Material Ethics Of Value Max Scheler And Nicolai Hartmann

Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann developed ethics upon a phenomenological basis. This volume demonstrates that their contributions to a material ethics of value are complementary: by supplementing the work of one with that of the other, we obtain a comprehensive and defensible axiological and moral theory. By “phenomenology,” we refer to an intuitive procedure that attempts to describe thematically the insights into essences, or the meaning-elements of judgments, that underlie and make possible our conscious awareness of a world and the evaluative judgments we make of the objects and persons we encounter in the world.

Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann developed ethics upon a phenomenological basis. This volume demonstrates that their contributions to a material ethics of value are complementary: by supplementing the work of one with that of the other, we obtain a comprehensive and defensible axiological and moral theory. By “phenomenology,” we refer to an intuitive procedure that attempts to describe thematically the insights into essences, or the meaning-elements of judgments, that underlie and make possible our conscious awareness of a world and the evaluative judgments we make of the objects and persons we encounter in the world.

Since the nineteenth century, moral philosophy in the Western world has been dominated by utilitarianism, Kantianism, and relativism. Only a few philosophers have been able to escape from this Procrustean bed. Foremost among these few is Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950). Together with Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger, Hartmann was instrumental in restoring metaphysics. Hartmann's metaphysics differs markedly from that of both Bergson and Heidegger, in his indebtedness to Plato. In 1926, Hartmann published a massive treatise, Ethik, which was translated into English by Stanton Coit and published as Ethics in 1932. Ethics is probably the most outstanding treatise on moral philosophy in the twentieth century. The central concept of the book is "value." Drawing upon the pre-modern view of ethics, Hartmann maintains that values are objectively given, part and parcel of the order of being. We cannot invent values, we can merely discover them. The first part of Ethics is concerned with the structure of ethical phenomena and criticizes utilitarianism, Kantianism, and relativism as misleading approaches. After some introductory thoughts concerning the competence of practical philosophy, Hartmann discusses the essence of moral values, including their absoluteness and ideal being, and the essence of the "ought." Hartmann is both controversial and compelling. He provides a moral philosophy that rejects the subjectivism of the ruling approaches, without taking recourse to older theological notions on the foundation of the ethical. In sum: Hartmann's Ethics constitutes an impressive and preeminent contribution to moral philosophy. Nicolai Hartmann was born in 1882 in Riga, Latvia, of German parents. He studied philosophy and classics, first in St. Petersburg and later in Marburg, where he was appointed to a chair of philosophy in 1920. In 1931, after a short spell at the University of Cologne, Hartmann was offered the prestigious chair of philosophy by the University of Berlin, where he lectured until the end of the war, untainted by Nazism. From 1945 until his death in 1950 he held a chair of philosophy at the University of Gttingen. Andreas A.M. Kinneging is associate professor in legal philosophy at the University of Leiden, and author of several works in normative theory and intellectual history, including Aristocracy, Antiquity, and History: Classicism in Political Thought, published by Transaction.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This volume explores Max Scheler’s role within the philosophical and sociological debates of his time into the 21st century. Scheler was an interpreter, a transmitter of, and respondent to the philosophical and sociological tradition. He was an interlocutor for his contemporaries, and an inspiration for subsequent and current debates in philosophy, psychology, and political thought. Both young and established scholars shed light on central and less investigated aspects of Scheler’s thought, such as the question of moral facts, personal individuality, cosmopolitanism, and opportunities for intercultural understanding. The contributors delve into Scheler’s influence on thinkers such as Tischner or Løgstrup, as well as his role as a key figure within Catholic thought. The book appeals to students and researchers while exploring how engaging with Scheler can benefit contemporary debates on embodiment, psychopathology, and value pluralism.