Philosophy Of Behavioral Biology

This volume provides a broad overview of issues in the philosophy of behavioral biology, covering four main themes: genetic, developmental, evolutionary, and neurobiological explanations of behavior. It is both interdisciplinary and empirically informed in its approach, addressing philosophical issues that arise from recent scientific findings in biological research on human and non-human animal behavior. Accordingly, it includes papers by professional philosophers and philosophers of science, as well as practicing scientists. Much of the work in this volume builds on presentations given at the international conference, “Biological Explanations of Behavior: Philosophical Perspectives”, held in 2008 at the Leibniz Universität Hannover in Germany. The volume is intended to be of interest to a broad range of audiences, which includes philosophers (e.g., philosophers of mind, philosophers of biology, and metaethicists), as well as practicing scientists, such as biologists or psychologists whose interests relate to biological explanations of behavior.

This volume provides a broad overview of issues in the philosophy of behavioral biology, covering four main themes: genetic, developmental, evolutionary, and neurobiological explanations of behavior. It is both interdisciplinary and empirically informed in its approach, addressing philosophical issues that arise from recent scientific findings in biological research on human and non-human animal behavior. Accordingly, it includes papers by professional philosophers and philosophers of science, as well as practicing scientists. Much of the work in this volume builds on presentations given at the international conference, “Biological Explanations of Behavior: Philosophical Perspectives”, held in 2008 at the Leibniz Universität Hannover in Germany. The volume is intended to be of interest to a broad range of audiences, which includes philosophers (e.g., philosophers of mind, philosophers of biology, and metaethicists), as well as practicing scientists, such as biologists or psychologists whose interests relate to biological explanations of behavior.

This volume has three goals with respect to the interplay between philosophy and behavioral psychology's experimental, applied, and interpretive levels of knowing. It aims to examine core principles in the philosophy of science, as they are interpreted by and relate to behavioral psychology; how these core principles interact with different problem areas in the study of human behavior; and how experimental, applied, and interpretive analyses complement one another to advance the understanding of behavior and, in so doing, also the philosophy of science.

Philosophers have traditionally assumed that the difference between active and passive movement could be explained by the presence or absence of an intention in the mind of the agent. This assumption has led to the neglect of many interesting active behaviors that do not depend on intentions, including the "mindless" actions of humans and the activities of non-human animals. In this book Jones offers a broad account of agency that unifies these cases. The book addresses a range of questions, including: When are movements properly attributed to whole agents, rather than to their parts? What does it mean for an agent to guide its action? What distinguishes agents from other complex systems? What is the relationship between action and adaptive behavior? And why might the study of living systems be the key to understanding agency? This book makes an important contribution to current philosophical debate on the nature and origins of agency. It defines action as a uniquely biological process and recasts human intentional action as a specialized case of a broader and more common phenomenon than has been previously assumed. Uniting findings from philosophy, cognitive science, psychology, biology, computer science, complexity theory and ethology, this book will be of interest to students and scholars working in these areas.

For some, biology explains all there is to know about the mind. Yet many big questions remain: Is the mind shaped by genes or the environment? If mental traits are the result of adaptations built up over thousands of years, as evolutionary psychologists claim, how can such claims be tested? If the mind is a machine, as biologists argue, how does it allow for something as complex as human thought? Revised and updated to take account of new developments in the field, The Biological Mind: A Philosophical Introduction explores these questions and more, using the philosophy of biology to introduce and assess the nature of the mind. Justin Garson addresses the following key topics: moral psychology, altruism, and levels of selection; evolutionary psychology and the adaptationism debate; genes, environment, and the nature–nurture debate; natural selection and mental representation; psychiatric classification and the maladapted mind. This second edition includes three new chapters on race, sex, and human nature as well as new sections on group and kin selection, psychological altruism, and cultural evolution. Including chapter summaries, annotated further readings, a glossary of terms, and examples and case studies throughout, this is an indispensable introduction for those teaching philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of biology. It will also be an excellent resource for those in related fields such as biology.

Morality is often defined in opposition to the natural "instincts," or as a tool to keep those instincts in check. New findings in neuroscience, social psychology, animal behavior, and anthropology have brought us back to the original Darwinian position that moral behavior is continuous with the social behavior of animals, and most likely evolved to enhance the cooperativeness of society. In this view, morality is part of human nature rather than its opposite. This interdisciplinary volume debates the origin and working of human morality within the context of science as well as religion and philosophy.

Rediscover the science and philosophy of behavior In Science and Philosophy of Behavior: Selected Papers, distinguished researcher W. M. Baum delivers an expansive collection of incisive papers setting out a new paradigm of thinking about behavior. The book offers only articles that put forward a philosophical and theoretical framework for an effective natural science of behavior. Quantitative analysis is largely avoided (except for a paper on, of all things, avoidance). Organized into three parts, the author explains the flow-like nature of behavior and its link to evolution, as well as descriptions of a pure form of behaviorism that correct some flaws in B.F. Skinner’s seminal works. The book also links behaviorism to anthropology in its final section. Readers will also find: Fulsome descriptions of the molar nature of behavior and why the molecular view is misguided Re-imaginations of the concept of reinforcement, including considerations of allocation, induction, and contingency Explorations of the links between behavior analysis and Darwinian evolutionary processes An essential critique—and reorganization—of behavior theory and philosophy, Science and Philosophy of Behavior: Selected Papers is a controversial, fascinating, and eye-opening journey through a half-century of transformational work in the field.

A collection of original essays by major thinkers, addressing how the biological sciences inform and inspire philosophical research.