Modern Insurgencies And Counterinsurgencies

Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies explores how unconventional warfare tactics have opposed past and present governments all over the world, from eighteenth-century guerrilla warfare to the urban terrorism of today. Insurgency remains one of the most prevalent forms of conflict and presents a crucial challenge to the international communi

Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies explores how unconventional warfare tactics have opposed past and present governments all over the world, from eighteenth-century guerrilla warfare to the urban terrorism of today. Insurgency remains one of the most prevalent forms of conflict and presents a crucial challenge to the international communi

Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies explores how unconventional warfare tactics have opposed past and present governments all over the world, from eighteenth-century guerrilla warfare to the urban terrorism of today. Insurgency remains one of the most prevalent forms of conflict and presents a crucial challenge to the international community, governments and the military.In addition to examining the tactics of guerrilla leaders such as Lawrence, Mao, Guevara and Marighela, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies also analyses the counter-insurgency theories.

This book provides a historical study of the theory and praxis of modern insurgencies and counterinsurgencies (COIN). Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: A Global History shows that the insurgents can wage a variety of conflicts: at times conventional war which lies at the high end of their spectrum, and terrorism which is located at the lowest end of their scale. When insurgencies reach a certain critical threshold, the insurgents shift their strategy from guerrilla (irregular) war to conventional (regular) war, and at that point the level of conflict escalates to the level of civil war. When the insurgents face intense state repression, they revert to terrorist activities. When the insurgents wage guerrilla war, they can be called guerrillas. The variety of wars conducted by the insurgents is termed as unconventional war. This volume demonstrates that the insurgents in the modern world had been motivated by a trinity: greed, grievances and ideology. Kaushik Roy traces the origin of modern insurgencies and COIN from the sixteenth century by focusing on regions outside Western Eurasia. He also touches on the twin interrelated phenomena of modern insurgencies and COIN metastasising into something new at the beginning of the Information Revolution at the end of the twentieth century. This volume will be of interest to researchers and research students of history, British Empire, imperial studies, Asian studies, security studies, strategic studies, and war and conflict studies.

Exploring how unconventional warfare tactics have opposed past and present governments all over the world, this text examines the tactics of Lawrence, Mao, Guevara and Marighela and the counterinsurgency theories of Callwell, Thompson and Kitson.

A study of the evolving 'national styles' of conducting insurgencies and counter-insurgency, as influenced by transnational trends, ideas and practices.

A collection of original works covering all aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency through a multinational lens, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War addresses the need to look beyond the United States and other prominent counterinsurgency actors in the contemporary world. It also reassesses some of the latent and burgeoning insurgent organizations and networks around the globe and suggests alternative approaches to understanding insurgency, counterinsurgency, and conventional and asymmetric warfare as they relate to insurgency and counterinsurgency. This book makes significant contributions to international and interdisciplinary discussions regarding the seminal features of insurgency and counterinsurgency in modern warfare. It also relates topics with terrorism in the post-9/11 era, including the historical roots of insurgency, radicalism in Europe, and regional radical groups like al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba. It emphasizes how issues around insurgency, counterinsurgency, and terrorism permeate or evolve into particular forms of warfare, military operations, and related governmental activities. Using a diversified lens of analysis, the chapters illustrate key elements that spawn insurgency such as insurgents’ beliefs, motivations, aims, leadership characteristics, recruitment methods, operations planning, and responses to state and non-state efforts to contain insurgency. The book also examines how certain terrorist and insurgent operations can remain in the shadows and become secret wars beneath the growing surface threats they pose to the societies in which they breed activity. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War takes a unique look at a subject that has become widely studied and written about in reaction to modern terrorism and insurgency. It analyzes conditions under which insurgency and counterinsurgency occur from nuanced perspectives that have not previously received full consideration.

When a country is threatened by an insurgency, what efforts give its government the best chance of prevailing? Contemporary discourse on this subject is voluminous and often contentious. Advice for the counterinsurgent is often based on little more than common sense, a general understanding of history, or a handful of detailed examples, instead of a solid, systematically collected body of historical evidence. A 2010 RAND study challenged this trend with rigorous analyses of all 30 insurgencies that started and ended between 1978 and 2008. This update to that original study expanded the data set, adding 41 new cases and comparing all 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide since World War II. With many more cases to compare, the study was able to more rigorously test the previous findings and address critical questions that the earlier study could not. For example, it could examine the approaches that led counterinsurgency forces to prevail when an external actor was involved in the conflict. It was also able to address questions about timing and duration, such as which factors affect the duration of insurgencies and the durability of the resulting peace, as well as how long historical counterinsurgency forces had to engage in effective practices before they won.