Judicial Responsibility And Coups D Tat

This book examines the responsibility of judges of domestic courts following unconstitutional usurpation of power of government (coups d’état). It explores judges’ liability for failing to discharge their judicial duty independently and impartially, and the criminality of usurpers and their accomplices and collaborators for their violation of fundamental rights and freedoms or commission of crimes of international concern. Written by a highly regarded non-Western author, the book is coherent and meticulously researched, covering an approach to coups in an insightful and fascinating fashion. It includes a sophisticated and thorough analysis of the relevant comparative jurisprudence of domestic and international courts, with concrete examples of the best practices among decisions of domestic courts in countries that have experienced coups d’état. With an increasing global interest in the phenomenon of coups, democratic backsliding and the place and role of the judiciary as the only hope to rein in acts of unconstitutional usurpation of power, the book will be essential reading for members of the legal profession, those cherishing democracy as well as students and researchers in constitutional law, law and political science, public international law, international human rights law, international criminal law, regime changes, transitional justice and international organizations.

The term coup d'état--French for stroke of the state--brings to mind coups staged by power-hungry generals who overthrow the existing regime, not to democratize, but to concentrate power in their own hands as dictators. We assume all coups look the same, smell the same, and present the same threats to democracy. It's a powerful, concise, and self-reinforcing idea. It's also wrong. In The Democratic Coup d'État, Ozan Varol advances a simple, yet controversial, argument: Sometimes, a democracy is established through a military coup. Covering events from the Athenian Navy's stance in 411 B.C. against a tyrannical home government, to coups in the American colonies that ousted corrupt British governors, to twentieth-century coups that toppled dictators and established democracy in countries as diverse as Guinea-Bissau, Portugal, and Colombia, the book takes the reader on a gripping journey. Connecting the dots between these neglected events, Varol weaves a balanced narrative that challenges everything we thought we knew about military coups. In so doing, he tackles several baffling questions: How can an event as undemocratic as a military coup lead to democracy? Why would imposing generals-armed with tanks and guns and all-voluntarily surrender power to civilian politicians? What distinguishes militaries that help build democracies from those that destroy them? Varol's arguments made headlines across the globe in major media outlets and were cited critically in a public speech by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Written for a general audience, this book will entertain, challenge, and provoke, but more importantly, serve as a reminder of the imperative to question the standard narratives about our world and engage with all ideas, no matter how controversial.

Jean-Paul Bertaud is the leading French authority on the army of the French Revolution, and La Revolution armee is the authortative treatment of the firest great national, patriotic, revolutionary, and mass army, engaged in what has been called the first total war: that between revolutionary France and the other European powers. The book is a successful attempt to integrate military history with social and political history and thereby to depict the army as a "school for the republic" that by subtle changes after 1795 made way for the Napoleonic regime. The distinguished historian R.R. Palmer presents the first translation of this work into English in a volume that will quickly become indispensable for French historians, historical sociologists, and political scientists interested in armies and revolutions. The theme of the book is suggested by its French title: "the Revolution armed." That is, the book is primarily about the Revolution, and specifically the Revolution in its relation to armed force. This revolution, and this army, activated the idea of the citizen-soldier exemplified by the ancient classical republics, and favored by Jean-jacques Rousseau and other eighteenth-century thinkers, but never before realized on so large and portentous a scale as in France in the 1790s. Jean-Paul Bertaud is Professor of Modern History at the University of Paris I (the Sorbonne). He has published widely in France on aspects of the French Revolution. R.R. Palmer is Professor Emeritus at Yale University and author of numerous books, including the two-volume The Age of the Democratic Revolution (1959 and 1964), Twelve Who Ruled (1941), and The Improvement of Humanity: Education and the French Revolution (1985), all published by Princeton University Press. He has translated many works from the French, most recently The Two Tocquevilles, Father and Son: Herve and Alexis de TOcqueville on the Coming of the French Revolution (Princeton, 1987). Originally published in 1988. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

States seldom resort to war to overthrow their adversaries. They are more likely to attempt to covertly change the opposing regime, by assassinating a foreign leader, sponsoring a coup d’état, meddling in a democratic election, or secretly aiding foreign dissident groups. In Covert Regime Change, Lindsey A. O’Rourke shows us how states really act when trying to overthrow another state. She argues that conventional focus on overt cases misses the basic causes of regime change. O’Rourke provides substantive evidence of types of security interests that drive states to intervene. Offensive operations aim to overthrow a current military rival or break up a rival alliance. Preventive operations seek to stop a state from taking certain actions, such as joining a rival alliance, that may make them a future security threat. Hegemonic operations try to maintain a hierarchical relationship between the intervening state and the target government. Despite the prevalence of covert attempts at regime change, most operations fail to remain covert and spark blowback in unanticipated ways. Covert Regime Change assembles an original dataset of all American regime change operations during the Cold War. This fund of information shows the United States was ten times more likely to try covert rather than overt regime change during the Cold War. Her dataset allows O’Rourke to address three foundational questions: What motivates states to attempt foreign regime change? Why do states prefer to conduct these operations covertly rather than overtly? How successful are such missions in achieving their foreign policy goals?

This volume addresses the controversial issue of State succession to international responsibility. It deals with two distinct questions. Firstly, whether or not there is State succession to obligations arising from internationally wrongful acts committed by the predecessor State against a third State before the date of succession. Secondly, whether or not there is State succession to the right to claim reparation as a consequence of internationally wrongful acts committed by a third State against the predecessor State before the date of succession. Winner 2008 ASIL Certificate of Merrit for High Technical Craftsmanship And Utility To Practicing Lawyers And Scholars.

Professor C.E. Black of Princeton University called this "a valuable contribution to our understanding of the revolutionary movements that are now a worldwide phenomenon. It includes thoughtful essays on many varieties of revolution, considered in the light both of past developments and future prospects. The twentieth century was an age of revolution. Over many areas of the world the two great ideologies of nationalism and communism spawned violent upheavals, often differing in form but aiming at the transformation of the existing order by means of coups d'etat, revolutions, and "wars of national liberation." Eleven distinguished political scientists and policy theorists offer a penetrating analysis of the theoretical and substantive aspects of revolution. Their scholarly, lucid, and well-balanced essays explore the revolutionary theories and experience of several centuries and apply them to the most crucial problem of this century. Carl J. Friedrich argues that it is the failure of government, which is at the core of the political revolution, and shows that constitutional regimes that have allowed "little revolutions" promoting gradual political and social change have been singularly free of revolutionary upheaval. Presenting the thinking of some of the best minds of the 20th century, this volume offers important guideposts for the future study of the etiology of revolutions. Here are not mere speculative and historical distillations, but new insights and conclusions regarding the origin, purpose, and impact of revolution on the world of today and tomorrow. An indispensable work for every student and scholar of comparative politics, international relations, and the history and theory of Communism, it will also be welcomed by the statesman and the educated layman who want to probe the causes of the historical upheavals of our time. Carl J. Friedrich was Eaton Professor of the Science of Government, Harvard University. During World War II he helped to found the School of Overseas Administration at Harvard to train officers for work in military government abroad, and he was its Director from 1943-1946. He was Professor of Political Science at the University of Heidelberg from 1956 to 1966, where he founded and helped to develop the Institut fr Politische Wissenschaft. He served as President of the American Political Science Association in 1962, the International Political Science Association from 1967-1970, and the Institut international de philosophie politique in 1969.