Proliferation And Nonproliferation In Ukraine

Limiting nuclear proliferation is a vital goal of U.S. security policy. With this in mind, the Strategic Studies Institute cosponsored a conference at the University of Pittsburgh on March 16-17, 1994 to deal with the issues involved in achieving this objective. An additional U.S. objective is the stabilization of relationships among the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. These two issues come together in Ukraine which, upon achieving independence, found itself in possession of nuclear missiles that were positioned in the former Soviet Union and on Ukraine's territory. Ukraine was reluctant to relinquish control of them for security reasons. This monograph, presented at the conference, seeks to explain why Ukraine originally sought to retain the weapons and then, in 1994, agreed to dismantle them in return for compensation and the very limited security guarantees that exist under the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. The author also examines the nature of Russia's threat to Ukraine and the implications of the new agreement for U.S. policy vis-a-vis Ukraine and Russia.

This book presents a comprehensive overview of Ukraine's nuclear history, beginning from its experiences within the Russian Empire in the early 20th century, through the Soviet period, to the emergence of Ukraine as an independent state that inherited the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal. The book discusses the development of the nuclear infrastructure on Ukrainian soil and offers a rich and nuanced background of how Ukraine became an important and integrated part of the Soviet nuclear infrastructure. It further analyzes Ukraine's nuclear disarmament based on extensive primary source material and places the Ukrainian nuclear reversal process in a larger international political context where Russia ́s, the United States, and other players ́ actions are interpreted in the light of the impact on the current nuclear non-proliferation regime. Finally, the book presents the nuclear-related development after the nuclear disarmament. It describes the integration of Ukraine into the international community and the role of nuclear power in the energy mix of the nation today. Concluding, Ukraine ́s adaptation to the new security situation after the Russian annexation of Crimea is described and discussed. This volume is a must-read for scholars, researchers, students, and policy-makers interested in a better understanding of Ukraine's nuclear history, the political background of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, as well as of security studies and international relations in general. The work on this book has been supported by the Swedish Radiation Authority (SSM) in the Nuclear History of Ukraine Project (2015-2019).

When the Soviet Union collapsed the new Ukrainian state inherited the nuclear weapons that had been deployed on its territory. Through 1993 there was growing support in Ukraine for the establishment of a quid pro quo. Many Ukrainians felt that, in return for denuclearization, Ukraine should receive security and economic guarantees from both Washington and Moscow. Until then it would hold back on dismantling and transferring the weapons to Russia, signing the START treaties, and ratifying the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. But in January 1994, after considerable coaxing and pressure, Ukraine agreed with Russia and the United States to proceed along those lines. This monograph examines the reasoning behind that decision and the implications of it for Ukraine's security and for its relationship with the United States. Ukraine's primary reasons for retaining the weapons were to deter Russia and to obtain U.S. guarantees and attention. However, because it never even began successful economic reform, Ukraine's economic condition has sharply deteriorated--to the degree that it now finds itself menaced by both economic collapse and ethnic separatism by its Russian population, mainly in Crimea. Despite its best efforts, Ukraine did not secure binding American guarantees of security. Meanwhile, compensation for its expenses is contingent upon ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which has yet to be consummated. Ukraine's politics remain deadlocked as does its security profile and it increasingly seems that Kiev believes America will ease its demands for substantial economic reform in order to protect it against the Russian threat. That threat is a real one deriving its power from the omnipresent Russian denial that Ukraine is or should be a sovereign state. Russia has employed nuclear blackmail, economic warfare, political and diplomatic campaigns, and incidents in the Black Sea to isolate Ukraine, diminish its sovereignty, and induce, if not coerce, it back into a military-political union with Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Therefore, Moscow regarded the prospect of Ukrainian nuclearization with unfeigned alarm. And precisely for that reason Ukraine's weapons, like Russia's, were used essentially as instruments of political bargaining and deterrence.

Limiting nuclear proliferation is a vital goal of U.S. security policy. With this in mind, the Strategic Studies Institute cosponsored a conference at the University of Pittsburgh on March 16-17, 1994 to deal with the issues involved in achieving this objective. An additional U.S. objective is the stabilization of relationships among the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. These two issues come together in Ukraine which, upon achieving independence, found itself in possession of nuclear missiles that were positioned in the former Soviet Union and on Ukraine's territory. Ukraine was reluctant to relinquish control of them for security reasons. This monograph, presented at the conference, seeks to explain why Ukraine originally sought to retain the weapons and then, in 1994, agreed to dismantle them in return for compensation and the very limited security guarantees that exist under the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This book presents a comprehensive overview of Ukraine's nuclear history, beginning from its experiences within the Russian Empire in the early 20th century, through the Soviet period, to the emergence of Ukraine as an independent state that inherited the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal. The book discusses the development of the nuclear infrastructure on Ukrainian soil and offers a rich and nuanced background of how Ukraine became an important and integrated part of the Soviet nuclear infrastructure. It further analyzes Ukraine's nuclear disarmament based on extensive primary source material and places the Ukrainian nuclear reversal process in a larger international political context where Russia ́s, the United States, and other players ́ actions are interpreted in the light of the impact on the current nuclear non-proliferation regime. Finally, the book presents the nuclear-related development after the nuclear disarmament. It describes the integration of Ukraine into the international community and the role of nuclear power in the energy mix of the nation today. Concluding, Ukraine ́s adaptation to the new security situation after the Russian annexation of Crimea is described and discussed. This volume is a must-read for scholars, researchers, students, and policy-makers interested in a better understanding of Ukraine's nuclear history, the political background of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, as well as of security studies and international relations in general. The work on this book has been supported by the Swedish Radiation Authority (SSM) in the Nuclear History of Ukraine Project (2015-2019).

Given their protracted economic difficulties, the nuclear and aerospace industries in Russia and Ukraine are tempted to export dual-use technologies that can contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile systems. John C. Baker proposes using international incentives to discourage irresponsible export behaviour while seeking long-term changes in the non-proliferation attitudes of their managers and government leaders.

This book presents a comprehensive overview of Ukraine's nuclear history, beginning from its experiences within the Russian Empire in the early 20th century, through the Soviet period, to the emergence of Ukraine as an independent state that inherited the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal. The book discusses the development of the nuclear infrastructure on Ukrainian soil and offers a rich and nuanced background of how Ukraine became an important and integrated part of the Soviet nuclear infrastructure. It further analyzes Ukraine's nuclear disarmament based on extensive primary source material and places the Ukrainian nuclear reversal process in a larger international political context where Russia ́s, the United States, and other players ́ actions are interpreted in the light of the impact on the current nuclear non-proliferation regime. Finally, the book presents the nuclear-related development after the nuclear disarmament. It describes the integration of Ukraine into the international community and the role of nuclear power in the energy mix of the nation today. Concluding, Ukraine ́s adaptation to the new security situation after the Russian annexation of Crimea is described and discussed. This volume is a must-read for scholars, researchers, students, and policy-makers interested in a better understanding of Ukraine's nuclear history, the political background of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, as well as of security studies and international relations in general. The work on this book has been supported by the Swedish Radiation Authority (SSM) in the Nuclear History of Ukraine Project (2015-2019).