Nuclear Proliferation In South Asia

This edited volume explores competing perspectives on the impact of nuclear weapons proliferation on the South Asian security environment. The spread of nuclear weapons is one of the world’s foremost security concerns. The effect of nuclear weapons on the behaviour of newly nuclear states, and the potential for future international crises, are of particular concern. As a region of burgeoning economic and political importance, South Asia offers a crucial test of proliferation’s effects on the crisis behaviour of newly nuclear states. This volume creates a dialogue between scholars who believe that nuclear weapons have stabilized the subcontinent, and those who believe that nuclear weapons have made South Asia more conflict prone. It does so by pairing competing analyses of four major regional crises: the 1987 "Brasstacks" crisis, the Indo-Pakistani crisis of 1990, the 1999 Kargil war, which occurred after the nuclear tests; and the 2001–2 Indo-Pakistani militarized standoff. In addition, the volume explores the implications of the South Asian nuclear experience for potential new nuclear states such as North Korea and Iran.

An important and critical re-evaluation of South Asia's post-tests nuclear politics, in contrast to other books, this volume emphasises the political dimension of South Asia's nuclear weapons, explains how the bombs are used as politico-strategic assets rather than pure battlefield weapons and how India and Pakistan utilise them for politico-strategic purposes in an extremely complex and competitive South Asian strategic landscape. Written by a group of perceptive observers of South Asia, this volume evaluates the current state of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrents, the challenges that the two countries confront in building their nuclear forces, the post-test nuclear doctrines of the two strategic rivals, the implications of Indo-Pakistani politics for regional cooperation, the role of two systemic actors (USA and China) in the region's nuclear politics and the critical issues of confidence-building and nuclear arms control.

Hagerty analyzes how India and Pakistan interacted in diplomatic and military crises before their 1998 nuclear tests. He presents detailed studies of the January 1987 Indo-Pakistani crisis, precipitated by India's Brasstacks military exercises, and the 1990 confrontation over Kashmir. Hagerty concludes that relations between India and Pakistan in recent years support the argument that nuclear proliferation does not necessarily destabilize international relations and may even reduce the risk of war.

Nuclear-armed adversaries India and Pakistan have fought three wars since their creation as sovereign states in 1947. They went to the brink of a fourth in 2001 following an attack on the Indian parliament, which the Indian government blamed on the Pakistan-backed Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorist organizations. Despite some attempts at rapprochement in the intervening years, a new standoff between the two countries was precipitated when India accused Lashkar-e-Taiba of being behind the Mumbai attacks late last year. The relentlessness of the confrontations between these two nations makes Inside Nuclear South Asia a must read for anyone wishing to gain a thorough understanding of the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia and the potential consequences of nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent. The book begins with an analysis of the factors that led to India's decision to cross the nuclear threshold in 1998, with Pakistan close behind: factors such as the broad political support for a nuclear weapons program within India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the intense rivalry between the two countries, the normative and prestige factors that influenced their behaviors, and ultimately the perceived threat to their respective national security. The second half of the book analyzes the consequences of nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent. These chapters show that the presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia has increased the frequency and propensity of low-level violence, further destabilizing the region. Additionally, nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan have led to serious political changes that also challenge the ability of the two states to produce stable nuclear détente. Thus, this book provides both new insights into the domestic politics behind specific nuclear policy choices in South Asia, a critique of narrow realist views of nuclear proliferation, and the dangers of nuclear proliferation in South Asia.

The book explains the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) compulsions to commit its government in the election manifesto of 2014 to study the Indian Nuclear Doctrine (IND) and “revise and update” it to make it relevant to contemporary geostrategic realities. Contributors to this volume have cited Pakistan’s deployment of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) and use of international terrorism (IT) as the main reasons for the BJP advocating a review of the IND. It is suggested that the addition of use of TNWs or IT by state or non-state actors in the existing IND is a sufficient cause for India to ensure massive retaliation with a second strike. To make the threat of a second strike realistic, it is necessary to acquire sufficient second strike capabilities, in particular submarine launched ballistic missiles. What is the relevance of IND in the absence of India not having a declared national security doctrine? Nuclear know-how is necessary for generating nuclear energy; various issues relating to it are analysed. The IND also claims nuclear disarmament as its inseparable goal, and this book highlights the Indian commitment to achieve it. Issues raised here have a global reach. Students of international relations, diplomats, policy-makers and those attentive to public debate will find the book interesting and immensely useful.

This book analyses India and Pakistan's decision to 'go nuclear' against the odds of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty-based nuclear order. It reflects upon the key factors that contributed to, and the process that prompted India and Pakistan's nuclear programmes to take a military orientation, which eventually culminated in the May 1998 nuclear tests. It also explains the motivation which underscored both India and Pakistan's determination to advance nuclear postures in 1998 that appeared to be inconsistent with the post-Cold War global strategic environment. Further, this book explains why international and regional nuclear non-proliferation regimes were ineffective in preventing India and Pakistan from going nuclear.