Politics Finance And The Role Of Economics

There is a long-standing difference amongst public economists between those who think that collective choice must be formally acknowledged, and those who derive their policy recommendations from a social planning framework in which politics plays no role. The purpose of this book is to contribute to a meaningful dialogue between these two groups, in the belief that the future of both political economy and of normative public finance lies somewhere between the two approaches. Some of the specific questions addressed in the book include: does public finance need political economy? Should collective choice play a role in the standard of reference used in normative public finance? What is a 'failure' in a non-market or policy process? And what have we learned about the theory and practice of public finance from three decades of empirical research on public choice? The book also provides a practitioner's view of the political economy of redistribution.

Originally published in 1971, when nationalized industries employed about 7 per cent of the national labour force, created about 10 per cent of the gross domestic product and had annual investment programmes which were equal to those of all private manufacturing put together. Even this understates the scope of public enterprise at the time, since there were many other organizations, ranging from the BBC to the Public Trustee, which were semi-autonomous public enterprises, but not nationalized industries. Moreover, the public enterprise sector continued to grow, even under Conservative governments, and there were many reasons for thinking that no government would succeed in reversing this trend, for it was felt unlikely that, as government became more complex, it would disgorge many new activities which would be given a semi-autonomous, that is, public enterprise status. The author, drawing on personal experience, shows that the facts of ministerial and parliamentary control were very different from what the public and Parliament thought at the time. He describes the very great practical independence of the Boards and also how much Ministers had come to rely on persuasion (which not only can impose serious waste of time and money on both Boards and Government but is also inefficient). Ministers have least power where the aims of public enterprise are social rather than commercial. If there were no changes, the growth of public enterprise to achieve social purposes would mean an important decline in the power of Parliament and Ministers. This book explores solutions to this problem and concludes that the government must build up a cadre and capacity for financial control which at the time were lacking to it.

Since 2008, the financial sector has been the subject of extensive criticism. Much of this criticism has focused on the morality of the actors involved in the crisis and its extended aftermath. This book analyses the key moral and political philosophical issues of the crisis and relates them to the political economy of finance. It also examines to what extent the financial sector can or should be reformed. This book is unified by the view that the financial sector had been a self-serving and self-regulating elite consumed by greed, speculation and even lawlessness, with little sense of responsibility to the wider society or common good. In light of critical analysis by authors from a variety of backgrounds and persuasions, suggestions for reform and improvement are proposed, in some cases radical reform. By placing the world of finance under a microscope, this book analyses the assumptions that have led from hubris to disgrace as it provides suggestions for an improved society. Rooted in philosophical reflection, this book invites a critical reassessment of finance and its societal role in the 21st century. This book will be of interest to academics, politicians, central bankers and financial regulators who wish to improve the morality of finance.

The current literature on financial economics is dominated by neoclassical dogma and, supposedly, the notion of value-neutrality. However, the failure of neoclassical economics to deal with real financial phenomena suggests that this might be too simplistic of an approach. This book consists of a collection of essays dealing with financial markets'' imperfections, and the inability of neoclassical economics to deal with such imperfections. Its central argument is that financial economics, as based on the tenets of neoclassical economics, cannot answer or solve the real-life problems that people face. It also shows the direct relationship between economics and politics OCo something that is usually denied in academic models, given that science is supposed to be value-neutral. In this thought-provoking and avant-garde book, the author not only exposes what has gone wrong, but also suggests reforms to both the academic and the political-economic systems that might help make markets fair rather than efficient. Drawing on interdisciplinary fields, this book will appeal to readers who are interested in finance, economics, business, the political economy and philosophy. Sample Chapter(s). Foreword (37 KB). Chapter 1: Method and Methodology (146 KB). Contents: Method and Methodology; What is All Efficiency?; Still Autistic Finance; The Young Finance Faculty''s Guide to Publishing; Prolific Authors in Finance; For-Profit Education: An Idea That Should be Put to Rest?; Weep Not for Microsoft: Monopoly''s Fatal Exception; The Socio-Economics of Scandals; Desperately Seeking Toto; And Now for Something Entirely Different; After the Ball; Capitalism or Industrial Fiefdom; The Theory of Fair Markets (TFM): Toward a New Finance Paradigm. Readership: Graduate students of finance; students of economics, economic methodology and philosophy of science."

First published in 1999, this volume surveys economic theories of political mechanisms as well as political theories of the influence of the institutional context in which decisions about social economic policies are being made. In the first half of the seventeenth century the Dutch Republic emerged as one of Europe's leading maritime powers. The political and military leadership of this small country was based on large-scale borrowing from an increasingly wealthy middle-class of merchants, manufacturers and regents This volume presents the first comprehensive account of the political economy of the Dutch republic from the sixteenth to the early nineteenth century. Building on earlier scholarship and extensive new evidence it tackles two main issues: the effect of political revolution on property rights and public finance, and the ability of the nation to renegotiate issues of taxation and government borrowing in changing political circumstances.