Military Assistance And Foreign Policy

This timely work presents cutting-edge analysis of the problems of U.S. foreign assistance programs - why these problems have not been solved in the past, and how they might be solved in the future. The book focuses primarily on U.S. foreign assistance and foreign policy as they apply to nation building, governance, and democratization. The expert contributors examine issues currently in play, and also trace the history and evolution of many of these problems over the years. They address policy concerns as well as management and organizational factors as they affect programs and policies. "Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy" includes several chapter-length case studies (on Iraq, Pakistan, Ghana, Haiti, and various countries in Eastern Europe and Africa), but the bulk of the book presents broad coverage of general topics such as foreign aid and security, NGOs and foreign aid, capacity building, and building democracy abroad. Each chapter offers recommendations on how to improve the U.S. system of aid in the context of foreign policy.

One major dilemma regarding US foreign policy is when and how the US should address human rights around the globe and what responsibility exists for the US to promote human rights in the countries that receive US aid. Does US policy for foreign assistance really address human rights or is it merely another instrument in the US foreign policy toolbox? This insightful book addresses several key themes and questions revolving around the complex nature of US foreign policy and human rights. It examines US foreign policy and human rights, as well as the evolution of US assistance, and includes empirical evidence and case studies of Plan Colombia, Turkey and the war on terror, India and Pakistan. It closes with a look at the future of foreign aid.

American foreign policy since 1947 cannot be understood apart from the U.S. security assistance program. Beginning with Truman, every president has considered security assistance programs important means for furthering U.S. national interests. Security assistance has been used to support a wide variety of policies, including the Truman Doctrine and containment, the underwriting of the Camp David Accords, and the channeling of aid to the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe. American foreign policy since 1947 cannot be understood apart from the U.S. security assistance program. Beginning with Truman, every president has considered security assistance programs important means for furthering U.S. national interests. Security assistance has been used to support a wide variety of policies, including the Truman Doctrine and containment, the underwriting of the Camp David Accords, and the channeling of aid to the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This book provides a comprehensive treatment of the program from 1947 through fiscal year 1996. After discussing the legal foundations and components of the program, the authors provide an historical survey from 1947 through the first Clinton administration. They then detail the role of Congress, public opinion, and interest groups. Separate treatment is given to countries such as Israel, Egypt, Greece, and Turkey. The authors also suggest ideas on how the programs can be changed to mesh with American objectives and resources in the 21st century. This is a major study of interest to students, scholars, researchers, and policymakers.

This work provides a theoretical and historical examination of the relationship between provision of military assistance and success in achieving donor aims. Eight case studies, which include the American Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Vietnam War, are examined to assess four prominent features of the donor-recipient relationship: the convergence of donor and recipient aims; donor control; commitment of donor military forces; and coherence of donor policies and strategies. As an essential part of the expanding body of multidisciplinary international scholarship, this book links history and theory to policy and narrows the gap between economics, political science, and military strategy. Each chapter refines the relevant features of the observed donor-recipient relationships into a pattern for comparison with other episodes. The final chapter collects the observations, compares them, and develops a set of uniformities that suggest a prototypical, successful donor-recipient relationship, suitable for direct application as a policy paradigm or for theoretical investigation. Mott suggests that both donor and recipient governments can use military assistance as a deliberate instrument of national policy and military strategy to achieve national aims.