Manana Es San Peron Pb

Concerned primarily with the formation of political culture, Plotkin (Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero, Argentina) explores the mechanisms of political consent (both active and passive) used by the authoritarian regime of Juan Domingo Peron to maintain and extend its power. Peronist political imagery and the institutional framework that supported the creation of the "symbolic apparatus" are examined. Going beyond traditional explanations that have concentrated on Peron's support among the organized working class, Plotkin looks into his mobilization of marginal sectors of the population (non-unionized workers, women, and the poor). Translated from the 1993 Spanish- language work. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Updated and revised with many new detailed maps and photographs, this sixth edition enables geographers to explore the changes and major issues facing this dynamic region today. The historical material has been streamlined in order to focus on contemporary issues. Key environmental issues are highlighted in new boxes throughout the chapters. The Systematic surveys have been restructured. New profiles of Latin American countries and major issues are also covered. This approach will help geographers visit the dynamic people and places of Latin America.

"This book is important and timely, bringing together some of the world's leading economists. The theory chapters provide new insights and apply new developments in contract theory to the problems of natural resources and credible host country policies. The case studies provide up-to-date illustrations of the difficulties and development of host country policy in Latin America and the UK." Roderick Duncan, Charles Sturt University, Australia "This book is likely to become a standard reference in the area of natural resources and credible host country policies-coming, as it does, with a solid grounding in modern economic theory." Tim Worrall, University of Manchester Volatility in commodity prices has been accompanied by perpetual renegotiation of contracts between private investors in natural resource production and the governments of states with mineral and energy wealth. When prices skyrocket, governments want a larger share of revenues, sometimes to the point of nationalization or expropriation; when prices fall, larger state participation becomes a burden and the private sectoris called back in. Recent and newsworthy changes in the price of oil (which fell from an all-time high of $147 in mid-2008 to $40 by year's end) are notable for their speed and the steepness of their rise and fall, but the up-and-down pattern itself is not unusual. If the unpredictability of commodity prices is so predictable, why do contracts not allow for this with mechanisms that would provide a more stable commercial framework? In The Natural Resources Trap, top scholars address this guestion in terms of both theory and practice. Theoretical contributions range across a number of fields, from contract theory to public finance, and treat topics that include taxation, royalties, and expropriation cycles. Case studies examine experiences in the U.K., Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela, and other parts of the world. --Book Jacket.

A challenging new work of cultural and political theory rethinks the concept of hegemony.