Natural Monopoly And Its Regulation

Natural monopolies exist in those markets in which demand can be satisfied at lowest cost by the output of only one rather than several competing firms. Under such conditions, conventional wisdom suggests that government regulation must substitute for competition to discipline the behavior of firms. Thirty years ago a young professor named Richard Posner asked the provocative question of whether the existence of natural monopoly provides adequate justification for government intervention. His even more provocative answer was no. The evils of natural monopoly are exaggerated, the effectiveness of regulation in controlling them is highly questionable, and regulation costs a great deal. "The resources and energies of government should be directed to problems we know are substantial, that we think are traceable to government action, and that cannot be left to the private sector to work out. There are plenty of those problems, and it is doubtful that natural monopoly is among them." Thirty years after its initial publication, read the original insights of Richard Posner about the regulation of natural monopoly as well as a new preface in which Posner reflects on the deregulation of industries that has occurred since 1969 and the possibilities for more deregulation in the future."

Considered the cutting edge of microeconomic theory in the 1970s, natural monopoly research remains an active and fertile field. Policy makers and regulators have begun to implement entry and pricing policies that are based on theoretical and empirical analyses. This book develops a comprehensive framework for analyzing natural monopoly. The authors first present a historical overview of regulatory economics, followed by analyses of optimal pricing and investment for single- and multiproduct natural monopolies. Topics covered include cost and demand structures, efficiency impacts of linear and multipart pricing, peak-load pricing, capacity determination, and the sustainability of natural monopolies. After a survey and analysis of natural monopoly regulation in practice, the links between technological change and regulation are identified. The book concludes with a discussion of the alternatives to traditional regulation, including public ownership, franchise schemes, quality regulation, and new incentive systems. Throughout the book, issues from the telecommunications and energy industries are used to illustrate key points. Its integrated framework will make it useful to academic economists, regulatory analysts, business researchers, and advanced students of public utility economics.

Considered the cutting edge of microeconomic theory in the 1970s, natural monopoly research remains an active and fertile field. Policy makers and regulators have begun to implement entry and pricing policies that are based on theoretical and empirical analyses. This book develops a comprehensive framework for analyzing natural monopoly. The authors first present a historical overview of regulatory economics, followed by analyses of optimal pricing and investment for single- and multiproduct natural monopolies. Topics covered include cost and demand structures, efficiency impacts of linear and multipart pricing, peak-load pricing, capacity determination, and the sustainability of natural monopolies. After a survey and analysis of natural monopoly regulation in practice, the links between technological change and regulation are identified. The book concludes with a discussion of the alternatives to traditional regulation, including public ownership, franchise schemes, quality regulation, and new incentive systems. Throughout the book, issues from the telecommunications and energy industries are used to illustrate key points. Its integrated framework will make it useful to academic economists, regulatory analysts, business researchers, and advanced students of public utility economics.

Optimal Regulation addresses the central issue of regulatory economics - how toregulate firms in a way that induces them to produce and price "optimally." It synthesizes the majorfindings of an extensive theoretical literature on what constitutes optimality in various situationsand which regulatory mechanisms can be used to achieve it. It is the first text to provide aunified, modern, and nontechnical treatment of the field.The book includes models for regulatingoptimal output, tariffs, and surplus subsidy schemes, and presents all of the material graphically,with clear explanations of often highly technical topics.Kenneth E. Train is Associate AdjunctProfessor in the Department of Economics and Graduate School of Public Policy at the University ofCalifornia, Berkeley. He is also Principal of the firm Cambridge Systematics.Topics include: Thecost structure of natural monopoly (economies of scale and scope). Characterization of firstandsecond-best optimality. Surplus subsidy schemes for attaining first-best optimality. Ramsey pricesand the Vogelsang-Finsinger mechanism for attaining them. Time-ofuse (TOU) prices and Riordan'smechanisms for attaining the optimal TOU prices' Multipart and self-selecting tariffs, and Sibley'smethod for using self-selecting tariffs to achieve optimality. The Averch-Johnson model of howrate-of-return regulation induces inefficiencies. Analysis of regulation based on the firm's returnon Output, costs, or sales. Price-cap regulation. Regulatory treatment of uncertainty and its impacton the firm's behavior. Methods of attaining optimality without direct regulation (contestability,auctioning the monopoly franchise.)

Regulatory Failure and Renewal develops a framework to understand the choice of regulatory instrument used in Canada for natural monopolies such as telephone companies, water utilities, streetcars, hydroelectricity, and railways from the 1880s to the 1930s. Using the transaction-cost literature pioneered by Oliver Williamson, John Baldwin examines the nature of contractual failure in Canada in natural monopoly cases, asking why initial forms of contracts between the state and private enterprise failed and why this failure so often resulted in the use of public enterprise. Baldwin outlines early attempts to deal with natural monopolies – from the use of a franchise contract to regulatory tribunals and finally to public enterprise – and compares Canadian experiences to US approaches, which turned more frequently to regulatory tribunals. This difference is due to Canada’s more limited constraints on the state’s ability to exercise coercive power, which sometimes leads to contractual failure that results in replacing franchise and regulatory frameworks with public enterprise. Regulatory Failure and Renewal demonstrates that public enterprise arose not so much as part of a purposive choice but because of reoccurring failures in the contractual process between the Canadian state and private enterprise.

Through three case studies, this book investigates whether digital industries are naturally monopolistic and evaluates policy approaches to market power.

This book addresses the fundamental issues underlying the debate over electric power regulation and deregulation. After decades of the presumption that the electric power industry was a natural monopoly, recent times have seen a trend of deregulation followed by panicked re-regulation. This important book critically analyses this controversial area from a legal and economic perspective.