Minimal Morality

Michael Moehler develops a novel multilevel social contract theory tailored to the conditions of societies that are deeply morally pluralistic. Such societies must cope with a variety of values and traditions: Moehler defines the minimal behavioral restrictions that are necessary to ensure mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation.

Michael Moehler develops a novel multilevel social contract theory. In contrast to existing theories in the liberal tradition, it does not merely assume a restricted form of reasonable moral pluralism, but is tailored to the conditions of deeply morally pluralistic societies which may be populated by liberal moral agents, nonliberal moral agents, and, according to the traditional understanding of morality, nonmoral agents alike. Moehler draws on the history of the social contract tradition, especially the work of Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Rawls, and Gauthier, as well as on the work of some of the critics of this tradition, such as Sen and Gaus. Moehler's two-level contractarian theory holds that morality in its best contractarian version for the conditions of deeply morally pluralistic societies entails Humean, Hobbesian, and Kantian moral features. The theory defines the minimal behavioral restrictions that are necessary to ensure, compared to violent conflict resolution, mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in deeply morally pluralistic societies. The theory minimizes the problem of compliance in morally diverse societies by maximally respecting the interests of all members of society. Despite its ideal nature, the theory is, in principle, applicable to the real world and, for the conditions described, most promising for securing mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in a world in which a fully just society, due to moral diversity, is unattainable. If Rawls' intention was to carry the traditional social contract argument to a higher level of abstraction, then the two-level contractarian theory brings it back down to earth.

Winner: 2002 Choice Outstanding Academic Title Award What are human rights? What justifies us in believing we have them? What are rights-holders and duty-bearers? Who should bear the costs and responsibilities for making human rights real? Why have some criticized the human rights perspective? And how can those supportive of human rights best respond? These and other conceptual issues are discussed in full in the first part of this book. The second part offers a detailed account of how the human rights idea came to be such a powerful force in the contemporary world; it traces the evolution of human rights from their origins to their present position in our daily lives, in political struggles, and in both national and international law.

Life typically becomes an object of reflection when it is seen to be under threat. In particular, humans have a tendency to engage in thinking about life (instead of just continuing to live it) when being confronted with the prospect of death: be it the death of individuals due to illness, accident or old age; the death of whole ethnic or national groups in wars and other forms of armed conflict; but also of whole populations, be they human or nonhuman. Even though Minimal Ethics for the Anthropocene is first and foremost concerned with life-understood as both a biological and social phenomenon-it is the narrative about the impending death of the human population (i.e., about the extinction of the human species), that provides a context for its argument. "Anthropocene" names a geo-historical period in which humans are said to have become the biggest threat to life on earth. However, rather than as a scientific descriptor, the term serves here primarily as an ethical injunction to think critically about human and nonhuman agency in the universe. Restrained in tone yet ambitious in scope, the book takes some steps towards outlining a minimal ethics thought on a universal scale. The task of such minimal ethics is to consider how humans can assume responsibility for various occurrences in the universe, across different scales, and how they can respond to the tangled mesh of connections and relations unfolding in it. Its goal is not so much to tell us how to live but rather to allow us to rethink "life" and what we can do with it, in whatever time we have left. The book embraces a speculative mode of thinking that is more akin to the artist's method; it also includes a photographic project by the author. This work was published by Saint Philip Street Press pursuant to a Creative Commons license permitting commercial use. All rights not granted by the work's license are retained by the author or authors.

. . . Roth s book is useful and valuable. Using modern secular thought as his starting point, he reaches roughly the same conclusions that one would reach reasoning from the older Christian tradition. There is certainly much to like about that effort. Paul A. Cleveland, Markets & Morality This book is one of the best discussions of welfare economics since Murray Rothbard s classic paper of 1956 Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics . David Gordon, The Mises Review Timothy Roth shows that social welfare theory, as currently defended by welfare economists and policymakers, is based on a confused and untenable moral theory, is incompatible with a rights-based legal order and is bound to promote unjust and arbitrary redistributions. By advocating a return to the Kantian conception of the moral agent, Roth shows the way to a normative economics that harmonizes with both intuitive morality and the American legal and constitutional tradition. Roger Scruton, Writer and Philosopher, formerly University Professor and Professor of Philosophy at Boston University, US The moral imperative of individual autonomy, embodied in the Kantian Rawlsian perspective on social order, cannot be reconciled with the utilitarian presuppositions that inform normative applications of modern economics. This book exposes the contradictions that are present when the basic philosophical foundations are ignored, a stance that is, unfortunately, characteristic of much modern discourse as well as political practice. James M. Buchanan, George Mason University, US and a Nobel Laureate At a time when technical economics dominates the thinking of much of the profession, it is important to be reminded that economics has roots in moral philosophy. Certainly this book, which deftly explores the ethical prior commitments underlying economic analysis, succeeds in bringing philosophical issues to the forefront. But it does more. Roth s closely reasoned study provides a clear exposition of the Kantian Rawlsian approach to public policy, and thus is able to establish a convincing critique of orthodox welfare theory. In general, the book offers a valuable change of perspective on social questions. Eirik G. Furubotn, Texas A&M University, US Because it is technically flawed and morally bankrupt, the author argues, the economist s consequence-based, procedurally detached theory of the state has contributed to the growth of government. As part of the Kantian Rawlsian contractarian project, this book seeks to return economics to its foundations in moral philosophy. Given the moral equivalence of persons, the greatest possible equal participation must be promoted, persons must be impartially treated and, because it is grounded in consequentialist social welfare theory (SWT), the economist s theory of the state must be rejected. Ad hoc deployment of SWT has facilitated discriminatory rent seeking and contributed to larger government. In contrast, this book argues that equal political participation and a constitutional impartiality constraint minimize rent seeking, respect individual perceptions of the public good and underwrite the legitimacy of government. Economists, moral philosophers and political scientists will find this book a unique contribution to the literature.

This book addresses fundamental questions about marriage in moral and political philosophy. It examines promise, commitment, care, and contract to argue that marriage is not morally transformative. It argues that marriage discriminates against other forms of caring relationships and that, legally, restrictions on entry should be minimized.

In this final revision of the classic work, the author has produced the fullest and most sophisticated account of this influential theoretical model. Here, he makes clear that morality is an informal system that does not provide unique answers to every moral question but does always limit the range of morally acceptable options, and so explains why some moral disagreements cannot be resolved. The importance placed on the moral ideals also makes clear that the moral rules are only one part of the moral system. A chapter that is devoted to justifying violations of the rules illustrates how the moral rules are embedded in the system and cannot be adequately understood independently of it. The chapter on reasons includes a new account of what makes one reason better than another and elucidates the complex hybrid nature of rationality.

This book explores the role of artificial intelligence in the development of a claim that morality is person-made and rational. Professor Danielson builds moral robots that do better than amoral competitors in a tournament of games like the Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken. The book thus engages in current controversies over the adequacy of the received theory of rational choice. It sides with Gauthier and McClennan, who extend the devices of rational choice to include moral constraint. Artificial Morality goes further, by promoting communication, testing and copying of principles and by stressing empirical tests.