Israel Jordan And The Peace Process

Israel and Jordan, even though self-proclaimed enemies of one another, practiced a relationship of interdependence based on corresponding interests. In the years following the 1967 war, these two countries' fates were delicately intertwined because of many factors like mutual reliance on natural resources (especially water) and parallel interests in the subordination of the Palestinian national movement. These conditions of commonality led to extensive ties between the two countries and approximated a state of de facto peace that— ironically—made an official peace treaty almost impossible to sign. A formal peace treaty would have required not only Israel's withdrawal from the West bank but also Jordan's acknowledgement of the clandestine contacts between the two formal enemies. Yehuda Lukacs gives us an account of how this relationship changed in 1988 when Jordan disengaged from the West Bank. This event, combined with the Palestinian uprising and the Gulf War, paved the way for Israel and Jordan in 1994 to sign the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. By systemically examining the impact of functional cooperation between two official enemies, Lukacs makes an important contribution to Middle East studies and international conflict resolution.

Drawing on intensive firsthand experience gained during the most successful years of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, Harold Saunders explains the complexities of the peace process: it was not just a series of negotiated agreements but negotiation embedded in a larger political process. In the first edition of The Other Walls, Saunders argued persuasively that until leaders change the political environment by lowering the human and political barriers to peace, negotiators stand little chance. Now he places that focus on political process in the context of a new world—where familiar concepts of international relations no longer provide adequate explanations for events, and where the tools of statecraft do not produce expected results. In the wake of the Gulf War Saunders suggests how insights from earlier Arab-Israeli peace negotiations can lead to a broader regional process. Originally published in 1991. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

The Israel–Jordan peace treaty (formally the "Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan), is an agreement that ended the state of war that had existed between the two countries since the 1948 Arab–Israeli War and established mutual diplomatic relations. In addition to establishing peace between the two countries, the treaty also settled land and water disputes, provided for broad cooperation in tourism and trade, and obligated both countries to prevent their territory being used as a staging ground for military strikes by a third country. The signing ceremony took place at the southern border crossing of Arabah on 26 October 1994.

"In 1994, Jordan and Israel signed a peace agreement and set out to create a 'warm peace' between their countries. The peace was to include an extensive network of bilateral economic, security and societal relationships and serve as potential model for future relations between Israel and other Arab nations. More than a dozen years on, following the abandonment of the Oslo process and failure of the peace that would deliver expected dividends to Jordan, the treaty itself remains intact, but relations between the two states, especially at the societal level, have not fulfilled expectations. Focusing primarily on the Jordanian perspective, Dona Stewart here examines the challenges involved over the last decade to create 'good neighbourly relations'."--Bloomsbury Publishing.

This book, the only first-hand account from the Jordanian perspective of the 1994 peace agreement between Jordan and Israel, is a major contribution to our understanding of the complexities of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. In 1994, Jordan and Israel achieved a peace treaty through bilateral negotiations initiated and sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. This book reveals in candid detail the difficulties of negotiating with other Arab nations as well as with Israel, the challenge of countering domestic opposition, and the triumph of achieving an agreement.

In Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, two noted Middle East scholars, present the first detailed examination of Syria's role in the long struggle for an Arab-Israeli peace. They paint a surprising portrait of a county whose power is out of proportion to its size, economy, and resources. They explore the reasons behind this phenomeno most importantly, the Machiavellian brilliance of its leader, Hafez al-Asad. The authors address the origins of the Asad regime, Syrias strategy toward its Arab neighbors, its conflict with Israel, and the history of its relationships with the Soviet Union and the United States. The authors argue forcefully that Syrian involvement is vital in an effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.