Lord Methuen And The British Army

This study analyzes the readiness of the British military establishment for war in 1899 and its performance in the South African War (1899-1902). It focuses on the career of Field Marshal Paul Sanford, 3rd Baron Methuen, whose traditional military training, used so effectively in Queen Victoria's small wars, was put to the test by the modern challenges of the South African War. A subsidiary aim of this work is to correct and refine the historical consensus that Methuen's campaing in the South African War was plagued by practical errors and poor judgement. The South African War was a crucial transitional episode in the history of the British army. Unlike Great Britain's other expeditions, it required the concentrated resources of the entire empire. It was a modern war in the sense that it employed the technology, the weaponry, the communications, and the transportation of the second industrial revolution.

Offers a revised and updated history of thirteen of the most significant British conflicts during the Victorian period.

This book examines the uniforms, equipment, history and organisation of the armies that fought in the Boer War. Both sides are covered, and the campaigns summarised. Uniforms are shown in full illustrated detail.

The next six weeks will be an anxious time for the British Empire. The war which begins as I write between three and four on Wednesday afternoon, October 11th, 1899, is a conflict for supremacy in South Africa between the Boer States, their aiders and abettors, and the British Empire. In point of resources the British Empire is so incomparably stronger than the Boer States that there ought to be no possibility of doubt about the issue. But the Boer States with all their resources are actually in the theatre of war, which is, separated by the wide oceans from all the sources of British power, from Great Britain, from India, from the Australian and Canadian colonies. The reinforcements ordered on September 8th have not yet all arrived, though the last transports are due to arrive during the next four or five days. After that no further reinforcements can be expected for a month, so that during the next few weeks the whole strength of the Boers, so far as it is available at all, can be employed against a mere fragment of the British power. To the gravity of this situation it would be folly to shut our eyes. It contains the possibility of disaster, though what the consequences of disaster now would involve must for the present be left unsaid. Yet it may be well to say one word on the origin of the unpleasant situation which exists, in order to prevent needless misgivings in case the first news should not be as favourable as we all hope. There is no sign of any mistake or neglect in the military department of the Army. The quantity and character of the force required to bring the war to a successful issue has been most carefully estimated in advance; every preparation which forethought can suggest has been thought out, so that the moment the word was given by the supreme authority, the Cabinet, the mobilisation and despatch of the forces could begin and proceed without a hitch. The Army was never in better condition either as regards the zeal and skill of its officers from the highest to the lowest, the training and discipline of the men, or the organisation of all branches of the service. Nor is the present condition of the Army good merely by comparison with what it was twenty years ago. A very high standard has been attained, and those who have watched the Army continuously for many years feel confident that all ranks and all arms will do their duty. The present situation, in which the Boers start favourably handicapped for five weeks certain, is the foreseen consequence of the decision of the Cabinet to postpone the measures necessary for the defence of the British colonies and for attack upon the Boer States. This decision is not attributable to imperfect information. It was regarded as certain so long ago as December last, by those in a position to give the best forecast, that the Boers of both States meant war with the object of establishing Boer supremacy. The Cabinet, therefore, has knowingly and deliberately taken upon itself the responsibility for whatever risks are now run. In this deliberate decision of the Cabinet lies the best ground for hoping that the risks are not so great as they seem.

Field-Marshal French is best known for his military services during the First World War; however, his military service stretches back through to his commands in the Boer War. In his campaigns with the newly formed cavalry division he was to receive much acclaim and praise for his adroit handling of his troops and their effectiveness against the largely irregular Boers. He won the battle of Elanslaagte and, having escaped the encirclement of Ladysmith, led his troops on to the capture of Bloemfontain and the relief of Kimberley. Tough and uncompromising, he became a celebrity with the papers back home, his character summed up by the verse: “E’s so tough and terse ‘E don’t want no bloomin’ nurse and ‘E ain’t had one reverse Ave yer, French?” This book charts Colonel French’s adventurous division across the vledts and kops of the South African landscape with pace and verve. The author, John George Maydon, was a prominent member of the Natal parliament that accompanied Colonel French on his cavalry campaign and writes from this unique perspective combining local South African knowledge with a loyalist viewpoint.

Lessons of the War: Being Comments from Week to Week to the Relief of Ladysmith is a commentary on the Boer War by Spenser Wilkinson. was the first Chichele Professor of Military History at Oxford University. Excerpt: "When the Boers sent their ultimatum they knew that fifty thousand British troops were under orders for South Africa, and that for six weeks the British forces in the theatre of war could not be substantially increased. As they were of opinion that no settlement of the dispute satisfactory to England could possibly be satisfactory to themselves they had resolved upon fighting. If we assume, as we are bound to do, that they had really faced the situation and thought it out, they must have had in their minds some course of action by which if they should begin the war on October 11th they would be likely to gain their end: the recognition of the sovereignty of the Transvaal. They could hardly expect to disarm the British Empire and dictate peace, but they might hope to make the occupation of their country so difficult that Great Britain would be tired of the effort before the moment of success. The Boer defence taken altogether could hope to do no more than to gain time, during which some outside embarrassment might cripple Great Britain; there might be a rising at the Cape, or some other Power might interfere."