Knowing Illusion Bringing A Tibetan Debate Into Contemporary Discourse

"The two volumes of this study examine fundamental issues in Buddhist thought and practice, particularly the implications of the two truths (relative and ultimate). If, as Buddhist sources claim, all perceptions are overlaid with error, is it possible to have confidence in our knowledge of the world? If buddhas only perceive reality as it is, does this entail that they are incapable of relating to ordinary beings, who view their environment through a lens of false imaginings? Taktsang Sherap Rinchen, a 15th century Sakya scholar, explored the philosophical and practical ramifications of Madhyamaka antifoundationalism and accused Tsongkhapa, one of Tibet's most influential thinkers, of a fundamental incoherence that stems from an attempt to bring together the Epistemology tradition-which posits reliable epistemic instruments-and Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka-which rejects any attempt at foundationalism. Both Taktsang and Tsongkhapa claim to correctly interpret Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti but draw vastly different conclusions from their respective readings. The controversy Taktsang sparked has its roots in Indian debates regarding the implications of the two truths. These were further developed in Tibet and engaged some of Tibet's best minds for centuries. Our study, the first book length discussion of this literature, situates it in philosophical perspective, drawing parallels with contemporary global philosophy, and it also draws out the implications of the debate for the entire Buddhist enterprise of making sense of the world and presenting a path capable of leading beings to buddhahood"--

Tsongkhapa (1357-1419) is by any measure the single most influential philosopher in Tibetan history. His articulation of Prasangika Madhyamaka, and his interpretation of the 7th Century Indian philosopher Candrakirti's interpretation of Madhyamaka is the foundation for the understanding of that philosophical system in the Geluk school in Tibet. Tsongkhapa argues that Candrakirti shows that we can integrate the Madhyamaka doctrine of the two truths, and of the ultimate emptiness of all phenomena with a robust epistemology that explains how we can know both conventional and ultimate truth and distinguish truth from falsity within the conventional world. The Sakya scholar Taktsang Lotsawa (born 1405) published the first systematic critique of Tsongkhapa's system. In the fifth chapter of his Freedom from Extremes Accomplished through Comprehensive Knowledge of Philosophy, Taktsang attacks Tsongkhapa's understanding of Candrakirti and the cogency of integrating Prasangika Madhyamaka with any epistemology. This attack launches a debate between Geluk scholars on the one hand and Sakya and Kagyu scholars on the other regarding the proper understanding of this philosophical school and the place of epistemology in the Madhyamaka program. This debate raged with great ferocity from the 15th through the 18th centuries, and continues still today. The two volumes of Knowing Illusion study that debate and present translations of the most important texts produced in that context. Volume I: A Philosophical History of the Debate provides historical and philosophical background for this dispute and elucidates the philosophical issues at stake in the debate, exploring the principal arguments advanced by the principals on both sides, and setting them in historical context. This volume examines the ways in which the debate raises issues that are relevant to contemporary debates in epistemology, and concludes with two contributions by contemporary Tibetan scholars, one on each side of the debate.

Tsongkhapa (1357-1419) is by any measure the single most influential philosopher in Tibetan history. His articulation of Prasangika Madhyamaka, and his interpretation of the 7th Century Indian philosopher Candrakirti's interpretation of Madhyamaka is the foundation for the understanding of that philosophical system in the Geluk school in Tibet. Tsongkhapa argues that Candrakirti shows that we can integrate the Madhyamaka doctrine of the two truths, and of the ultimate emptiness of all phenomena with a robust epistemology that explains how we can know both conventional and ultimate truth and distinguish truth from falsity within the conventional world. The Sakya scholar Taktsang Lotsawa (born 1405) published the first systematic critique of Tsongkhapa's system. In the fifth chapter of his Freedom from Extremes Accomplished through Comprehensive Knowledge of Philosophy, Taktsang attacks Tsongkhapa's understanding of Candrakirti and the cogency of integrating Prasangika Madhyamaka with any epistemology. This attack launches a debate between Geluk scholars on the one hand and Sakya and Kagyu scholars on the other regarding the proper understanding of this philosophical school and the place of epistemology in the Madhyamaka program. This debate raged with great ferocity from the 15th through the 18th centuries, and continues still today. These two volumes study that debate and present translations of the most important texts produced in that context. Volume I provides historical and philosophical background for this dispute and elucidates the philosophical issues at stake in the debate, exploring the principal arguments advanced by the principals on both sides, and setting them in historical context. This volume presents English translations of each of the most important texts in this debate.

This two-volume set examines the Tibetan debate regarding the possibility of knowledge in the context of Madhyamaka initiated by the 15th century philosopher Taktsang's attack on Tsongkhapa's presentation of epistemology and Madhyamaka. Volume II presents translations of the principal texts.

This two-volume set examines the Tibetan debate regarding the possibility of knowledge in the context of Madhyamaka initiated by the 15th century philosopher Taktsang's attack on Tsongkhapa's presentation of epistemology and Madhyamaka. Volume II presents translations of the principal texts.

"The two volumes of this study examine fundamental issues in Buddhist thought and practice, particularly the implications of the two truths (relative and ultimate). If, as Buddhist sources claim, all perceptions are overlaid with error, is it possible to have confidence in our knowledge of the world? If buddhas only perceive reality as it is, does this entail that they are incapable of relating to ordinary beings, who view their environment through a lens of false imaginings? Taktsang Sherap Rinchen, a 15th century Sakya scholar, explored the philosophical and practical ramifications of Madhyamaka antifoundationalism and accused Tsongkhapa, one of Tibet's most influential thinkers, of a fundamental incoherence that stems from an attempt to bring together the Epistemology tradition-which posits reliable epistemic instruments-and Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka-which rejects any attempt at foundationalism. Both Taktsang and Tsongkhapa claim to correctly interpret Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti but draw vastly different conclusions from their respective readings. The controversy Taktsang sparked has its roots in Indian debates regarding the implications of the two truths. These were further developed in Tibet and engaged some of Tibet's best minds for centuries. Our study, the first book length discussion of this literature, situates it in philosophical perspective, drawing parallels with contemporary global philosophy, and it also draws out the implications of the debate for the entire Buddhist enterprise of making sense of the world and presenting a path capable of leading beings to buddhahood"--

All lineages of Tibetan Buddhism today claim allegiance to the philosophy of the Middle Way, the exposition of emptiness propounded by the second-century Indian master Nagarjuna. But not everyone interprets it the same way. A major faultline runs through Tibetan Buddhism around the interpretation of what are called the two truths--the deceptive truth of conventional appearances and the ultimate truth of emptiness. An understanding of this faultline illuminates the beliefs that separate the Gelug descendents of Tsongkhapa from contemporary Dzogchen and Mahamudra adherents. The Two Truths Debate digs into the debate of how the two truths are defined and how they are related by looking at two figures, one on either side of the faultline, and shows how their philosophical positions have dramatic implications for how one approaches Buddhist practice and how one understands enlightenment itself.

An insightful and illuminating survey of key insights into one of the most foundational and profound topics in Buddhist thought. In this clear and exemplary approach to one of the core philosophical subjects of the Buddhist tradition, Sonam Thakchoe guides readers through the range of Indian Buddhist philosophical schools and how each approaches the two truths: ultimate truth and conventional truth. In this presentation of philosophical systems, the detailed argumentations and analyses of each school’s approach to the two truths are presented to weave together the unique contributions each school brings to supporting and strengthening a Buddhist practitioner’s understanding of reality. The insights of the great scholars of Indian Buddhist history—such as Vasubandhu, Bhavaviveka, Kamalashila, Dharmakirti, Nagarjuna, and Chandrakirti—are illuminated in this volume, with profound implications for the practice and views of modern practitioners and scholars. The Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Yogachara, and Madhyamaka schools provide a framework for a continuum of philosophical debate that is far more interrelated, and internally complex, than one may presume. Yet we see how the schools build upon the findings of one another, leading from a belief in the realism of external phenomena to the relinquishment of any commitment to realism of either external or internal realities. This fascinating movement through philosophical approaches leads us to see how the conventional and ultimate—dependent arising and emptiness—are twin aspects of a single reality.