Nuclear Jihad In Pakistan

When we talk about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, armed forces and civilian governments, then controversies and uninvited misperceptions swirl in our minds. If we take in the broad picture, we inevitably conclude that not all is going in the right direction in the country; and that is because the army, politicians and the establishment perceive jihadism as a profitable business. They run this business of killings and torture through their proxies. While we study the militarized mind of Pakistani generals and recognize their resentment towards civilian governments, we find more controversies about the role of armed forces and their relationship with worldwide terrorist organizations. International journalist Musa Khan Jalalzai is ideally positioned to present us with a picture of what is actually afoot and what it means for the future. When we study the militarized mind of Pakistani generals and recognize their resentment towards civilian institutions, we find more controversies about the role of armed forces and their relationship with worldwide terrorist organizations. The Pakistan military controls the financial market, stock exchange, real estate business, banking sector, and smuggling of narcotics. Ethnic representation within the armed forces raises serious concerns. Some experts say this is not a national army but view it as the club of Pashtun and Punjabi generals. The army has failed to develop a true ethnic representation process or motivate Baloch and Sindhis to join the armed forces; but they certainly have gained experience in killing innocent civilians. Then there is the question of the Saudi investment in Pakistan's "Islamic" nuclear bomb. Saudi Arabia's link with Pakistan's nuclear and missile program has long been the source of speculation that Pakistan might either station nuclear forces on Saudi sand or provide a nuclear umbrella to the Wahabi state, in return for oil supply; or that the Saudis would purchase nuclear weapons from Pakistan. International journalist Musa Khan Jalalzai is ideally positioned to present us with a picture of what is actually afoot and what it means for the future.

On political conditions under the tenure of Pervez Musharraf, president of Pakistan, and his encouragement towards fostering Jihad.

How did a nation founded as a homeland for South Asian Muslims, most of whom follow a tolerant nonthreatening form of Islam, become a haven for Al Qaeda and a rogue's gallery of domestic jihadist and sectarian groups? In this groundbreaking history of Pakistan's involvement with radical Islam, John R. Schmidt, the senior U.S political analyst in Pakistan in the years before 9/11, places the blame squarely on the rulers of the country, who thought they could use Islamic radicals to advance their foreign policy goals without having to pay a steep price. This strategy worked well at first--in Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet jihad, in Kashmir in support of a local uprising against Indian rule, and again in Afghanistan in backing the Taliban in the Afghan civil war. But the government's plans would begin to unravel in the wake of 9/11, when the rulers' support for the U.S. war on terror caused many of their jihadist allies to turn against them. Today the army generals and feudal politicians who run Pakistan are by turns fearful of the consequences of going after these groups and hopeful that they can still be used to advance the state's interests. The Unraveling is the clearest account yet of the complex, dangerous relationship between the leaders of Pakistan and jihadist groups—and how the rulers' decisions have led their nation to the brink of disaster and put other nations at great risk. Can they save their country or will we one day find ourselves confronting the first nuclear-armed jihadist state?

Former American President Bill Clinton Referred To Kashmir As The Most Dangerous Place On Earth. In 1999 Nuclear-Armed Powers India And Pakistan Fought A War Over Kashmir, And Again In 2002 They Came Close To Another. The Kashmir Dispute Represents One Of The World S Oldest And Most Intractable Conflicts, Having Befuddled Policymakers Since The Partition Of The Subcontinent In 1947. Author Arvin Bahl Attempts To Analyze This Conflict In The Context Of International Relations Theory, Drawing On A Variety Of Sources, Including Interviews With Leading Figures Of The Indian And Pakistani Establishments.Bahl Argues That The Question Of The Kashmir Dispute Is Really The Question Of Why The Liberation Of The Kashmir Valley From Indian Rule Has Been A Foremost Pakistani National Interest Since The Partition. Realism, The Dominant Theory Of International Relations, Argues That Regardless Of Era, Region, Ideology Or Domestic Politics, States Will Behave In The Same Ways When Faced With Similar Situations In The International System, Namely They Will Try To Maximize The State S Interests. Yet, Pakistan S Quest For Control Of The Kashmir Valley Represents A Case In Which A Country S Foreign Policy Cannot Be Explained By Realism, And Realism S Main Assumption Of The State As A Rational Actor Appears To Be Violated. The Kashmir Valley Has Little Strategic Importance To Pakistan, Pakistan Has Almost No Chance Of Obtaining It Against A Much Stronger Power That Dismembered It In A Previous War And Its Economy Is Being Destroyed By Military Confrontation With India, Which Also Threatens Its Security.This Study Attempts To Explain The Puzzle Of Pakistan S Seemingly Irrational Policy Behavior On Kashmir By Developing A Framework Combining Liberal And Constructivist Approaches. Constructivists Emphasize The Importance Of Ideas, Ideologies And Identities When Observing How States Behave. The Ideology That Pakistan Was Founded On, The Two-Nation Theory, Makes Ending Indian Rule Over The Kashmir Valley Of Utmost National Interest. For Pakistan To Concede That A Muslim Majority Region That Is Contiguous With It Can Be A Part Of India Would Be For Pakistan To Accept That There Was No Need For The Partition Of The Subcontinent Along Religious Lines And The Creation Of Pakistan In The First Place.Liberals Focus On Understanding Domestic Politics In Order To Understand A Country S Actions In The International System. The Pakistani Military, The Country S Most Powerful Institution Since Its Formation, Has Used The Conflict With India To Bring About And Legitimize Its Dominance Of The Country.South Asia Gained Prominence In American Foreign Policy After The 9/11 Attacks And The Standoff That Ensued Between India And Pakistan In Early 2002. Thus, This Study Concludes With Policy Recommendations, Primarily To American Policymakers, For Dealing With Pakistan And Kashmir Based On The Analysis Developed In The Preceding Chapters.This Book, We Hope, Is An Eye-Opener For All General Readers. It Will Be Found Immensely Useful And Informative By Students, Researchers And Teachers Of History, Political Science, International Relations And South Asian Studies.

"Pakistan is teetering on the brink. The country's staggering and lurching foreign policy has failed to evolve with changing political and geopolitical developments. The army and ISI lack coherent and long-term national security approach. The prolixity of the Afghan war and participation of Pakistan's jihadist black-water in it has blighted its social and political stratification. Its domestic policies are in a grief-stricken state. The two states (Islamic Republic and Military Establishment) have adopted different foreign, domestic and economic policies, and view neighbouring states with different glasses. The gradual radicalization of Pakistan army and its links with worldwide terrorist organizations over the last 70 years, poses a grave danger to the country's nuclear installations in terms of insider attacks. The spectrum of rogue and radicalized elements range from military officers to employees of Strategic Planning Division and officers of nuclear force. These aspects have been elaborated by the author in this book. The book can be an essential reading for every reader interested in Pakistan’s nuclear program and its threat of falling into hands of rogue elements."

Islamist militants based in Pakistan have played a major role in terrorism around the world and pose a significant threat to regional and international security. Although the Pakistan-militant connection has received widespread attention only in recent years, it is not a new phenomenon. Pakistan has, since its inception in the wake of World War II, used Islamist militants to wage jihad in order to compensate for severe political and material weakness. This use of militancy has become so important that it is now a central component of Pakistani grand strategy; supporting jihad is one of the principal means by which the Pakistani state seeks to produce security for itself. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the strategy has not been wholly disastrous. It has achieved important domestic and international successes, enabling Pakistan to confront stronger adversaries and shape its strategic environment without the costs and risks of direct combat, and to help promote internal cohesion to compensate for its weak domestic political foundations. Recently, however, these successes of Pakistan's militant strategy have given way to serious problems. The militant organizations that Pakistan nurtured over the decades are increasingly exceeding its control; continued support for jihad diverts scarce resources from pressing domestic projects, impeding the country's internal development; and the militant campaign's repeated provocations have led India to adopt a more aggressive conventional military posture. As Paul Kapur shows in Jihad as Grand Strategy, these developments significantly undermine Pakistani interests, threatening to leave it less politically cohesive and externally secure than it was before. Thus, despite its past benefits, the strategy has outlived its utility, and Pakistan will have to abandon it in order to avoid catastrophe. This will require not simply a change of policy, but a thoroughgoing reconceptualization of the Pakistani state.

Few nations are more central to the security of their region yet more fraught with danger than Pakistan. It is a country with deep internal schisms and with nuclear weapons, attempting to simultaneously rebuild democracy and fend off regional instability and avowed enemies. Of all the world's nuclear powers, Pakistan is the one most susceptible to some form of armed conflict or internal disintegration. For the United States and other nations concerned with security in South and Central Asia, one of the most ominous trends has been the growing influence of Jihadist groups in Pakistan which feel obligated to wage "holy war" against everything that they perceive as "non-Islamic." Their objective would be a Pakistani government similar to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The danger this would pose to regional stability and U.S. interests is clear.