Low Intensity Conflict

Low intensity conflicts (or LICs) are motivated and sustained by a strong ideology—be it economic, political, ethnic or psychological. Through a sustained process of attrition, these often protracted struggles are capable of bringing the state to its knees, besides draining the exchequer and resulting in the loss of many lives. This important book is the first comprehensive account of LICs in India from 1947 to the present. The conflicts covered in detail are: - Militancy in both Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir - The complex problems in the North-East - The agitation for Gorkhaland and Naxalite violence. Lt Col Vivek Chadha covers all facets of these LICs including their causes and origins, the factors that sustain them and the trajectory of each. He provides a comparative analysis of the causes of these conflicts and examines the state’s response in dealing with them. Insightful, objective and lucidly written, this book will attract a wide readership among army, paramilitary and police personnel as well as administrators, policy-makers and students of strategic studies.

A common thread ties together the five case studies of this book: the persistence with which the bilateral relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union continues to dominate American foreign and regional policies. These essays analyze the LIC environment in Central Asia, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa.

Drawn from current Army doctrine, this concise and readable manual offers combat leaders and staff officers tactical-level guidance for commanding, planning, coordinating, and controlling operations in a low-intensity environment.

Low Intensity Operations is an important, controversial and prophetic book that has had a major influence on the conduct of modern warfare. First published in 1971, it was the result of an academic year Frank Kitson spent at University College, Oxford, under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence, to write a paper on the way in which the army should be prepared to deal with future insurgency and peacekeeping operations. Its findings and propositions are as striking as when the work was first published. 'To understand the nature of revolutionary warfare, one cannot do better than read Low Intensity Operations... The author has had unrivalled experience of such operations in many parts of the world.' Daily Telegraph 'A highly practical analysis of subversion, insurgency and peacekeeping operations... Frank Kitson's book is not merely timely but important.' The Economist

This volume aims to operationalize General John R. Galvin's call for a new paradigm to fight the most prevalent form of conflict in the world today-insurgency. It contributes to the understanding needed to formulate and implement efforts in the contemporary international security arena.

This book grew from an opportunity to study a third world air force fighting an externally supported insurgency. The players were the Royal Moroccan Air Force and the Polisario, the latter trying to wrest control of the Western Sahara from the Kingdom of Morocco. The United States has also been a player in the Morocco-Polisario war as the source of much of Moroccos war material, especially the weapons used by the Royal Moroccan Air Force. Help from the United States was especially important when the Polisario deployed Soviet-built SA-6 surface-to-air missiles to counter the growing effectiveness of the Royal Moroccan Air Force. For many reasons, the United States and the US Air Force were not able to assist the Moroccans effectively. The Moroccan-Polisario-US scenario that provides the basis for this study was a tiny aspect of US foreign and military policy in the early 1980s. But it shows a political-military problem that deserves a good deal of thought now. That problem simply stated is: How is the United States going to exert political-military influence in the third world during the next twenty years? Clearly, overall US influence in the third world will be a combination of political, military, economic, and social activity. But the military, in many cases, will be the most visible form of assistance, and one upon which the recipient nation will depend for immediate results. Are the military components as instruments of national policy able to act effectively in the third world? If not, what needs to be done? Colonel Deans study makes a significant contribution to the growing body of literature on low-intensity conflict.