Philosophy Of Mathematics And Natural Science

When mathematician Hermann Weyl decided to write a book on philosophy, he faced what he referred to as "conflicts of conscience"--the objective nature of science, he felt, did not mesh easily with the incredulous, uncertain nature of philosophy. Yet the two disciplines were already intertwined. In Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science, Weyl examines how advances in philosophy were led by scientific discoveries--the more humankind understood about the physical world, the more curious we became. The book is divided into two parts, one on mathematics and the other on the physical sciences. Drawing on work by Descartes, Galileo, Hume, Kant, Leibniz, and Newton, Weyl provides readers with a guide to understanding science through the lens of philosophy. This is a book that no one but Weyl could have written--and, indeed, no one has written anything quite like it since.

This broad and insightful book presents current scholarship in important subfields of philosophy of science and addresses an interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary readership. It groups carefully selected contributions into the four fields of I) philosophy of physics, II) philosophy of life sciences, III) philosophy of social sciences and values in science, and IV) philosophy of mathematics and formal modeling. Readers will discover research papers by Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Keizo Matsubara, Kian Salimkhani, Andrea Reichenberger, Anne Sophie Meincke, Javier Suárez, Roger Deulofeu, Ludger Jansen, Peter Hucklenbroich, Martin Carrier, Elizaveta Kostrova, Lara Huber, Jens Harbecke, Antonio Piccolomini d’Aragona and Axel Gelfert. This collection fosters dialogue between philosophers of science working in different subfields, and brings readers the finest and latest work across the breadth of the field, illustrating that contemporary philosophy of science has successfully broadened its scope of reflection. It will interest and inspire a wide audience of philosophers as well as scholars of the natural sciences, social sciences and the humanities. The volume shares selected contributions from the prestigious second triennial conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science/ Gesellschaft für Wissenschaftsphilosophie (GWP.2016, March 8, 2016 – March 11, 2016).

In three volumes, a distinguished group of scholars from a variety of disciplines in the natural and social sciences, the humanities and the arts contribute essays in honor of Robert S. Cohen, on the occasion of his 70th birthday. The range of the essays, as well as their originality, and their critical and historical depth, pay tribute to the extraordinary scope of Professor Cohen's intellectual interests, as a scientist-philosopher and a humanist, and also to his engagement in the world of social and political practice. The essays presented in Physics, Philosophy, and the Scientific Community (Volume I of Essays in Honor of Robert S. Cohen) focus on philosophical and historical issues in contemporary physics: on the origins and conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics, on the reception and understanding of Bohr's and Einstein's work, on the emergence of quantum electrodynamics, and on some of the sharp philosophical and scientific issues that arise in current scientific practice (e.g. in superconductivity research). In addition, several essays deal with critical issues within the philosophy of science, both historical and contemporary: e.g. with Cartesian notions of mechanism in the philosophy of biology; with the language and logic of science - e.g. with new insights concerning the issue of a `physicalistic' language in the arguments of Neurath, Carnap and Wittgenstein; with the notion of `elementary logic'; and with rational and non-rational elements in the history of science. Two original contributions to the history of mathematics and some studies in the comparative sociology of science round off this outstanding collection.

Foundational questions in logic, mathematics, computer science and physics are constant sources of epistemological debate in contemporary philosophy. To what extent is the transfinite part of mathematics completely trustworthy? Why is there a general `malaise' concerning the logical approach to the foundations of mathematics? What is the role of symmetry in physics? Is it possible to build a coherent worldview compatible with a macroobjectivistic position and based on the quantum picture of the world? What account can be given of opinion change in the light of new evidence? These are some of the questions discussed in this volume, which collects 14 lectures on the foundation of science given at the School of Philosophy of Science, Trieste, October 1989. The volume will be of particular interest to any student or scholar engaged in interdisciplinary research into the foundations of science in the context of contemporary debates.

This book identifies the organizing concepts of physical and biological phenomena by an analysis of the foundations of mathematics and physics. Our aim is to propose a dialog between different conceptual universes and thus to provide a unification of phenomena. The role of “order” and symmetries in the foundations of mathematics is linked to the main invariants and principles, among them the geodesic principle (a consequence of symmetries), which govern and confer unity to various physical theories. Moreover, an attempt is made to understand causal structures, a central element of physical intelligibility, in terms of both symmetries and symmetry breakings. A distinction between the principles of (conceptual) construction and of proofs, both in physics and in mathematics, guides most of the work. The importance of mathematical tools is also highlighted to clarify differences in the models for physics and biology that are proposed by continuous and discrete mathematics, such as computational simulations. Since biology is particularly complex and not as well understood at a theoretical level, we propose a “unification by concepts” which in any case should precede mathematization. This constitutes an outline for unification also based on highlighting conceptual differences, complex points of passage and technical irreducibilities of one field to another. Indeed, we suppose here a very common monist point of view, namely the view that living objects are “big bags of molecules”. The main question though is to understand which “theory” can help better understand these bags of molecules. They are, indeed, rather “singular”, from the physical point of view. Technically, we express this singularity through the concept of “extended criticality”, which provides a logical extension of the critical transitions that are known in physics. The presentation is mostly kept at an informal and conceptual level. Contents:Mathematical Concepts and Physical ObjectsIncompleteness and Indetermination in Mathematics and PhysicsSpace and Time from Physics to BiologyInvariances, Symmetries, and Symmetry BreakingsCauses and Symmetries: The Continuum and the Discrete in Mathematical ModelingExtended Criticality: The Physical Singularity of Life PhenomenaRandomness and Determination in the Interplay between the Continuum and the DiscreteConclusion: Unification and Separation of Theories, or the Importance of Negative Results Readership: Graduate students and professionals in the fields of natural sciences, biology, computer science, mathematics, and physics. Keywords:Foundations of Mathematics and of Physics;Epistemology;Theoretical BiologyKey Features:This book is an epistemological reflection carried out by two working scientists, a physicist and a mathematician, who focus on biology. They first address a comparative analysis of the founding principles of their own disciplines. On the grounds of a three-fold blend, they then introduce a unique proposal, which does not passively transfer the paradigms of the first two theoretically well-established disciplines, to suggest a novel theoretical framework for the third discipline

Eleven distinguished historians of science explore natural philosophy and mathematics in the Middle Ages.

This study addresses a central theme in current philosophy: Platonism vs Naturalism and provides accounts of both approaches to mathematics, crucially discussing Quine, Maddy, Kitcher, Lakoff, Colyvan, and many others. Beginning with accounts of both approaches, Brown defends Platonism by arguing that only a Platonistic approach can account for concept acquisition in a number of special cases in the sciences. He also argues for a particular view of applied mathematics, a view that supports Platonism against Naturalist alternatives. Not only does this engaging book present the Platonist-Naturalist debate over mathematics in a comprehensive fashion, but it also sheds considerable light on non-mathematical aspects of a dispute that is central to contemporary philosophy.