Military And Political Leaders Success

What is success in war? Who defines success? A review of past theorists such as Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Jomini and Clausewitz along with modern scholars such as William Martel, Azar Gat, and J. Boone Bartholomees produces a model for understanding success. First, success must be defined using political terms. Since war is a political endeavor at the strategic level, success in war must be defined using political language. Politicians and military leaders must define the objectives of war and convince the population that the political condition has improved using whatever political language is required for the given situation. Military tactical language is not sufficient for defining success at the political level. Second, the political leaders must define the desired objective for the military campaign. Political leaders understand politics and the nature of the population. Military leaders should help political leaders define success in war. Politicians understand the population and military leaders understand the theory and history of war. Third, the political condition that exists at the end of the war determines whether the war was successful. Victory in battle is important but is not always necessary for success. War must improve the political condition. Finally, a review of two US conflicts in Lebanon against the success model demonstrates its utility. The political and military leaders in Lebanon 1958 followed the theory of the model and achieved a successful outcome for the conflict. The political and military leaders of Lebanon 1983 did not adhere to the theory of the success model and were unable to achieve success. Although adherence to the model will not ensure future success, it can be used to help political and military leaders better prepare for future conflict.

Fifty-five of the world's greatest military and political leaders share their formulas for success What is the key to success? To begin with, said Thomas Jefferson, "one must determine never to be idle." According to Calvin Coolidge, "Persistence and determination are omnipotent." For General Norman Schwarzkopf, successful leadership was, above all, a product of integrity. "Leadership is a potent combination of strategy and character. But if you must be without one, be without the strategy." While the individual leaders profiled in this inspiring book had their own personal formula for success, all shared certain essential attributes. From Alexander the Great to Colin Powell, Sitting Bull to Ronald Reagan, these remarkable people possessed discipline, courage, tenacity and a willingness to take risks and learn from their mistakes. And despite vast geographical and cultural differences across far-reaching periods in time, these leaders' examples continue to teach us important lessons about achieving greatness. Discover how: Tecumseh forged an Indian confederacy stretching from Missouri to Canada General Patton's formula for war --speed, simplicity, and boldness -- led his troops to victory Queen Elizabeth I brought Britain into an age of unprecedented prosperity and growth Ulysses S. Grant turned the tide in the Civil War Winston Churchill led his nation through World War II and won the Nobel Prize for literature

Success in war has always been difficult to measure. What is judged successful by military leaders may not be judged so by political leadership, nor by the wider public, at least in a Western-style democracy. The public is generally inclined to applaud military victory, but it instinctively reserves the right to ask afterwards: Was it really worth it? In Political Victory, Brian Crozier looks at modern wars involving democracies to evaluate victory and defeat by the success or failure of political outcomes. Crozier begins with the two world wars, where in both cases the German aggressor was defeated by three key democracies: the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. In World War I military victory was squandered by treaty terms that led to the advent of Hitler and Nazism. By contrast, the total defeat of Nazism in 1945 left the Western Allies in charge of some two-thirds of Germany's population, thus enabling the victors to convert the vanquished to democracy. Crozier also deals with the break up of empires following World War II, comparing how Britain avoided full-scale war in contrast with France's violent confrontations in Southeast Asia and Algeria. America's involvement in Vietnam is analyzed in the wider context of the Cold War and the mounting challenge of international communism to Western democracies. His assessment stresses the lack of popularity in America for the idea of democratizing a region to which the U.S. has no historical or sentimental attachment. Among the smaller conflicts considered in this volume are the Suez crisis of 1956, the Falkland Island war between Britain and Argentina, and the fateful Soviet involvement in Afghanistan that helped bring about the collapse of the Soviet system. Crozier concludes with analyses of the 1991 Gulf War and the Western intervention in the former Yugoslavia. Crozier's final chapters focus on looming threats around the world with particular emphasis on international terrorism and the challenge of radical Islam. Both historical and timely, Political Victory will be of interest to military historians, political scientists, and foreign affairs specialists. Brian Crozier is a journalist and historian. He is the author of more than twenty books including The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, The Gorbachev Phenomenon, Socialism: Dream and Reality, DeGaulle, and Franco.

Joseph Nye coined the term "soft power" in the late 1980s. It is now used frequently—and often incorrectly—by political leaders, editorial writers, and academics around the world. So what is soft power? Soft power lies in the ability to attract and persuade. Whereas hard power—the ability to coerce—grows out of a country's military or economic might, soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. Hard power remains crucial in a world of states trying to guard their independence and of non-state groups willing to turn to violence. It forms the core of the Bush administration's new national security strategy. But according to Nye, the neo-conservatives who advise the president are making a major miscalculation: They focus too heavily on using America's military power to force other nations to do our will, and they pay too little heed to our soft power. It is soft power that will help prevent terrorists from recruiting supporters from among the moderate majority. And it is soft power that will help us deal with critical global issues that require multilateral cooperation among states. That is why it is so essential that America better understands and applies our soft power. This book is our guide.

Success in war ultimately depends on the consolidation of political order. Nadia Schadlow argues that the steps needed to consolidate a new political order are not separate from war. They are instead an essential component of war and victory. --James Mattis, USMC (Ret.), Hoover Institution "H-War"

The author helps readers figure out which leaders matter, why, and when - and what lessons they can learn from those who do matter. Leaders from politics and business are profiled, they include: Abraham Lincoln, Neville Chamberlain, Woodrow Wilson, Thomas Jefferson, Winston Churchill, Jamie Dimon, Al Dunlap, Sir Jacky Fisher, and Judah Folkman.

First published in 1986, Military Power and Politics in Black Africa explores many themes that concerned military power and politics in sub-Saharan Africa at the time of publication. Adopting a thematic approach, the book considers the nature of both intervention and disengagement and looks at the relationship between civilian and military institutions. The final chapters put forward arguments for the importance of foreign intervention in the politics and civil-military relations of African states.

Today's protracted asymmetrical conflicts confuse efforts to measure progress, often inviting politics and wishful thinking to replace objective evaluation. In Assessing War, military historians, social scientists, and military officers explore how observers have analyzed the trajectory of war in American conflicts from the Seven Years’ War through the war in Afghanistan. Drawing on decades of acquired expertise, the contributors examine wartime assessment in both theory and practice and, through alternative dimensions of assessment such as justice and proportionality, the war of ideas and economics. This group of distinguished authors grapples with both conventional and irregular wars and emerging aspects of conflict—such as cyberwar and nation building—that add to the complexities of the modern threat environment. The volume ends with recommendations for practitioners on best approaches while offering sobering conclusions about the challenges of assessing war without politicization or self-delusion. Covering conflicts from the eighteenth century to today, Assessing War blends focused advice and a uniquely broad set of case studies to ponder vital questions about warfare's past—and its future. The book includes a foreword by Gen. George W. Casey Jr. (USA, Ret.), former chief of staff of the US Army and former commander, Multi-National Force–Iraq.