Military Buildup On Guam Costs And Challenges In Meeting Construction Timelines

The rapid modernization of the Chinese Navy is a well-documented reality of the post-Cold War world. In two decades, the People's Liberation Army Navy has evolved from a backward force composed of obsolete platforms into a reasonably modern fleet whose growth is significantly shaking the naval balance in East Asia. The rationale behind China's contemporary rise at sea remains, however, difficult to grasp and few people have tried to see how the current structure of the international system has shaped Chinese choices. This book makes sense of Chinese priorities in its naval modernization in a 'robust' offensive realist framework. Drawing on Barry Posen's works on sources of military doctrine, it argues that the orientation of Beijing's choices concerning its naval forces can essentially be explained by China's position as a potential regional hegemon. Yves-Heng Lim highlights how a rising state develops naval power to fulfil its security objectives, a theoretical perspective that goes farther than the sole Chinese case.

The Department of Defense's (DOD) plans to increase the U.S. military presence on Guam are expected to increase the island's current military population by about two and a half times by 2020. DOD plans to fund DOD-owned and on-base infrastructure to support the military realignment and buildup, such as roads, buildings, and other facilities, while the government of Guam is expected to be largely responsible for funding and constructing government of Guam-owned off-base roads and utilities and providing certain public services. We have previously reported that the government of Guam faces significant challenges in addressing the impacts of the buildup and realignment. The government of Guam established the Civilian-Military Task Force in April 2006 to identify and develop cost estimates for potential nondefense projects and programs needed to support the larger military presence. The processes used by the government of Guam to develop the key cost estimates for planned off-base projects and programs varied depending on project or program value, complexity, and size; whether independent consultants provided input; and the extent to which DOD provided data to help set project requirements. As a result, the estimates prepared to date vary in quality, and the overall costs to develop supporting off-base infrastructure are still uncertain. In commenting on this report, DOD stated that it accurately characterizes the challenges that both DOD and Guam face in developing cost estimates for off-base projects and programs designed to deal with the impact of the military buildup and realignment on Guam. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate into this report. DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in enclosure II.

As the U.S. military presence in the Middle East winds down, Asia and the Pacific are receiving increased attention from the American national security community. The Obama administration has announced a “rebalancing” of the U.S. military posture in the region, in reaction primarily to the startling improvement in Chinese air and naval capabilities over the last decade or so. This timely study sets out to assess the implications of this shift for the long-established U.S. military presence in Asia and the Pacific. This presence is anchored in a complex basing infrastructure that scholars—and Americans generally—too often take for granted. In remedying this state of affairs, this volume offers a detailed survey and analysis of this infrastructure, its history, the political complications it has frequently given rise to, and its recent and likely future evolution. American seapower requires a robust constellation of bases to support global power projection. Given the rise of China and the emergence of the Asia-Pacific as the center of global economic growth and strategic contention, nowhere is American basing access more important than in this region. Yet manifold political and military challenges, stemming not least of which from rapidly-improving Chinese long-range precision strike capabilities, complicate the future of American access and security here. This book addresses what will be needed to maintain the fundaments of U.S. seapower and force projection in the Asia-Pacific, and where the key trend lines are headed in that regard. This book demonstrates that U.S. Asia-Pacific basing and access is increasingly vital, yet increasingly vulnerable. It demands far more attention than the limited coverage it has received to date, and cannot be taken for granted. More must be done to preserve capabilities and access upon which American and allied security and prosperity depend.