Japan And Its Partners In The Indo Pacific

"The book studies the development of Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. As strategic competition grows, the lessons from the pandemic, the deepening Sino-US rivalry, and the US losing grip on the current world strategic environment all compel Japan to focus its attention on the Indo-Pacific region. The volume examines Japan's foreign policy through an analysis of its strategic agenda, economic calculations, maritime security concerns, and soft power policies. It looks at Japan's relations with India, Vietnam, Africa, China, Australia, South Korea, Indonesia, and the US, in the context of Japan's bilateral and multilateral arrangements. An important contribution to the study of politics in the Indo-Pacific region, the book will be an indispensable resource for students and researchers of political science, international relations, foreign policy, geopolitics, security studies, strategic studies, as well as area studies, namely Asian and East and Southeast Asian studies and Indo-Pacific studies"--

Contributed articles at a round table conference held at New Delhi on March 14-15, 2005.

The purpose of this book is to introduce readers to INDOPACOM, which is responsible for U.S. military operations in a region covering approximately 50 percent of the Earth from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. INDOPACOM has not received much attention in Japan compared to USFJ or the US Seventh Fleet. This book shines a spotlight on INDOPACOM in an effort to promote an understanding of its various aspects. The mission of INDOPACOM is to protect U.S. territory, people, and national interests. However, it also includes protection of the countries within its geographic scope that are U.S. allies and security partners. INDOPACOM and its precursor Pacific Command, established in 1947, have always been major contributors to the peace and safety of Japan in the post-World War II era. In view of the importance of U.S. interests in Northeast Asia, the region also has two Sub-Unified Combatant Commands called United States Forces Japan (USFJ) and United States Forces Korea (USFK). Each of these organizations strives to strengthen the relationship with the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the Republic of Korea armed forces. Together, the United States, Japan and our partners around the globe will continue to safeguard the rules-based security order that has underpinned peace and prosperity for decades.

As tensions between China and Japan increase, including over the disputed islands in the East China Sea, Japan has adopted under Prime Minister Abe a new security posture. This involves, internally, adapting Japan’s constitutional position on defence and, externally, building stronger international relationships in the Asia-Pacific region and more widely. This book presents a comprehensive analysis of these developments. It shows how trust and co-operation with the United States, the only partner with which Japan has a formal alliance, is being rebuilt, discusses how other relationships, both on security and on wider issues, are being formed, in the region and with European countries and the EU, with the relationships with India and Australia being of particular importance, and concludes by assessing the likely impact on the region of Japan’s changing posture and new relationships.

The book studies the development of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. As strategic competition grows, the lessons from the pandemic, the deepening Sino-US rivalry, and the United States losing grip on the current world strategic environment all compel Japan to focus its attention on the Indo-Pacific region. The volume examines Japan's foreign policy through an analysis of its strategic agenda, economic calculations, maritime security concerns, and soft power policies. It looks at Japan’s relations with United States, Australia, India, Vietnam, Africa, South Korea, Indonesia, and the United States in the context of Japan’s bilateral and multilateral arrangements. An important contribution to the study of politics in the Indo-Pacific region, the book will be an indispensable resource for students and researchers of political science, international relations, foreign policy, geopolitics, security studies, strategic studies, as well as area studies – namely East and Southeast Asian studies and Indo-Pacific studies.

This book explores the most important strategic questions about the emerging Indo-Pacific region by offering an incisive analysis on the current and future patterns of competition and cooperation of key nations in the region. Examining emerging policies of cooperation and conflict adopted by Indo-Pacific states in response to a rising China, the book offers insights into the evolving Indo-Pacific visions and strategies being developed in Japan, India, Australia and the US in reaction to shifting geopolitical realities. The book provides evidence of geopolitical advances in what some see as a spatially coherent maritime zone stretching from the eastern Pacific to the western Indian Ocean, including small island states and countries that line its littoral. It also analyzes the development and operationalization of Indo-Pacific policies and strategies of various key nations. Contributors provide both macro and micro perspectives to this critically significant topic, offering insights into the grand strategies of great powers as well as case studies ranging from the Philippines to the Maldives to Kenya. The book suggests that new rivalries, shifting alliances and economic ebbs and flows in the Indo-Pacific will generate new geopolitical realities and shape much else beyond in the twenty-first century. A timely contribution to the rapidly expanding policy and scholarly discussions about what is likely to be the defining region for international politics for coming generations, the book will be of interest to policymakers as well as students and academics in the fields of International Relations, Foreign Policy, Security Studies, Diplomacy and International Law, East and South Asian Studies, East African Studies, Middle East Studies, and Australian Studies.

The Asia-Pacific has become the Indo-Pacific region as the US, Japan, Australia and India have decided to join forces and scale-up their political, economic and security cooperation. The message coming from Washington, Tokyo, Canberra and New Delhi is clear: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is no longer the only game in town and Beijing’s policymakers better get ready for fierce competition. Japan’s ongoing and future “quality infrastructure” policies and investments in the Indo-Pacific in particular make it very clear that Tokyo wants a (much) bigger slice of the pie of infrastructure investments in the region. China’s territorial expansionism in the South China Sea and its increasing interests and presence in countries in South Asia have done their share to help the four aforesaid countries expand their security and defence ties. Beijing, of course, smells containment in all of this and it probably has a point. Who will have the upper hand in shaping and defining Asian security and providing developing South and Southeast Asia with badly-needed infrastructure: the US and Japan together with its allies or the increasingly assertive and uncompromising China and its Belt and Road Initiative?

The emerging strategic relationship between India and Japan is significant for the future security and stability of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. It is also a critical emergent relationship for U.S. security objectives across the Asia-Pacific. India possesses the most latent economic and military potential of any state in the wider Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, India is the state with the greatest potential outside of the United States itself to contribute to the objectives of the "Rebalance to the Pacific" announced by Washington in 2011. This "rebalance" was aimed at fostering a stable, prosperous, and rules-based region where peace, prosperity, and wide respect for human rights are observed and extended. Implicit in the rebalance was a hedge against a China acting to challenge the existing post-World War II rules-based international and regional order. India and Japan share complementary, but not identical, strategic visions. Both seek to manage-and minimize-the potential negative impacts from the rise of China in accord with their own strategic perspectives. As of early 2017, Japan perceives China's growing assertive actions to be a great and rising strategic threat. India is concerned about China's increasingly worrisome behavior but finds itself relatively more dependent upon China for economic growth and less worried about its immediate physical threat than Japan. As a result, India has been, and will continue to be, less vocal in complaints about Chinese behavior, preferring to warn Beijing with subtle signaling and actions. There is broad bipartisan domestic support in Japan and India for enhancing bilateral strategic cooperation now and moving forward. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's role has been a critical factor in the rapid growth of the strategic relationship, and the partnership is unlikely to have moved as far or as fast without his leadership. However, Japan's important relationship with India has been institutionalized in special ways over the past decade that will make it durable-if not as dynamic-when Abe leaves the political stage in Japan. The same is largely true in India. Since mid-2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's personal approach and his special relationship with Abe have been a significant accelerant to the India-Japan strategic relationship. Indian strategic thinking is broadly supportive of continuing to grow strategic bilateral relations with Tokyo. There is a depth of support in both countries that will foster a robust strategic relationship well into the future. Japan provides India with economic, political, and diplomatic interactions that it cannot replicate elsewhere. Japanese economic assistance is special in that it can undertake projects of enormous scope and scale in the Indian economy-offering a competitive and often preferred alternative to Chinese bids on critical Indian infrastructure projects. As a technologically advanced industrial nation with an established defense industry, and one now enabled to export weapons platforms and technologies abroad due to a historic political evolution, Japan can help India advance its national military and defense capabilities. India provides Japan with a security partner of enormous latent potential and three main short-term advantages. India's border dispute with China causes Beijing to spend more on defense along the Indian border, limiting its attention and defense spending against contested island claims astride Japan. Growing Indian maritime capability will enable New Delhi to assume greater responsibility for Indian Ocean security, allowing Japan and the United States to allocate a greater proportion of their own resources to counter Chinese adventurism in the South and East China Seas. Finally, India has the potential to assist Vietnam to develop as a Japanese security partner in Southeast Asia, as both India and Vietnam currently have many of the same Russian military platforms.