians and Israelis. The stalemate can be attributed to domestic variables in Israel, such as the fragmented political system, internal contests and the balance of power. The factional power base, ideology and personalities of leaders like Netanyahu, Barak and Sharon have played a crucial role, as well as the responses of Israelis to the actions of some Palestinians. This study demonstrates that there is a strong link between Israel's internal political system and its foreign policy.

Since October 2000, the Al-Aqsa Intifada uprising has shattered any recognisable peace process. Part of the "Studies in Peace Politics in the Middle East" series, this work deals with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It also addresses the full range of the reconciliation process between Israel and the Arab World.

"Meet your Enemy Number One," a nervous Norwegian diplomat said to Uri Savir, the young director-general of Israel's Foreign Ministry, as he introduced him to Abu Ala, one of Yasser Arafat's top aides. They were in Oslo, and this was the first official encounter between Israel and the PLO. The atmosphere was tense. Savir read from prepared notes: "The aim of Israel's elected government," he began, "is to bring about a historic reconciliation with the Palestinian people. We have no interest in only a cosmetic change of the status quo. It is not our wish to control your lives. . . ." For more than half a century, both sides had denied the other's right to exist; both had sustained a terrible toll. Yet in the three years that followed that first encounter, after thousands of hours of subtle and complex secret negotiations, they hammered out the blueprint for a peaceful conclusion to a conflict that had seemed irre- concilable. This book is the Israeli chief negotiator's extraordinary account of those negotiations, their implementation and aftermath, and of the un- likely partnership that emerged between Yitz- hak Rabin, Yasser Arafat, and Shimon Peres. As the process initiated at Oslo began to re- shape allegiances throughout the Middle East, Israeli and Palestinian extremists set out to violently destroy what they described as "the threat of peace." This is the inside story of the race between those committed to reconciliation and those who vowed to destroy the peace. It is also a poignant story of the developing relationship between Savir and Abu Ala, both from Jeru- salem, both committed to their people, to their land, and to peace. Will the peace process initiated at Oslo prevail against the assault of extremists and enemies of peace on both sides? The answer to this question, and the future of the peace process, is crucial not just to Israel and the Palestinians, but to the Middle East and the world.

Updated through the first term of President George W. Bush, this edition analyses how each US president since Lyndon Johnson has dealt with the complex challenge of Arab-Israeli peacemaking.

Israel and Jordan, even though self-proclaimed enemies of one another, practiced a relationship of interdependence based on corresponding interests. In the years following the 1967 war, these two countries' fates were delicately intertwined because of many factors like mutual reliance on natural resources (especially water) and parallel interests in the subordination of the Palestinian national movement. These conditions of commonality led to extensive ties between the two countries and approximated a state of de facto peace that - ironically - made an official peace treaty almost impossible to sign. A formal peace treaty would have required not only Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank but also Jordan's acknowledgment of the clandestine contacts between the two formal enemies. Yehuda Lukacs gives us an account of how this relationship changed in 1988 when Jordan disengaged from the West Bank. This event, combined with the Palestinian uprising and the Gulf War, paved the way for Israel and Jordan in 1994 to sign the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. By systematically examining the impact of functional cooperation between two official enemies, Lukacs makes an important contribution to Middle East studies and international conflict resolution.