Nuclear First Strike

A former design engineer for Lockheed presents a comprehensive survey of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces and strategic doctrines that exposes the U.S. military's dangerous bid for first strike capability and describes corporate imperatives for perpetuating the arms race and circumventing arms control.

This provocative and timely work examines various scenarios in which the deployment of nuclear weapons could occur, the probable consequences of such an escalation, the likely world reactions, and the plausible policy ramifications. Rather than projecting the physical damage that would result from nuclear attacks, George H. Quester offers an exploration of the political, psychological, and social aftermath of nuclear conflict. The prospect of nuclear attack -- sixty years after atomic bombs destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki -- is difficult to confront on many levels. We may avoid the discussion for emotional reasons, for fear of generating a self-confirming hypothesis, or simply because of the general "nuclear taboo." But there are also self-denying propositions to be harnessed here: if the world gives some advance thought to how nuclear weapons might be used again, such attacks may be headed off. If the world avoids nuclear weapons use until the year 2045, it will be able to celebrate one hundred years of nuclear concord. Quester suggests that this may be achieved through the careful consideration of possible nuclear deployment scenarios and their consequences. In this insightful analysis, he provides a starting point for informed and focused reflection and preparation. -- Martha Smith-Norris

Aims to demystify aspects and effects of nuclear weapons so that civil and military defence planners have a reasonable idea about the scale and magnitude of disaster that will follow a nuclear attack. As a natural corollary, the book examines the type and nature of post-attack disaster management operations that may have to be launched following a counter-value strike.

The current U.S. nuclear strategy goes beyond the legitimate objective of survivable strategic forces to active preparation for nuclear war. The Reagan administration strategy rejects minimum deterrence and prepares for a nuclear war that might be protracted and controlled. The strategy reflects the understanding that a combination of counterforce targeting, crises location of urban populations, and ballistic missile defense could make nuclear war purposeful and tolerable. The strategy includes five unwarranted assumptions: (1) the Soviets might decide to launch a limited first strike on the United States or its allies; (2) the USSR is more likely to be deterred by the threat of limited U.S. counterforce reprisals than by the threat of overwhelming, total nuclear retaliation; (3) victory is possible in a superpower nuclear war; (4) a counterforce nuclear strategy can be undertaken without compromising the prospects of vertical and horizontal arms control; and (5) peace can be maintained indefinitely via nuclear deterrence. According to the author, Reagan administration strategy must be reversed, and an alternative strategy should be pursued. The United States needs to seek a comprehensive test ban, renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, and institute additional weapon free zones. (Author/NE)

In 2002 the Bush administration completed a Nuclear Posture Review that introduced a ‘new triad’ based on offensive-strike systems, defences and a revitalized defence infrastructure. The new triad is designed for a new strategic threat environment, characterized not by a long-standing nuclear rivalry with another superpower, but by unstable relationships with rogue-state proliferators, alongside more ambiguous relations with nuclear-weapon powers. Providing a historical context to these modifications to US nuclear strategy, Nuclear Superiority details how the new triad, which strongly emphasizes the need to bolster the credibility of the nuclear deterrent and to prepare for nuclear use when deterrence fails, is founded on previous efforts to secure nuclear superiority against the Soviet Union and counter-proliferation capabilities against WMD-proliferant adversaries. It illustrates how the evolution of American nuclear strategy towards more effective counter-force capabilities, regardless of the current threat environment, has led to a host of counter-force developments. David S. McDonough explores how this strategy is based on the long-standing American desire to control conflict escalation and how it may invite crisis instability with regional adversaries and disquiet among established nuclear powers.