Money Laundering And Terrorism Financing Risks Posed By Alternative Remittance In Australia

Governments, through their regulatory bodies, typically regulate formal financial sector players such as banks, which can leave providers working in informal remittance systems outside regulatory channels. Value transfer services financial transfers performed domestically or across borders on behalf of clients are essential to the financial system, and as such, are often offered by both formal and informal actors. Law enforcement and counter-terrorism authorities are evaluating money and value transmission channels for vulnerabilities that may make these channels attractive for illicit use, including the financing of terrorism. 'Alternative Remittance Systems and Terrorism Financing: Issues in Risk Management' aims to help countries bring these informal alternative remittance systems into their counter-terrorism programs, without hindering the ability of those who depend on these systems to send and receive money at low cost.

This paper is designed to cover a subset of such category, i.e. the realm of unregulated/informal Alternative Remittance Systems, also known as informal value transfer systems (IVTS). In these cases, operators form a parallel, underground financial system aimed at rapidly and effectively moving value within or between jurisdictions, often without being detected by regulators and law enforcement, and usually without available transaction records. Where prevalent (as it is often the case in low-income economies), ARS are frequently the only mechanism by which the poor or isolated can send and receive funds and therefore provide an essential service to facilitate economic activity. On the other hand, money and value transmission channels are being evaluated for vulnerabilities that may make them attractive for illicit use, including the financing of terrorism. The paper aims to help countries trying to bring these informal alternative remittance systems into their counter-terrorist financing regime without hindering the poor??s ability to effectively send and receive funds at low cost.

This second edition of the Reference Guide is a comprehensive source of practical information on how countries can fight money laundering and terrorist financing. Aimed at helping countries understand the new international standards, it discusses the problems caused by these crimes, the specific actions countries need to take to address them, and the role international organizations play in the process. The Reference Guide is a valuable tool for establishing effective regimes to successfully prevent, detect, and prosecute money laundering and terrorist financing.

This report examines the risks to Australin non-profit sector of money laundering and terrorism financing and describes the regulatory changes that could minimise risk. The report uses information derived from government, non-government and peer reviewed literature, case law and regulatory reports, observations made by representatives from non-profit sector, law enforcement and key regulatory agencies, and academia.

"Money laundering and terrorist financing are serious crimes that affect not only those persons directly involved, but the economy as a whole. According to international standards, every bank has the obligation to know its customers and to report suspicious transactions. Although these obligations sound straightforward, they have proved challenging to implement. What information precisely has to be gathered? How should it be recorded? If and when does one have to file a suspicious transaction report? It is here that a supervisor can play a crucial role in helping supervised institutions; first, in understanding the full extent of the obligations of Customer Due Diligence and Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR) and, second, in ensuring that those obligations are not just words on paper but are applied in practice. Effective supervision is key to the success of a country's AML/CFT system. In this regard, field work in both developed and developing countries has shown an overall low compliance in the area of supervision of banks and other financial institutions; supervisory compliance is indeed generally lower than the average level of compliance with all Financial Action Task Force recommendations. As a result, by providing examples of good practices, this book aims to help countries better conform to international standards. In this regard, this handbook is specifically designed for bank supervisors.

Most developed countries across the globe have enacted to prescribe acts of money laundering and financing of terrorism, and to enable the proceeeds of crime to be recovered from offenders. Despite the normative approach taken in the FATF-GAFI recommendations, the specific legislative and procedural responses taken by individual countries have differed in many respects. Law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies need to understand the differences that exist in criminal law relating to money laundering between different countries when investigating and prosecuting illegal conduct, as conduct of this nature often entails cross-border activity requiring mutual assistance between agencies and extradition of suspects across jurisdictional borders. The countries included were the European Union (the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Belguim), Asia (the Republic of China (Taiwan), Hong Kong and Singapore), the United States and Australia.

Gibraltar’s Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism is reviewed. The principal AML risk to Gibraltar is lodged in its professional sector, which is likely to be involved in the layering and integration of proceeds of crime. There is also some risk to Gibraltar at the placement stage, in connection with drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, and organized crime in southern Spain. The Financial Services Commission in Gibraltar has established a strong, risk-based framework for financial institutions for AML.