Proliferation Threat And Response

Offers access to the 1997 "Proliferation: Threat and Response" report from the United States Department of Defense. Details nuclear, biological, chemical, and other weapon proliferation in Asian, Middle Eastern, and former Soviet areas. Provides access to related news releases and a press briefing transcript. Links to related sites.

Contemporary fears of rogue state nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism pose unique challenges for the global community. This book offers a unique approach by examining why states that have the military capability to severely damage a proliferating state's nuclear program instead choose to pursue coercive diplomacy. The author argues cognitive psychological influences, including the trauma derived from national tragedies like the September 11th attacks and the Holocaust, and a history of armed conflict increase the threat perceptions of foreign policy decision-makers when confronting a state perceived to be challenging the existing power structure by pursuing a nuclear weapon. The powerful state's degree of perceived threat, combined with its national security policies, military power projection capabilities, and public support then influence whether it will take no action, use coercive diplomacy/sanctions, or employ military force to address the weaker state's nuclear ambitions. Brian K. Chappell, PhD served twenty-eight years in the United States Air Force and is a veteran of the Afghanistan War. He is a career Nuclear and Missile Operations Officer and has served as a Middle East policy senior advisor to the Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

The intelligence community's flawed assessment of Iraq's weapons systems—and the Bush administration's decision to go to war in part based on those assessments—illustrates the political and policy challenges of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this comprehensive assessment, defense policy specialists Jason Ellis and Geoffrey Kiefer find disturbing trends in both the collection and analysis of intelligence and in its use in the development and implementation of security policy. Analyzing a broad range of recent case studies—Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons, North Korea's defiance of U.N. watchdogs, Russia's transfer of nuclear and missile technology to Iran and China's to Pakistan, the Soviet biological warfare program, weapons inspections in Iraq, and others—the authors find that intelligence collection and analysis relating to WMD proliferation are becoming more difficult, that policy toward rogue states and regional allies requires difficult tradeoffs, and that using military action to fight nuclear proliferation presents intractable operational challenges. Ellis and Kiefer reveal that decisions to use—or overlook—intelligence are often made for starkly political reasons. They document the Bush administration's policy shift from nonproliferation, which emphasizes diplomatic tools such as sanctions and demarches, to counterproliferation, which at times employs interventionist and preemptive actions. They conclude with cogent recommendations for intelligence services and policy makers.