Proliferation And Nonproliferation In Ukraine Implications For European And U S Security

Limiting nuclear proliferation is a vital goal of U.S. security policy. With this in mind, the Strategic Studies Institute cosponsored a conference at the University of Pittsburgh on March 16-17, 1994 to deal with the issues involved in achieving this objective. An additional U.S. objective is the stabilization of relationships among the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. These two issues come together in Ukraine which, upon achieving independence, found itself in possession of nuclear missiles that were positioned in the former Soviet Union and on Ukraine's territory. Ukraine was reluctant to relinquish control of them for security reasons. This monograph, presented at the conference, seeks to explain why Ukraine originally sought to retain the weapons and then, in 1994, agreed to dismantle them in return for compensation and the very limited security guarantees that exist under the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. The author also examines the nature of Russia's threat to Ukraine and the implications of the new agreement for U.S. policy vis-a-vis Ukraine and Russia.

When the Soviet Union collapsed the new Ukrainian state inherited the nuclear weapons that had been deployed on its territory. Through 1993 there was growing support in Ukraine for the establishment of a quid pro quo. Many Ukrainians felt that, in return for denuclearization, Ukraine should receive security and economic guarantees from both Washington and Moscow. Until then it would hold back on dismantling and transferring the weapons to Russia, signing the START treaties, and ratifying the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. But in January 1994, after considerable coaxing and pressure, Ukraine agreed with Russia and the United States to proceed along those lines. This monograph examines the reasoning behind that decision and the implications of it for Ukraine's security and for its relationship with the United States. Ukraine's primary reasons for retaining the weapons were to deter Russia and to obtain U.S. guarantees and attention. However, because it never even began successful economic reform, Ukraine's economic condition has sharply deteriorated--to the degree that it now finds itself menaced by both economic collapse and ethnic separatism by its Russian population, mainly in Crimea. Despite its best efforts, Ukraine did not secure binding American guarantees of security. Meanwhile, compensation for its expenses is contingent upon ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which has yet to be consummated. Ukraine's politics remain deadlocked as does its security profile and it increasingly seems that Kiev believes America will ease its demands for substantial economic reform in order to protect it against the Russian threat. That threat is a real one deriving its power from the omnipresent Russian denial that Ukraine is or should be a sovereign state. Russia has employed nuclear blackmail, economic warfare, political and diplomatic campaigns, and incidents in the Black Sea to isolate Ukraine, diminish its sovereignty, and induce, if not coerce, it back into a military-political union with Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Therefore, Moscow regarded the prospect of Ukrainian nuclearization with unfeigned alarm. And precisely for that reason Ukraine's weapons, like Russia's, were used essentially as instruments of political bargaining and deterrence.

Limiting nuclear proliferation is a vital goal of U.S. security policy. With this in mind, the Strategic Studies Institute cosponsored a conference at the University of Pittsburgh on March 16-17, 1994 to deal with the issues involved in achieving this objective. An additional U.S. objective is the stabilization of relationships among the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. These two issues come together in Ukraine which, upon achieving independence, found itself in possession of nuclear missiles that were positioned in the former Soviet Union and on Ukraine's territory. Ukraine was reluctant to relinquish control of them for security reasons. This monograph, presented at the conference, seeks to explain why Ukraine originally sought to retain the weapons and then, in 1994, agreed to dismantle them in return for compensation and the very limited security guarantees that exist under the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Leading international security scholars and policy advisors from universities, think-tanks, and nuclear weapons laboratories in the United States analyze the future of nuclear weapons proliferation. In April 1995, the earlier 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was renewed indefinitely and without change to the original clauses of the treaty. The authors examine the continuing relevance or irrelevance of the old treaty, the role of coercive sanctions in enforcing restraint, and the impact of biological, chemical and missile proliferation on the nuclear motives and ambitions of various states. Attention is given to proliferation conditions in the former Soviet republics, East and South Asia and the Middle East.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, fifteen newly independent states emerged from the imperial wreckage, some more ready than others to grasp their new found independence. This book tackles the seminal question related to these broader developments: why did some states choose to align with Russia, despite Moscow's overwhelming power advantage and recurrent neo-imperial ambitions? Eric A. Miller develops and tests a theoretical framework that extends traditional realist alignment theories to include domestic level political and economic variables critical to the study of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Specifically, Miller argues that internal political threats to CIS leaders and the extent of a country's economic dependence on Russia were the most influential factors in determining alignments. The volume is designed to meet the need for a thorough theoretical and scholarly assessment of the international and domestic politics of CIS countries.

Since the nuclear genie was let out of the bottle, nuclear weapons have been the exclusive domain of a select few countries. At the dawn of the next millennium, however, the notion that small countries and even a few individuals many acquire and use them, or threaten to, is a major concern. This annotated bibliography presents citations of the current book and journal literature which deal with this dangerous issue. Access is provided through subject, author and titles indexes.

In 1999 the EU decided to develop its own military capacities for crisis management. This book brings together a group of experts to examine the consequences of this decision on Nordic policy establishments, as well as to shed new light on the defence and security issues that matter for Europe as a whole.

This open access book examines key aspects of international cooperation to enhance nuclear safety, security, safeguards, and nonproliferation, thereby assisting in development and maintenance of the verification regime and fostering progress toward a nuclear weapon-free world. Current challenges are discussed and attempts made to identify possible solutions and future improvements, considering scientific developments that have the potential to increase the effectiveness of implementation of international regimes, particularly in critical areas, technology foresight, and the ongoing evaluation of current capabilities.