Jubal Early S Raid On Washington

In an era of battlefield one-upmanship, the raid on the Nation’s Capital in July 1864 was prompted by an earlier failed Union attempt to destroy Richmond and free the Union prisoners held there. Jubal Early’s mission was in part to let the North have a taste of its own medicine by attacking Washington and freeing the Confederate prisoners at Point Lookout in southern Maryland. He was also to fill the South’s larder from unmolested Union fields, mills and barns. By 1864 such southern food raids had become annual wartime events. And he was to threaten and, if possible, capture Washington. This latter task was unrealistic in an age when the success of rifle fire was judged to be successful not by accuracy, but by the amount of lead that was shot into the air. Initially, the Union defenders of the city were larger former slaves, freemen, mechanic, shopkeepers and government clerks, as well as invalids. They might not have known much about riflery and accuracy, but they were capable of putting ample lead on the long until Regular Union regiments arrived. Jubal Early hesitated in attacking Washington, but he held the City at bay while his troops pillaged the countryside for the food Lee’s Army needed to survive. This new account focuses on the reasons, reactions and results of Jubul Early’s raid of 1864. History has judged it to have been a serious threat to the capital, but James H. Bruns examines how the nature of the Confederate raid on Washington in 1864 has been greatly misinterpreted—Jubal Early’s maneuvers were in fact only the latest in a series of annual southern food raids. It also corrects some of the thinking about Early’s raid, including the reason behind his orders from General Lee to cross the Potomac and the thoughts behind the proposed raid on Point Lookout and the role of the Confederate Navy in that failed effort. It presents a new prospective in explaining Jubal Early’s raid on Washington by focusing on why things happened as they did in 1864. It identifies the cause-and-effect connections that are truly the stuff of history, forging some of the critical background links that oftentimes are ignored or overlooked in books dominated by battles and leaders.

During the summer of 1864 General Grant was hammering at the gates of Richmond and the Confederacy seemed doomed. In a bold and desperate stroke, General Lee countered by sending Jubal A. Early and a force of only twelve thousand men toward Washington, D.C. After some victories along the way, they crossed the Potomac and caused plenty of confusion and consternation in the capital before retreating. Early reportedly said: "We haven't taken Washington, but we've scared Abe Lincoln like hell!" In fact, Lincoln kept cool, but a lot of others on the Union side did not. The story of that daring diversion, its losses and gains, is memorably told in Jubal's Raid.

"Cooling has produced what is sure to become the definitive scholarly account of the campaign. Drawing on a vast array of sources, including seldom-used veterans' accounts, Cooling presents a comprehensive campaign study from origins to aftermath. Not only does Cooling masterfully describe the specific movements of the opposing forces, but he also never loses sight of the wider context in which the campaign was fought. In fact, Cooling's greatest contribution may be his clear demonstration that Grant was fooled by Early's operations and took an uncommonly long time to react to a very serious threat."--American Historical Review "Cooling's superb account of one of the most dramatic ventures of the Civil War, one the peaked with a Confederate army at the gate of the nation's capital even as powerful Union forces threatened a clamp on the capital of Rebeldom . . . reflects most intensive research and provides a strictly objective account of the doings of both sides in the course of Early's thrust at Washington, from his entry into Maryland until his withdrawal back into Virginia."--Journal of Military History

The definitive biography of one of the Civil War's most combative, assertive, and controversial generals. Detailed maps of Early's battles and campaigns and 16 pages of illustrations make Jubal not only the first modern biography of an important figure but a major contribution to our knowledge of the Civil War, the Confederacy and the American South.

With the assistance of several scholars, including James M. McPherson and Gary Gallagher, and a long-time specialist in Civil War books, Ralph Newman, David Eicher has selected for inclusion in The Civil War in Books the 1,100 most important books on the war. These are organized into categories as wide-ranging as "Battles and Campaigns," "Biographies, Memoirs, and Letters," "Unit Histories," and "General Works." The last of these includes volumes on black Americans and the war, battlefields, fiction, pictorial works, politics, prisons, railroads, and a host of other topics. Annotations are included for all entries in the work, which is presented in an oversized 8 1/2 x 11 inch volume in two-column format. Appendixes list "prolific" Civil War publishers and other Civil War bibliographies, and the works included in Eicher's mammoth undertaking are indexed by author or editor and by title. Gary Gallagher's foreword traces the development of Civil War bibliographies and declares that Eicher's annotation exceeds that of any previous comprehensive volume. The Civil War in Books, Gallagher believes, is "precisely the type of guide" that has been needed. The first full-scale, fully-annotated bibliography on the Civil War to appear in more than thirty years, Eicher's The Civil War in Books is a remarkable compendium of the best reading available about the worst conflict ever to strike the United States. The bibliography, the most valuable reference book on the subject since The Civil War Day by Day, will be essential for college and university libraries, dealers in rare and secondhand books, and Civil War buffs.

In July 1864, while hemmed in by Grant at Richmond, General Robert E. Lee conceived a bold plan designed not only to relieve Lynchburg and protect the Confederate supply line but also to ultimately make a bold move on Washington itself. A major facet of this plan, with the addition of General Jubal Early's forces, became the rescue of the almost 15,000 Confederate prisoners at Point Lookout, a large Union prison camp at the confluence of the Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay. With international recognition hanging in the balance for the Confederacy, the failure of Lee's plan saved the Union and ultimately changed the course of the war. This work focuses on the many factors that contributed to this eventual failure, including Early's somewhat inexplicable hesitancy, a significant loss of time for Confederate troops en route, and aggressive defensive action by Union General Lew Wallace. It also discusses various circumstances such as Washington's stripped defenses, the potential release of imprisoned Southern troops and a breakdown of Union military intelligence that made Lee's gamble a brilliant, well-founded strategy.