Public Choice And The Challenges Of Democracy

This timely and important volume addresses the serious challenges faced by democracy in contemporary society. With contributions from some of the world's most prestigious scholars of public choice and political science, this comprehensive collection p

First published in 1991. This book initially offers a critique of some key rational public choice models, to show that they were internally inconsistent and ideologically slanted. Then due to the authors’ research the ideas are restructured around a particular kind of institutional public choice method, recognizing the value of instrumental models as a mode of thinking clearly about the manifold complexities of political life.

What is Public Choice "the use of economic tools to deal with traditional problems of political science" is what is meant by the term "public choice," additionally known as "public choice theory." An examination of political behavior is included in its scope of coverage. Within the realm of political science, the subfield of positive political theory is responsible for the investigation of self-interested agents and the interactions between them. These interactions can be represented in a variety of ways, including the utilization of game theory, decision theory, or standard limited utility maximization. Additionally, it serves as the intellectual basis for the work that is being done in the field of political economy today. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Public choice Chapter 2: Logrolling Chapter 3: Rational choice theory Chapter 4: Political economy Chapter 5: James M. Buchanan Chapter 6: The Calculus of Consent Chapter 7: Gordon Tullock Chapter 8: Government failure Chapter 9: Philosophy and economics Chapter 10: Economic methodology Chapter 11: Social Choice and Individual Values Chapter 12: Virginia school of political economy Chapter 13: Robert Tollison Chapter 14: The Myth of the Rational Voter Chapter 15: Public economics Chapter 16: Rational irrationality Chapter 17: Vincent Ostrom Chapter 18: Constitutional economics Chapter 19: Altruism theory of voting Chapter 20: Benefit principle Chapter 21: Efficient Voter Rule (II) Answering the public top questions about public choice. (III) Real world examples for the usage of public choice in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Public Choice.

This volume contains a selection of Anthony Downs' essays, written since the 1950s, on politics and political theory. The articles address such issues as democracy, public choice theory, rational political decision-making and political policy.

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in public choice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined including a normative analysis of the simple majority rule, Bergson–Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibility theorems, Rawls's social contract theory and the constitutional political economy of Buchanan and Tullock.

In Policy Challenges and Political Responses, leading public choice scholars confront the most significant problems facing democratic societies at the dawn of the 21st century. Ranging widely across the policy spectrum, this authoritative volume demonstrates the vibrancy and continuing relevance of the public choice research program by applying its ideas and methods to constitution-making in the European Union, terrorism, the growth of government, political campaign finance, vote-counting technologies, participatory democracy, corporate governance, school choice, and tort reform. Essays assessing the present state of the social contract and the enduring tensions between capitalism, socialism, and democracy broaden the book’s perspective. The distinguished list of contributors includes James Buchanan, Charles Rowley, Dennis Mueller, Todd Sandler, Randall Holcombe, Michael Munger, Thomas Stratmann, Harold Mulherin, Lawrence Kenny, and Paul Rubin. Edited by two of the editors of the journal Public Choice and as fresh as today’s headlines, this volume positions the public choice literature in the context of current events and points its research agenda in new directions. It is a unique and indispensable collection of value to economists, political scientists, political philosophers, and public policymakers.

Reproduces 26 articles on public choice and public economics by Mueller, written over 20 years. Employing the contractarian-constitutional methodology of public choice, he examines the properties of several voting methods, representational systems and questions of equity and justice.

"Caplan argues that voters continually elect politicians who either share their biases or else pretend to, resulting in bad policies winning again and again by popular demand. Calling into question our most basic assumptions about American politics, Caplan contends that democracy fails precisely because it does what voters want. Through an analysis of American's voting behavior and opinions on a range of economic issues, he makes the case that noneconomists suffer from four prevailing biases: they underestimate the wisdom of the market mechanism, distrust foreigners, undervalue the benefits of conserving labor, and pessimistically believe the economy is going from bad to worse. Caplan lays out several ways to make democratic government work better.