Negotiating Cultural Diversity In Afghanistan

This book analyses the problematique of governance and administration of cultural diversity within the modern state of Afghanistan and traces patterns of national integration. It explores state construction in twentieth-century Afghanistan and Afghan nationalism, and explains the shifts in the state’s policies and societal responses to different forms of governance of cultural diversity. The book problematizes liberalism, communitarianism, and multiculturalism as approaches to governance of diversity within the nation-state. It suggests that while the western models of multiculturalism have recognized the need to accommodate different cultures, they failed to engage with them through intercultural dialogue. It also elaborates the challenge of intra-group diversity and the problem of accommodating individual choice and freedom while recognising group rights and adoption of multiculturalism. The book develops an alternative approach through synthesising critical multiculturalism and interculturalism as a framework on a democratic and inclusive approach to governance of diversity. A major intervention in understanding a war-torn country through an insider account, this book will be of great interest to scholars and researchers of politics and international relations, especially those concerned with multiculturalism, state-building, nationalism, and liberalism, as well as those in cultural studies, history, Afghanistan studies, South Asian studies, Middle East studies, minority studies, and to policymakers.

Cross-cultural interactions take place every day in contemporary Afghanistan between locals and the thousands of foreigners working in the country as diplomats, officials from international organisations and humanitarian aid workers. As their work requires them to interact with Afghans in manifold ways, all foreigners are, at least indirectly, required to negotiate. Karrer’s ePaper sheds light on the cross-cultural issues likely to contribute to the difficulties encountered by the international community in negotiating with Afghans, as well as for Afghans negotiating with foreigners. Through an analysis of academic literature, Karrer broadly outlines selected elements of Pashtun, in contrast to Western, negotiation culture, discusses the extent to which this negotiation culture may be attributed to Pashtun tradition, and attempts to highlight the complexity of Afghan negotiation behaviour against the binary indexing predominant in the preconceived cluster of Western cross-cultural negotiation and communication theories. Karrer’s research yields some significant insights into the impacts of cross-cultural issues on negotiation. Largely, he finds that current cross-cultural theories fail to provide a solid basis upon which to interpret the reality that exists on the ground in Afghanistan. This Paper draws on a final research work submitted to fulfil the requirements of the Executive Master in International Negotiation and Policy-Making (INP). The views and opinions expressed in this ePaper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position position of Switzerland's Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA).

Diplomatic efforts to resolve the Afghanistan crisis began almost immediately after the Soviet Union's military intervention in that country in December 1979. Untying the Afghan Knot offers the first detailed account of the diplomatic process set in motion by that intervention and culminating in the April 1988 Geneva Accords--a milestone in multilateralism and United Nations (UN) peacemaking. Riaz M. Khan, a senior Pakistani diplomat, participated actively in all meetings on Afghanistan in the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and in all of the Geneva negotiating rounds (1882-1988). Drawing upon his personal experience, official documents, scholarly literature, and press accounts, he provides a unique insider's view of these precedent-setting negotiations, which were often shrouded in secrecy and misperceptions. Khan examines the interests, positions, and behind-the-scenes maneuverings of the major players--Afghan governments and resistance groups, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, the United States, and UN mediators--and assesses the impact of military and political developments inside Afghanistan and elsewhere, including the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev. Khan's authoritative account of these critical diplomatic initiatives sheds important light on the internal dynamics of the multilateral Afghanistan negotiations.

Historical insurgencies that ended in settlement after a stalemate have generally followed a seven-step path. A "master narrative" distilled from these cases could help guide and assess the progress toward a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan.

For nearly a decade the international community has supported Afghanistan's political, social, and economic reconstruction--and opposed the return to power of the Taliban. While Afghans have seen many improvements over that decade, there has been a Taliban resurgence across much of the country. Despite the recent increase in fighting, neither side has been able to vanquish the other militarily. Moreover, a majority of Afghans seem anxious for the contending factions to achieve a negotiated end to the war. Can this growing sense of a military stalemate help usher in a political phase to conclude this conflict? This report, the product of an international task force led by ambassadors Lakhdar Brahimi and Thomas R. Pickering, recommends a political path toward ending the war. Peace is possible in Afghanistan, the task force members assert, if Afghans and the various international stakeholders can overcome their deep divisions and commence the serious negotiations that will be required to achieve it. The report outlines the issues that would need to be addressed in any peace settlement: the division of power, the political order, the role of Islam, human rights, economic development, suppression of terrorist networks and narcotics, the role of foreign forces, and so on. It also presents concrete steps for moving into a political process that could achieve a negotiated settlement to the war. The task force argues that, to end this war with a durable compromise settlement, a complex and multitiered negotiating framework will be essential, and the time to start that political process is now.

Why has the Taliban been so much more effective in presenting messages that resonate with the Afghan population than the United States, the Afghan government and their allies? This book, based on years of field research and the assessment of hundreds of original source materials, examines the information operations and related narratives of Afghan insurgents, especially the Afghan Taliban, and investigates how the Taliban has won the information war. Taliban messaging, wrapped in the narrative of jihad, is both to the point and in tune with its target audiences. On the other hand, the United States and its Kabul allies committed a basic messaging blunder, failing to present narratives that spoke to or, often, were even understood by their target audiences. Thomas Johnson systematically explains why the United States lost this "battle of the story" in Afghanistan, and argues that this defeat may have cost the US the entire war, despite its conventional and technological superiority.

A whole generation has grown up in Afghanistan knowing little but the ravages of war. The dramatic overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001 was simply one event in a series of interrelated struggles which have blighted ordinary people's lives over the last three decades, and which continue to interfere with reconciliation and reconstruction. This new edition of The Afghanistan Wars provides a meticulously-documented history of these successive waves of conflict. From the roots of Afghanistan's slide into disorder in the late 1970s to the challenges faced by Afghan leaders following the substantial withdrawal of international forces in 2014, it explores military and diplomatic history while also offering valuable insight on humanitarian action, gender, medical and cultural themes. Thoroughly revised in the light of the latest research, the third edition also features a new final chapter which examines recent developments in Afghanistan, bringing the story up to the present day and mounting a strong case for continuing support for this troubled country. New to this Edition: - A final chapter on the recent developments in Afghanistan up to the present day - Revised to take into account the considerable amount of new material published on this topic since 2009 - Refreshed and updated throughout

The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 was the result of declining active support for the government, and of waste and inefficiency in aid delivery. Yet, while corrosive, these problems were not in themselves sufficient to have brought about a collapse. To a significant degree, they were the result of early failings in institutional design, reflecting an American inclination to pursue short-term policy approaches that created perverse incentives⁠—thus interfering with the long-term objective of stability. This book exposes the true factors underpinning Kabul’s fall. The Afghan Republic came under relentless attack from Taliban insurgents who depended critically on Pakistani support. It also suffered a creeping invasion that put the government on the back foot as the US tried and failed to deal with Pakistan’s perfidy. The fatal blow came when bored US leaders naively cut an exit deal with the enemy, fatally compromising the operation of the Afghan army and air force and triggering the final collapse, with top leaders at odds over whether to make a final stand in Kabul. The Afghan Republic did not simply decline and fall. It was betrayed.