Japan S Reluctant Realism

In Japan's Reluctant Realism , Michael J. Green examines the adjustments of Japanese foreign policy in the decade since the end of the Cold War. Green presents case studies of China, the Korean peninsula, Russia and Central Asia, Southeast Asia, the international financial institutions, and multilateral forums (the United Nations, APEC, and the ARF). In each of these studies, Green considers Japanese objectives; the effectiveness of Japanese diplomacy in achieving those objectives; the domestic and exogenous pressures on policy-making; the degree of convergence or divergence with the United States in both strategy and implementation; and lessons for more effective US - Japan diplomatic cooperation in the future. As Green notes, its bilateral relationship with the United States is at the heart of Japan's foreign policy initiatives, and Japan therefore conducts foreign policy with one eye carefully on Washington. However, Green argues, it is time to recognize Japan as an independent actor in Northeast Asia, and to assess Japanese foreign policy in its own terms.

In Japan's Reluctant Realism , Michael J. Green examines the adjustments of Japanese foreign policy in the decade since the end of the Cold War. Green presents case studies of China, the Korean peninsula, Russia and Central Asia, Southeast Asia, the international financial institutions, and multilateral forums (the United Nations, APEC, and the ARF). In each of these studies, Green considers Japanese objectives; the effectiveness of Japanese diplomacy in achieving those objectives; the domestic and exogenous pressures on policy-making; the degree of convergence or divergence with the United States in both strategy and implementation; and lessons for more effective US - Japan diplomatic cooperation in the future. As Green notes, its bilateral relationship with the United States is at the heart of Japan's foreign policy initiatives, and Japan therefore conducts foreign policy with one eye carefully on Washington. However, Green argues, it is time to recognize Japan as an independent actor in Northeast Asia, and to assess Japanese foreign policy in its own terms.

Has Japanese foreign policy changed in the post - Cold War era? On the surface, it appears to have been quite consistent since the end of World War II. It has stressed the US-Japanese security alliance, the use of economic tools, and constraints on the use of force. However, this book argues that new ideas and new patterns of diplomacy have in fact come about following the changes after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Using case studies that look at China, the Korean peninsulas, Russia and Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and international institutions, Michael Green uncovers a more Japanese foreign policy in Japan. Though it still converges with the US on fundamental issues, it is increasingly independent. While remaining low-risk, it is more sensitive to balance-of-power issues. It is still reactive, but it is far less passive. Green argues that this emerging strategic view, what he calls “reluctant realism,” is being shaped by a combination of changes in the international environment, insecurity about national power resources, and Japanese aspirations for a national identity that moves beyond the legacy of World War II. As a result, it is time for the US and the world to recognize Japan as an independent actor in Northeast Asia and to assess Japanese foreign policy on its own terms.

In this book, Daniel Kliman argues that the years following September 11, 2001, have marked a turning point in Japan's defense strategy. Utilizing poll data from Japanese newspapers as well as extensive interview material, Kliman chronicles the erosion of normative and legal restraints on Tokyo's security policy. In particular, he notes that both Japanese elites and the general public increasingly view national security from a realpolitik perspective. Japan's more realpolitik orientation has coincided with a series of precedent-breaking defense initiatives. Tokyo deployed the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Indian Ocean, decided to introduce missile defense, and contributed troops to Iraq's post-conflict reconstruction. Kliman explains these initiatives as the product of four mutually interactive factors. In the period after September 11, the impact of foreign threats on Tokyo's security calculus became ever more pronounced; internalized U.S. expectations exerted a profound influence over Japanese defense behavior; prime ministerial leadership played an instrumental role in deciding high profile security debates; and public opinion appeared to overtake generational change as a motivator of realpolitik defense policies. This book rebuts those who exaggerate the nature of Japan's strategic transition. By evaluating potential amendments to Article 9, Kliman demonstrates that Tokyo's defense posture will remain constrained even after constitutional revision.

Paradoxically, Japan provides massive amounts of development aid to China, despite Japan's clear perception of China as a prime competitor in the Asia-Pacific region. This clearly written and comprehensive volume provides an overview of the way Japan's aid to China has developed since 1979. It explains the shifts that have taken place in Japan's China policy in the 1990s against the background of international changes and domestic changes in both countries, and offers new insights into the way Japanese aid policy making functions, thereby providing an alternative view of Japanese policy making that might be applied to other areas. Through a series of case studies, it shows Japan’s increasing willingness to use development aid to China for strategic goals and explains a significant shift of priority project areas of Japan’s China aid in the 1990s, from industrial infrastructure to socio-environmental infrastructure. The book argues that, contrary to the widely held view that Japan's aid to China is given for reasons of commercial self-interest, the objectives are much more complex and dynamic. Using original material, Takamine shows how policy making power within the Japanese government has shifted in recent years away from officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to politicians in the Liberal Democratic Party.

A 2023 Choice Reviews Outstanding Academic Title This is the most up-to-date and comprehensive volume on the international relations of Asia and the Indo-Pacific. The Asian region has become the fulcrum of international relations globally—it is the most economically vibrant, geostrategically significant, socially and culturally diverse, and militarily dangerous region in the world. The world’s leading great powers—the United States and China—jockey for primacy and vie for influence throughout the region, while “middle powers”—India, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea—are extending their regional reach. The ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is collectively important in its own right, but has also become the epicenter of US-China regional competition. While Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands largely operate in their own orbits, Australia has assumed growing regional impact. North Korea and Taiwan are both significant actors but they are also each tinderboxes of potential conflict. While the region is geographically sprawling across the Indo-Pacific, it is tied together economically, technologically, and strategically. No one working in or on Asia cannot afford to read this volume.

This collection discusses China's contemporary national and international identity as evidenced in its geopolitical impact on the countries in its direct periphery and its functioning in organizations of global governance. This contemporary identity is assessed against the background of the country's Confucian and nationalist history.

In this book, Paul Midford engages claims that since 9/11 Japanese public opinion has turned sharply away from pacifism and toward supporting normalization of Japan's military power, in which Japanese troops would fight alongside their American counterparts in various conflicts worldwide. Midford argues that Japanese public opinion has never embraced pacifism. It has, instead, contained significant elements of realism, in that it has acknowledged the utility of military power for defending national territory and independence, but has seen offensive military power as ineffective for promoting other goals—such as suppressing terrorist networks and WMD proliferation, or promoting democracy overseas. Over several decades, these realist attitudes have become more evident as the Japanese state has gradually convinced its public that Tokyo and its military can be trusted with territorial defense, and even with noncombat humanitarian and reconstruction missions overseas. On this basis, says Midford, we should re-conceptualize Japanese public opinion as attitudinal defensive realism.