Prince Of Darkness Richard Perle

At nearly every pivotal moment in international politics over the past twenty-five years–from the Reagan-Gorbachev summits, to the Iran-Contra scandal, to the collapse of the Soviet Union, to the decision to go to war in Iraq–if you dug deeply you would find a figure just behind the scenes influencing the action: that of Richard Perle. Largely eschewing senior cabinet appointments and other high-profile roles, the passionate, zealous Perle has been content to operate quietly—behavior which earned him the moniker of The Prince of Darkness. Nevertheless, his influence in Washington has helped to fuel an international disaster in Iraq and the growth of anti-Americanism worldwide. Alan Weisman, a former producer for 60 Minutes, CBS Sunday Morning, and the CBS Evening News, is now shining a light on this major political figure. While Perle has not authorized this biography, he has submitted to interviews with Weisman, encouraged his friends to do so, and provided non-classified material. Such access has granted Weisman a deep and critical insight into Perle’s methods and mindset. Weisman explores how Perle derailed a nuclear arms agreement between the U.S. and the then Soviet Union; his controversial business dealings; Perle’s tenure as Chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board during the present Bush Administration; and his role leading up to the Iraqi War, including his dealings with Iraqi exiles like Ahmed Chalabi. From the collapse of the Soviet Union to the current saber-rattling over Iran, Syria, and North Korea, Perle has put his stamp on almost every decisive event in international politics. This is an insightful and incisive study of the highest quality, and one that everyone—not just policy experts—should read. From Prince of Darkness, What People Say about Richard Perle: “We used to have major problems when Richard would wander off the farm and be caught doing things that were not consistent with the policies that [Caspar] Weinberger and [George] Shultz were trying to implement.”—Colin Powell, Secretary of State, 2001-2005 “Richard can take a really bad idea and make it sound almost plausible and reasonable, even brilliant.”—Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State, 1983-1985 “I really don’t understand Perle. If you talk about the real neocons, there’s Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, and they’re very different. Paul Wolfowitz is an idealist, but he’s prepared to impose democracy by the sword. I don’t think Perle gives a [bleep] about democracy. Fundamentally, it’s all a means to an end.”—Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor, 1989-1993

An inside look at the kingdom of Saudi Arabia discusses Wahhabism, the corruption within the Saudi royal family, its ties to terrorism, and the threat it poses to the Western world.

Ron Robin looks at the original power couple of strategic studies who, during the most dangerous military standoff in history, gained access to the deepest corridors of power. The Wohlstetters’ legacy was kept alive by disciples in George W. Bush’s administration, and their signature brilliance and hubris continue to shape U.S. policy today.

Taking the period from the end of the 1970s to the end of the 1990s, this book critically examines the evolution of the strategic relationship between the US and Turkey during this period, with a particular focus on the Middle Eastern context. Strategic Relations Between the US and Turkey employs interviews with US, Turkish and Israeli officials and archival research in order to offer an alternative reading of the realities that shaped bilateral co-operation through multi-level analysis. The unraveling of these realities enlightens the reader about the past course of events but also aids the understanding of the dynamics of the relationship today. Essential reading for students and scholars of U.S. and Turkish foreign policy, this study of co-operation between a super-power and a relatively weak state in the international system will also be of use to those interested in International Relations, Diplomatic History and World Politics more broadly.

More information to be announced soon on this forthcoming title from Penguin USA

Leo Strauss and his students have long been accused of mendacity, elitism, and militarism, but the Iraq War has prompted unprecedented levels of caustic and inaccurate denunciations. Inappropriate criticisms have issued from artists (Tim Robbins), politicians (Ron Paul), journalists (Joe Klein), and even highly lauded scholars such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Gordon Wood, Douglas Massey, Stephen Holmes, Anne Norton, Shadia Drury, Sheldon Wolin, John Pocock, John Yolton, Nicholas Xenos, and Brian Leiter. In Straussophobia, Peter Minowitz provides a methodical and detailed critique of the major offenders, especially of Drury, who maintains that Strauss established a 'covert tyranny' that would keep the Western world 'mired in perpetual war.' In replying to such charges_and to various authors who belittle Strauss's contributions as a scholar_Minowitz highlights the imaginative yet meticulous manner in which Strauss interpreted Thucydides, Plato, Xenophon, Farabi, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Carl Schmitt. Straussophobia also provides both a comprehensive assessment of Strauss's 1933 letter that commended 'fascist, authoritarian, and imperial' principles, and a compelling account of Strauss's influence, or lack of influence, on neoconservative promoters of the Iraq War (e.g., Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and Lewis Libby). The book likewise breaks new ground in employing diversity discourse to explain and combat the bigotry and buffoonery that pervade attacks against Strauss and Straussians_and in drawing on Strauss to illuminate the distortions that mar some widely-used arguments for affirmative action.

In the year after the September 11, 2001 attacks the Bush administration put together the elements of a far-reaching foreign policy doctrine based on unilateral action, pre-emptive military strikes, and prevention of the emergence of any strategic rivals to U.S. supremacy. Bush’s grand strategy was formalized in a September 17, 2002 presidential report called The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The report argued for pre-emptive strikes against rogue states and terrorists, even if faced with international opposition, and for the maintenance of American military supremacy. Additionally the report placed the U.S. off-limits to international law, asserting that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court "does not extend to Americans." Underlying the Bush doctrine is the notion that the U.S. must remain the unchallenged power in world affairs. "The United States possesses unprecedented – and unequaled – strength and influence in the world," the report began. Supremacy involves maintaining forces that "will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States." Many questions are raised by the trajectory of U.S. policy under George W. Bush. What is distinctive about the Bush administration’s militarism and unilateralism? What are the political, ideological, and economic roots of the turn in U.S. foreign policy under George W. Bush? In what ways has the "war on terrorism" affected politics inside the United States in terms of civil liberties, treatment of immigrants, domestic and economic policy, and political discourse more generally? The Politics of Empire examines critically these and other urgent political and analytical questions. This is a Special Issue of the Journal New Political Science

When President Clinton sent Richard Holbrooke to Bosnia as America's chief negotiator in late 1995, he took a gamble that would eventually redefine his presidency. But there was no saying then, at the height of the war, that Holbrooke's mission would succeed. The odds were strongly against it. As passionate as he was controversial, Holbrooke believed that the only way to bring peace to the Balkans was through a complex blend of American leadership, aggressive and creative diplomacy, and a willingness to use force, if necessary, in the cause for peace. This was not a universally popular view. Resistance was fierce within the United Nations and the chronically divided Contact Group, and in Washington, where many argued that the United States should not get more deeply involved. This book is Holbrooke's gripping inside account of his mission, of the decisive months when, belatedly and reluctantly but ultimately decisively, the United States reasserted its moral authority and leadership and ended Europe's worst war in over half a century. To End a War reveals many important new details of how America made this historic decision. What George F. Kennan has called Holbrooke's "heroic efforts" were shaped by the enormous tragedy with which the mission began, when three of his four team members were killed during their first attempt to reach Sarajevo. In Belgrade, Sarajevo, Zagreb, Paris, Athens, and Ankara, and throughout the dramatic roller-coaster ride at Dayton, he tirelessly imposed, cajoled, and threatened in the quest to stop the killing and forge a peace agreement. Holbrooke's portraits of the key actors, from officials in the White House and the Élysée Palace to the leaders in the Balkans, are sharp and unforgiving. His explanation of how the United States was finally forced to intervene breaks important new ground, as does his discussion of the near disaster in the early period of the implementation of the Dayton agreement. To End a War is a brilliant portrayal of high-wire, high-stakes diplomacy in one of the toughest negotiations of modern times. A classic account of the uses and misuses of American power, its lessons go far beyond the boundaries of the Balkans and provide a powerful argument for continued American leadership in the modern world.